The Caspian Region and Middle East Security

Recent discussions on Middle Eastern security have highlighted the emergence of a New Middle East, inspired first, to a certain extent at least, by Shimon Peres's usage of the concept to designate the region as a place where cooperation could replace political competition. ¹ In fact, in the post-Cold War world the nomenclature of international politics as well as its conceptual patterns and definitive notions have been transformed; words like region and frontier have taken on new shades of meaning. It is to be expected that these transformations are reflected in the Middle East and that interpretations will differ when one attempts to describe the new characteristics of the region.

There are certain factors and processes that lead to some optimistic evaluations of Middle Eastern security. The foremost development that suggests a new and more secure Middle East is the Arab-Israeli peace process. Depending upon the degree of rapprochement between Israel and some of its opponents in the Arab world, some analysts foresee a peaceful future for the region. Considering the gradual integration of Israel into the region--its evolution from a geocultural and then a geopolitical alien to a recognized regional entity--prospects for normalized, nonhostile strategic relationships may seem possible. In fact, for a short period of time, the Madrid and Oslo summits reinforced this inclination toward optimism. However, two factors make this prospect unrealistic. One is the negative developments that have occurred in the peace process, especially the tenure of Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel and the lack of support he gave to the peace process during his government. His successor, Ehud Barak, could not successfully restart the peace process, and such a turn does not seem possible under Ariel Sharon, who is considered a war criminal by the Arab world. The continuation of Israeli settlement policies and the delay of withdrawal from the West Bank have prevented expectations of peace from being fulfilled.

The other factor making optimistic predictions for the peace process unrealistic is the falsity of using the process itself as the central criterion and the ultimate condition for security in the Middle East. The perceived centrality of the peace process creates a false impression that the settlement of Arab-Israeli problems represents the end of chronic insecurity in the region. Although peaceful resolution of problems between Israel and its neighboring Arab countries is one of the most important conditions for enhanced security, there are many other dynamics and strategic trends that define security in the region. Middle East politics are characterized by a large number of territorial disputes, ethnic and religious clashes, intra-Arab problems, civil wars, and intense competition for oil and water. There will be major variables defining the future of security in the region even if the Arab-Israeli peace process ends with real success.

Economic and development trends in the Middle Eastern countries also contribute to the optimistic accounts of security in the region. Modernization, increasing levels of literacy, better education conditions, and some tendency toward political reform and relative liberalization of economics in varying degree in different countries imply a promising picture of security. Paradoxically, these developments themselves may create a situation that would be just the opposite of what these optimistic accounts expect from them, for at least some of the positive indicators contain within themselves inherent destabilizing effects. Given the fact that many of the Middle Eastern regimes lack a genuine basis of political legitimacy, these reformist trends may further erode their stability and the existing balances within their polities. Increased literacy and education open new channels and more informed attitudes for questioning political structures. A variety of disturbing prospects, then, confront both regional actors and extraregional powers like the United States, especially at a time when these indigenous regimes try to emphasize their state-national identities and preserve their separateness in strategic calculations. ² Neither regional countries nor the United States have the courage and intention to cope with a potential crisis that...