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  • Computers and Commerce: A Study of Technology and Management at Eckert-Mauchly Computer Company, Engineering Research Associates, and Remington Rand, 1946–1957
  • Atsushi Akera
Arthur L. Norberg . Computers and Commerce: A Study of Technology and Management at Eckert-Mauchly Computer Company, Engineering Research Associates, and Remington Rand, 1946–1957. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005. x + 347 pp. ISBN 0-262-14090-X, $40.00 (cloth).

Arthur Norberg's Computers and Commerce is a much-needed study of the technical and business history of the Eckert-Mauchly Computer Corporation (EMCC) and Engineering Research Associates (ERA). Although there have been many historical studies about IBM, there have been relatively few accounts describing the firm's primary competitors or of the early formation of the industry. Norberg's study offers valuable insights into the latter by providing a detailed history of the technical decisions and financial strategies of the two entrepreneurial firms that helped create the modern computer industry. Although both firms enjoyed only limited success—both were acquired by a larger, established corporation, namely Remington [End Page 855] Rand, to settle their debts and to provide the working capital necessary to produce a going concern—Norberg presents credible evidence that the technical efforts and sales efforts of these firms defined the overall structure of the digital computers market and compelled bigger firms to enter the industry earlier than they might have done otherwise.

The book offers two chapters each on EMCC and ERA, followed by a chapter describing Remington Rand's fitful efforts to integrate the two firms into its corporate structure. For those unfamiliar with the history of computing, it should be noted that the EMCC (which began as the Electronic Controls Company in 1946) was created by J. Presper Eckert, Jr. and John Mauchly, inventors of the first general-purpose digital electronic computer. The "Univac" became a household word synonymous with computers before the ascent of IBM, producing much intrigue about whether Remington Rand squandered their opportunity by failing to appreciate their position within the nascent digital computers market. Norberg's analysis more or less follows earlier interpretations on this score. Nevertheless, his detailed history of corporate decision-making in these three firms provides a much more precise understanding of the circumstances and interpersonal dynamics that prevented Remington Rand from making a more successful entry.

The more novel evidence presented in this book concerns the passages pertaining to ERA. Established in St. Paul, Minnesota as a spin-off of a naval computing laboratory created during World War II, ERA operated primarily as a captive engineering shop for the Navy and other U.S. military agencies. This was itself a novel arrangement, similar to the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California. It generated new institutional and managerial challenges that were part and parcel to the task of creating an expanded national infrastructure for Cold War R&D. ERA operated in this unique and emerging market. ERA's aspirations in the digital computers field were also supported in good measure by the Office of Naval Research, a naval unit whose mode of operation was substantially influenced by academic institutions. Although Norberg does not make the direct connection, much of ERA's difficulty in operating under Remington Rand, then later Sperry Rand, drew from these more tradition-bounded firms' failure to appreciate the new kind of market in which ERA did business. William Norris, as the vice president in charge of ERA after the acquisition, did complicate matters by trying to enter a commercial market in which Remington's other acquisition, EMCC, wished to maintain dominance.

Norberg's book stands as a strong study in the history of computing, answering many questions about the early history of the computer [End Page 856] industry. However, those who approach Computers and Commerce strictly from the standpoint of business history may find the book somewhat difficult. Much of the book is written as a detailed technical history, and although Norberg makes the claim that this technical history is essential for understanding the managerial issues, the connections are not always explicitly drawn. Norberg's interpretations and intuitions regarding managerial strategy also appear occasionally as somewhat naïve, which is consistent with his principal background in...

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