Nabokov, Time, and Timelessness: A Reply to Martin Hagglund

I respond to the two parts of Martin Hägglund's "Chronophilia: Nabokov and the Time of Desire" in different ways. I note that the second half, on Ada, advances claims for its own original treatment of time in Ada without knowing that much of what it argues has been discussed at length by critics for over twenty years. The first part of Hägglund's essay observes that Nabokov is an avowed chronophiliac, a lover of time, and a chronophobiac, in that he dreads the loss of things in time. But Hägglund then accuses me of foisting on Nabokov a desire to transcend time, to escape from the prison of time, which he thinks is my personal philosophy of time and not Nabokov's. It is not mine, but it is Nabokov's, quite explicitly, and many things about timelessness that Hägglund wishes to claim are logically impossible are actually demonstrated in Nabokov works Hägglund does not know, does not remember, or suppresses. A philosophical character in Nabokov's The Gift muses on the limits of mortal human knowledge: "'You will understand when you are big,' those are really the wisest words that I know." Hägglund seems to think he is already big, and understands. Nabokov thought that we are all still small, and imprisoned in time, and do not know enough, and might discover much more if only we could get outside our confinement. He did not claim to know the answers, but, unlike Hägglund, he did not think we should close off the questions.