Policy toward Algeria after a Decade of Isolation

After a decade of extraordinary turmoil, and despite continuing violence, Algeria shows signs of recovery and assertiveness on the international scene. Its reemergence and the rediscovery of the country's traditional foreign policy activism is likely to have important implications for North Africa, the Mediterranean region, and the West. In general, and despite widespread fears, Europe and the United States were not seriously affected by the Algerian crisis. Algeria's reemergence, alongside unresolved internal strains, will now present a new set of challenges for policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic. In many respects, Algeria will be a country to watch over the next few years. The country takes itself seriously, and others will have good reasons to do so as well. The United States and Europe need a concerted approach to a reemerging Algeria.

Western Fears Unrealized

In retrospect, the crisis in Algeria has had relatively little effect on European and American security. In the early stages of the Algerian nightmare, Western observers, especially in France, were alarmed by the potentially significant security consequences of the turmoil. Several concerns were prominent in this context, but so far none has developed to the extent many analysts feared. The first and overarching concern was the possibility of a government collapse and the advent of an Islamic regime in Algiers. In retrospect, this scenario seems far-fetched, but in the early 1990s, against a background of active Islamist movements elsewhere, the potential for Algeria to become the "next fundamentalist state" was taken seriously in many quarters. ¹ A separate but related debate focused on whether an Islamic Algeria would behave as a moderate or radical state and the regional consequences of a radicalized Algeria. Given Algeria's size, resources, and sporadic nuclear ambitions, these questions became central to discussions of Mediterranean security and policy toward political Islam, above all in Southern Europe but also in Washington.

A second concern was the potential for large-scale refugee movements as a result of an Algerian collapse. From 1992 onward, French observers in particular began to speculate about the risk of uncontrolled migration across the Mediterranean as French-speaking Algerians fled political violence and economic collapse. In fact, there has been relatively little migration as a result of the Algerian crisis, in part because of the formidable barriers to legal migration and the frequent closure of Western consulates in Algeria. Illegal migration from North Africa in general has slowed over the past decade, confounding dire predictions, and the Algerian crisis has had little effect on this trend. The crisis-driven migration that has taken place has been felt largely in Morocco and Tunisia, not in Europe.

A third and more serious concern involved energy security. Spain, Portugal, France, and Italy have become increasingly reliant on natural gas imports from Algeria. Natural gas is a favored fuel, and new pipelines, including a line from Algeria to Spain via Morocco completed at the height of the violence in Algeria, have facilitated growing European imports. ² European companies are major stakeholders in Algerian energy projects. Unlike oil, gas remains essentially a regional commodity, with limited scope for adjustment in the event of supply disruptions. The energy security question provided reasonable grounds for worry, but there have been very few attacks on oil and gas facilities or pipelines and no significant interruptions in supply to the European market. Tight security in remote locations, together with the absence of a compelling logic for energy attacks by Islamic insurgents, have kept energy security problems at bay.

Finally, and more credibly, there was concern about the spillover of terrorism and political violence outside Algeria, affecting the security of Europe and North America. Millions of Algerians reside in France or elsewhere in Europe. Groups such as the armed wing of the FIS (the Islamic Salvation Front) and the GIA (Armed Islamic Group) had established networks for fund raising, arms smuggling, and political advocacy in Europe. French officials were especially...