Letters to the Editor
We are always pleased to have letters to the editor because this shows that people are reading our Journal seriously. However, due to space limitations, we ask that letters be kept under 500 words.
To the Editor:
I wish to thank Dennis M. Conrad of the Naval Historical Center for his positive and generally fair review of my book, The Southern Strategy: Britain's Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia, 1775–1780 (JMH 70 [July 2006]: 828–29). While there are several points of disagreement that I have with Mr. Conrad's review, I most strongly object to his assertion that: "Wilson relies almost exclusively on secondary sources and printed primary accounts for [his] narratives." This is an inaccurate statement and unjust mischaracterization of my research.
Contrary to Mr. Conrad's assertion, secondary sources comprise the smallest part of my research materials (roughly 10 percent of the citations in the book) as a cursory examination of the endnotes will reveal. The vast majority of the sources that I used were published primary accounts. More importantly, Mr. Conrad failed to mention my extensive use of manuscript documents which included diaries, letters, strength returns, casualty returns, maps, and other documents—all of which are fully documented in my endnotes and bibliography.
There are over 100 references to manuscript documents in the book, many of which have never been published before. Indeed, I selected several of the most important of these documents and made eight pages of them available as appendices to the chapters on the battles of Savannah and Stono Ferry. I find it difficult to understand how these selections of original research could be overlooked, given that they were presented in such a prominent manner. Therefore, while I appreciate Mr. Conrad's positive review, it is an empirical fact that secondary sources comprise only a fraction of my research materials, and that the vast majority of my research consists of primary accounts and manuscript documents.
To the Editor:
Thank you for Kimberly Kagan's well-argued essay on "Redefining Roman Grand Strategy" (JMH 70 [April 2006]: 333–62). She is indeed correct that much of this material has not been put before an English-speaking audience of nonspecialists. Even if one could master all the products of the annual limes conferences on frontier studies (a daunting task indeed) one would not necessarily have a better view of Roman grand strategy.
There is one glaring lacuna in her otherwise masterful essay, however, and that is the role of strategic intelligence (or lack thereof) in formulating grand strategy. Ms. Kagan points out that the Romans formulated grand strategy even if they did not have the vocabulary or modern insights to do it the way the Pentagon might. The same can be said of intelligence collection. As Sun Tzu rightly pointed out, what allows an intelligent government and wise military leadership to overcome others and achieve extraordinary accomplishments is foreknowledge.
Although there was a time when the materials on ancient intelligence were even more obscure than limes reports that is no longer the case. Several recent studies could have been consulted. Austin and Rankov's Exploratio (Routledge, 1995) came out a decade ago, and my Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome (Frank Cass, 2005) made the material accessible for a general audience. Even the obscure secondary works have been collected and explained in Espionage in the Ancient World: An Annotated Bibliography (McFarland, 2003). Consulting these works and their conclusions on the role of intelligence in formulating grand strategy would have made Kagan's argument much stronger. This may seem like a minor point, but in our information age it is an important one.
Lexington, Virginia
Professor Kagan responds:
I am grateful for Rose Mary Sheldon's thoughtful comments on Roman grand strategy. Her remarks advance the argument that grand strategy is a process of allocating resources to meet policy objectives, rather...
