Response

1. What world hypothesis does Nagel propose?

Nagel asserts that ". . . the capacity of the universe to generate organisms with minds capable of understanding the universe itself is itself somehow a fundamental feature of the universe." This suggests at least the claim that the universe has a power to generate human minds, where "generate" means "is the efficient cause of" in Aristotle's sense. I shall refer to this capacity as the mind-making power.

Nagel's characterization of this power as "fundamental" suggests that it is irreducible in some sense. What sense? It is not "generated incidentally by a process that can be entirely explained by the operation of the nonteleological laws of physics on the material of which we and our environments are all composed." Apparently, this means that it can't be fully explained in terms of "quantum field theory." Nagel thereby disassociates himself from physicalists offering reductive explications of the mental order in terms of the material order.

On the other hand, he also disassociates himself from "religious" world views: "It is possible to accept a worldview that does not explain everything in terms of quantum field theory without necessarily believing in God." In particular, his hypothesis is compatible with "atheism" in the sense that it does not commit him to asserting the existence of a "divine person" or a "world soul."

What does he mean by "universe"? One interpretive alternative is that he is referring to the totality of things that happen to presently exist, whether necessary or contingent. A second is that he intends to refer to just that aspect or constituent of the universe which (i) persists through all temporal changes and (ii) is an ontologically ultimate factor (or set of factors) that, while accounting for the existence of everything else in the universe, is not itself ontologically accounted for in terms of anything distinct from itself. It seems to me that Nagel's pattern of referring to the universe as possessing inherent capacities suggests the second interpretation. I shall refer to this ontologically ultimate factor (or set of factors) as the ground of being.

Thus, Nagel's hypothesis can be formulated in terms of three component propositions:

(1) The ground of being possesses a mind-making power.

(2) That power is not reducible to matter.

(3) The ground of being itself has no consciousness or mental capacity.

2. What arguments does Nagel offer for his hypothesis?

I can't find any explicit arguments, but perhaps he has in mind something like this:

(1) The hypothesis of reductive materialism is epistemically unacceptable because it can't account for the existence of the mental order.

2) The hypothesis of theism is epistemically unacceptable to many thoughtful people for a great variety of reasons and, in any case, isn't genuinely explanatory.

(3) Nagel's hypothesis avoids the inadequacies of both the others.

(4) Hence, it is epistemically preferable.

Many questions could be raised. I shall focus upon just one. Nagel's hypothesis is epistemically preferable only if it's internally consistent. Is it?

3. Is Nagel's world hypothesis internally consistent?

His hypothesis is internally consistent only if its three component propositions are compatible. Nagel obviously presupposes their compatibility, but offers no argument. The compatibility question I shall take up is whether the third is compatible with the first and second.

There is a traditional metaphysical principle that, if accepted, could easily motivate a negative response. Aristotle says, "The agent of change will always bring with it some form, which will either be 'such-and-such a thing' or 'such-and-such a quality' or 'such-and-such a quantity', and this form will be the principle and cause of any change that the agent of change produces. For instance, it is an actual man who creates a man out of that which is potentially a man" (Physics, Bk. III, 202a9-12). In the course of commenting on Aristotle, Aquinas...