Guderian: Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker? (review)

After the Second World War, how the English-speaking world looked at the war was shaped by a number of influential memoirs penned by former German officers. Among the more notable of these were Erich von Manstein's Lost Victories (aka Boy, Was I Brilliant) and F. W. von Mellenthin's Panzer Battles. Few were more influential, however, than Heinz Guderian's Panzer Leader.

Published in Germany in 1951 under the title Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, Guderian's memoir was translated into English and published the following year as Panzer Leader. The book proved remarkably influential in shaping perceptions as to how the German Army created its panzer arm, and Guderian's role in that process. This perception was aided by the publication, especially in the United States, of numerous books on the German Army and Air Force written by people who did not read German, or were unfamiliar with the German document collections at the U.S. National Archives.

Over the past twenty years, however, the image of Guderian as the premier armor theorist in the interwar German Army has been attacked by a number of military historians in this country, including Williamson Murray, James Corum, Robert Citino, and this reviewer. The latest work in this effort is Russell A. Hart's monograph on Guderian. In its essence, Hart's book is a sustained attack on Guderian's reputation as a military theorist, field commander, and, especially, as a memoirist. Hart suggests that, while Guderian was an important armor theorist, he was by no means the only one and that Guderian's stature as Germany's premier armor theorist rested on his self-serving memoir. As a field commander, Hart argues that Guderian's successes from 1939 to 1941 were as much a matter of luck as of skill. Finally, Hart repeatedly shows where Guderian fibbed in his memoir.

In regard to Guderian's relationship with the Nazi regime, Hart suggests that Guderian was less a Nazi than a "Hitlerite." While Guderian was very much an ardent right-wing nationalist, he never bought into Nazi ideology. Rather, he was personally beholden to Hitler, who was supportive of Guderian, and who gave him, like every other German general, sizeable bribes to insure loyalty.

Hart uses contemporaneous documents to show where Guderian was putting forth outright lies in his memoirs. More commonly, he shows where Guderian conveniently forgot to mention any number of things, such as Hitler's bribes, that would have been rather embarrassing, to say the least. The monograph does have its problems. Hart's criticisms at times can be too sweeping. Granted, Guderian's career as a field commander was marked by sheer good fortune. This, however, can be said of just about every successful field commander. Likewise, Hart suggests that Guderian's criticism of the reorganization of German panzer divisions in 1941 has been uncritically accepted by "virtually every military historian." To back this claim, however, Hart cites only one work. This suggests that the book was written in a bit of a hurry.

This monograph is certainly not the definitive biography of Guderian, and I do not think the author had that goal in mind. As a corrective to one of the more mendacious memoirs of the Second World War, Hart's work clearly hits the mark.