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  • ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army
  • Dale Andrade

South Vietnam's military, known as the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam), has gone down in history as one of the most ineffective military organizations in modern times. This book does nothing to alter that view. Brigham largely corroborates the conclusions of many other historians that the South Vietnamese were no match for their Communist enemy, writing that "ARVN was never more than a collection of individuals" (p. 55).

However, readers looking for a military history of the ARVN will not find it here. In the preface Brigham warns that this is a "social history" that looks "beyond the battlefield" and into the daily lives of the soldiers, and at this level he does a fine job. The book is divided into chapters on conscription, training, morale, battles, and family, each one full of details on life in the ARVN and the formidable problems faced by soldiers, all brought to life by the author's many interviews. There is a particularly useful examination of the stark differences between South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese morale.

Unfortunately, the book's social approach, combined with its short [End Page 1107] length and corresponding lack of military focus, inevitably leave too many areas unexamined. There is no order of battle (rarely is an ARVN unit mentioned by name), no discussion of its organizational structure (not even a chart), and almost no combat chronology. Indeed, the North Vietnamese order of battle gets more attention here than does that of the ARVN.

Any examination of the ARVN—social or military—must examine the underlying causes of the South Vietnamese defeat, and Brigham does this well. It comes as no surprise that he blames the South Vietnamese government's illegitimacy and corruption, as well as poor leadership within the ARVN, for South Vietnam's defeat. However, there is a new twist here. Beneath the incompetence and corruption, claims Brigham, the ordinary soldiers fought for something else. "Exhausted, demoralized, and continually defeated," he writes, "ARVN struggled to find meaning in the war. . . . They found it in their families." Brigham argues that "When officials in Saigon turned their backs and allowed the Americans to dictate the conditions of the war, most soldiers looked inward to find something worth defending" (p. 109).

There are two threads here. First, the average South Vietnamese soldier had lost faith in his own government and its ability to win the war, and moved from fighting for country to fighting for family. Perhaps, but it is clear that South Vietnamese soldiers always cared deeply for family, often keeping them close to base so they could maintain and protect them. Since the weaknesses inherent in the ARVN were ongoing, it is difficult to see how there was a point at which the Army as a whole became fed up with the politics of the war and switched to fighting purely to protect their relatives.

Second, although Brigham lays most of the blame for defeat squarely at the feet of the ARVN, he also notes that the Americans "took over" offensive operations, leaving the ARVN to deal with "security missions" (p. 63). What else could be done? Security forms the basis of counterinsurgency, and ultimately only South Vietnamese troops could really do the job of securing the South Vietnamese population. Indeed, if they had been doing the job up front there would have been no need for U.S. troops to take over. It is disingenuous to blame the Americans for "pushing aside" the ARVN after admitting that South Vietnam was on the verge of collapse, with the ARVN losing virtually every battle with the Viet Cong.

Ultimately, this book will be less-than-satisfying to military historians. While Brigham has broadened our knowledge of the lives of South Vietnamese soldiers, he could have done much more—especially given that this is a short book. Adding a few chapters dealing with the ARVN order of battle and organization, and the politics of the officer corps, and providing more detail on the South Vietnamese in combat, would have made this a more valuable addition to the historiography of the war.

Dale Andrade
U...

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