Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat (review)

Book shelves groan with the many books on military aviation, mostly written by, and aimed at, the layman and buff. In contrast, Why Air Forces Fail is directed at a much broader audience and is written by specialists. While perhaps less than half of these authors may be known to readers of this journal, they are highly qualified, as their essays demonstrate. They provide an analytical coverage of their topics, rather than a narrative history, put their subjects into context by delving into the background of the respective air forces, and center a significant portion of their discussion on the less exciting yet vital aspects of military aviation such as plans, production, airfields, logistics, and management, rather than operations. The eleven chapters cover the Austro-Hungarian and German air forces in World War I, the British, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Polish, Soviet, and U.S. air forces in World War II, as well as the Arab and Argentinian air forces in the post-1945 period.

This study highlights the greater ability of a major power possessing sufficient economic resources and geographic space or a strategic buffer to absorb and survive an initial defeat, contrasted with a smaller nation without these assets. Why Air Forces Fail also underscores the fact that the aggressors usually win the short wars but lose the long ones. Another striking element is the importance of timing. The French, Italian, U.S. (in 1941–42), and Argentine air forces would certainly have performed better had these conflicts been fought at a different time. This collection is most notable, however, for its tendency to shift the focus from operations to infrastructure, which thus far has been terribly neglected.

Why Air Forces Fail can be faulted for two of the typical problems of this genre, which so often features various authors writing on a loose theme. First, the quality of the essays varies from very good to disappointing. Second, some will criticize the choice of chapter topics and the ensuing balance. There is no explanation of the method of topic selection, which may have resulted from space constraints, availability of authors, or judgment of importance. The resulting product consists of one essay dealing with World War I, eight with World War II, and two (one on the Falklands War and one on the Arab-Israeli wars) that differ from the others because they cover events outside of the European/African and Pacific theaters of World War II. Therefore, this collection can be criticized more for what is absent than for what is present. Other subjects that might have been treated include the Republican air force in the Spanish Civil War, the North Korean (or Chinese or Soviet) air force in the Korean War, the combatants in the Indo-Pakistani Wars, the U.S. air forces in Vietnam, and perhaps even the Iraqi air force in the three Gulf Wars. With the exception of the first of these, this addition would have tilted the book away from its European and pre-1945 orientation into a much broader chronological and geographic survey. Another criticism concerns the lack of citations, although each chapter does include short, useful concluding sections entitled "Suggestions for Further Research" and "Recommended Readings."

Overall this is an excellent book that will have both appeal and value to a wide range of readers. The topics cover a broad spectrum, the essays are well done, and perhaps most of all, this collection will stimulate thinking along new lines. Consequently, Why Air Forces Fail is one of the more interesting and better books on military aviation to appear in the last few years.