Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (review)

Few pundits would suggest that Soviet-American struggles from a half-century ago provide much insight into the post 9/11 world. Yet Ken Osgood's comprehensive examination of President Eisenhower's use of propaganda at home and abroad in the 1950s demonstrates that 2005 headlines involving the "Lincoln Group" secretly planting fake pro-U.S. news stories in Baghdad newspapers have their origins in the Cold War.

Osgood convincingly argues that total war was the defining experience for the generation of Americans who led the U.S. during the early Cold War. While these men recognized that the advent of thermonuclear weapons meant that military force could not be employed as it had been in the past, no such constraints applied to the battle for the hearts and minds of those throughout the world. Covert operations, cultural and educational exchanges, book publication and distribution, space exploration, and scientific cooperation could all be employed safely and effectively in this conflict.

Total War begins by exploring the theory and practice of propaganda and early American psychological warfare efforts. It then recounts the major themes, campaigns, and operations of America's propaganda battles during the 1950s—Atoms for Peace, Open Skies, People-to-People program, and the space race. In the process it examines the key role played by private groups and individuals in the pursuit of the Eisenhower administration's ideological warfare campaign as well as the preeminent part played by Eisenhower himself. Osgood breaks new ground in shifting his focus from tales of psychological operations to foment unrest behind the Iron Curtain to the broader effort to win the hearts and minds of people in the free world. Through extensive archival research examining records from roughly three dozen countries, he shows that Eisenhower's main effort was centered on retaining or winning over the support of allies, noncommunists, and neutrals. Osgood excels at demonstrating how distinctions between propaganda intended for "domestic" and "international" audiences were meaningless. U.S. psychological operations were premised upon the total war notion that public opinion at home needed to be agitated and organized to sustain national morale for the long struggle.

Osgood's examination of how Eisenhower waged cold war and the way the military was drawn into this approach will be of particular interest to JMH readers. Total War also offers valuable insights for those engaged in the Global War on Terrorism, from the challenges confronted to the actual propaganda means and methods used. Total War is not without its shortcomings. Osgood credits Eisenhower with more vision and coherence in his strategic thought than the historical record seems to support. Moreover, his vision of how psychological warfare should be waged—as evidenced by the 1956 Hungarian Uprising and the role of Radio Free Europe—was not always shared or correctly implemented by his subordinates, a gap not fully explored by Osgood. Nonetheless, Total War would be a welcome addition to any personal or institutional library. Well written and beautifully illustrated, this book provides engaging reading for anyone interested in the Cold War, psychological warfare, information operations, or the views and policies of the thirty-fourth president.