Turkish-Greek Relations: From Uneasy Coexistence to Better Relations? A Retired Ambassador Takes Stock

The last decade of the twentieth century has been described rightly as an especially tumultuous one for Turkish-Greek relations. The near war over Kardak/Imia, the confrontation over the Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles in Cyprus, the opposition of Greece to Turkey's European Union application, and the Ocalan affair in 1999, among other events, made the 1990s a particularly turbulent period. The reasons for this state of affairs are varied and complex; regional and global as well as domestic factors combined to make the 1990s a testing time for Ankara and Athens. There is no doubt that the end of the Cold War impacted the bilateral relationship, as the neighborhood of both countries was transformed with the collapse of communist regimes in the Balkans and the Caucasus. In looking back to the 1990s, particularly the decade's first half, one can see that Greece's reaction to post-Cold War regional changes was discordant and mistrustful. A case in point is how Greece reacted to Balkan developments by voicing support for Serbia. By comparison, Turkey's response to the end of the Cold War was more optimistic than Greece's, in particular owing to the collapse and peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union. Turkey was enthused about new opportunities for expanding its influence in regions where expansion had been unimaginable for many decades: the Caucasus and Central Asia, for example. However, there was also considerable apprehension in Turkey regarding the implications of the new regional and international order that was emerging. Turkish leaders were wary of getting involved in conflicts in their neighborhood: hence, Ankara's cautious reaction to Balkan developments, including the war in Bosnia, where the tragedies that were visited upon the Bosnian Muslims sparked enormous compassion among the Turkish people. However strong the emotional support of Turks for Bosnians, Ankara steered away from any kind of unilateral response in the Balkans, whether in Bosnia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, or Kosovo.

In fact, the overriding interests of both Turkey and Greece in their respective neighborhoods did not diverge in major respects. In the Balkans, for example, the two neighbors valued stability, which is why neither had relished the prospect of the Yugoslav dissolution. The Turkish-Greek aggravation in the Balkans in the 1990s had more to do with the enduring mistrust between Ankara and Athens than with a major divergence of interests. Here, domestic politics played a substantial role. In the case of Greece, in particular, governments found it more politically expedient to portray an expansionist Turkey than to explore ways in which the two countries could respond cooperatively to the emerging crises in their vicinity. In Turkey, too, with the departure of Turgut Ozal as prime minister in 1991 and the succession of weak coalition governments in Ankara, the domestic environment was unsuitable for any kind of initiative for better relations with Greece. Ironically, it took the tragedies of the earthquakes of mid-1999 to offer an opportunity to turn a new page in Turkish-Greek relations and to launch a new rapprochement.

Déjà Vu: The 1980s Experience

The ups and downs of Turkish-Greek relations in the 1990s bring to mind previous episodes of confrontation and bids for diplomatic breakthrough that the two neighbors experienced. The 1990s may have been especially daunting in Turkish-Greek relations, but except for the short-lived Davos initiative late in the decade, the 1980s were hardly any more favorable in making headway toward improvements in the bilateral relationship. I was able to witness relations between the two countries first-hand as Turkey's ambassador to Greece from 1984 to 1989.

My posting to Athens was at a time when Turkish-Greek relations were at a very low ebb. Before I left for Athens, Prime Minister Ozal instructed me to assure the government and people of Greece that Turkey does not...