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  • John Brown Engineering: Power Contractors to the World
  • M.W. Kirby
John Brown Engineering: Power Contractors to the World. By John Hood. Pp. 115. ISBN 0-9547453. Aker Kvaerner. 2004. £10.00.

This short, well-illustrated book charts the fluctuating fortunes of John Brown Engineering (Clydebank)—JBE—formed in 1966 as a wholly owned subsidiary of John Brown and Company. This was the result of the decision of the parent board to separate its shipyard and engine works establishments in advance of the publication of the Geddes Report which recommended the establishment of the Shipbuilding Industry Board endowed with funds to facilitate the rationalisation of the ailing British shipbuilding industry as a whole. At its inception, JBE negotiated a sub-contract agreement with the large American gas turbine manufacturer, GE, and it was this relationship that enabled JBE to move from its original marine engine base into the expanding market for heavy-duty gas turbines. By the mid-1970s, JBE was one of the largest gas turbine manufacturers outside the USA and possessed an impressive international market presence, including Europe, Africa, the Middle and Far East and North and South America. Further expansion was precipitated by the growing market for oil pipeline turbines and, from the early 1970s onwards, the exploitation of North Sea oil and gas. In the latter context, JBE formed JBE Offshore Limited as a wholly-owned subsidiary devoted to the construction of platform modules and associated equipment.

The first check to JBE's advance occurred at the end of the 1970s in the face of declining orders and profitability in an intensely competitive market: substantial redundancies took place at Clydebank, complemented by managerial restructuring. This was to set the tone for the remainder of JBE's existence with the ongoing financial problems of the parent company providing a further source of instability. Indeed, the parent company was the subject of successive takeover bids and was absorbed by the construction conglomerate Trafalgar House in 1986. From this point onwards JBE began to flourish once more with a sequence of highly successful overseas contracts: profitability rose and the workforce expanded continuously to 1994 when a maximum establishment of 1,800 was reached. The denouement for JBE was prompted by two developments: the imposition of financial penalties amounting to £30 million as a result of delays in completing the Keadby Power Station in North Humberside; and the takeover of Trafalgar House by the Norwegian conglomerate, Kvaerner AS, in 1996. Renamed Kvaerner Energy Limited (KEL), JBE lived under the constant threat of rationalisation as the new parent company sought to eliminate loss-making subsidiaries inherited from Trafalgar House. With orders hard to obtain, the inevitable occurred in 1999, when KEL was put up for sale. Within the Scottish business and political community, and with the support of former JBE executives and the workforce, there were valiant efforts to find a buyer, all of which failed, with the result that the original JBE Clydeside plant closed in March 2001. [End Page 373]

This is a salutary tale of the experience of a distinctive branch of the British engineering industry as the contraction of the manufacturing base gained momentum into the 1970s and 1980s. In its heyday, over the divide of 1970, JBE had substantial marketing and engineering achievements to its credit (including several Queen's Awards for export achievement). The early relationship with GE paid dividends in facilitating JBE's entry to the growing market for power generation plant and the provision of oil and gas line turbines. Markets were buoyant in the Commonwealth, and Middle and Far Eastern countries in receipt of huge oil revenues could embark upon ambitious power generation projects. But even in this context, JBE was subject to cyclical instability in terms of the order book and profitability, fully in conformity with the historic experience of the British engineering industry as a whole. In addition, the initial reliance on GE technology proved to be an ultimate source of weakness as the technological sponsor weakened its links with Manufacturing Associates with the aims either of takeover or closure. In its final years of existence, JBE was afflicted by loss-making contracts of huge proportions and after...

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