There is an increasing feeling that current arms control regimes are somehow failing. If we are to improve these nonproliferation measures, we need to examine how states acquire weapons of mass destruction in today's environment where technological know-how is diffusing around the world. This essay looks for commonalities between how developing states, such as Iraq and Libya, have produced a wide spectrum of WMD and what the most important factors were in either their success or failure. The surprising result is that clandestine networks, made famous by the renegade Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan, play major roles in the proliferation of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, by selling complete production facilities. We also find that a major determinant of success is how much training shop-floor workers receive. Both of these are bad news for nonproliferation regimes in a world where technology and know-how are quickly spreading.


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pp. 92-103
Launched on MUSE
Open Access
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