This research explains why Mexico's 1968 student movement ended in the massacre of hundreds of students, while the peasant revolts that followed won land reform from the state. I argue that because Mexico's presidents managed each movement with both repression and concessions, other factors beyond the state's political opportunity structure explain these sharply contrasting social movement outcomes. The evidence strongly suggests that while Mexico's version of authoritarianism increased the odds of repression, each movement's levels of organization, disruption, and framing strategies determined the forms and degree of state violence. The analysis shows how politically salient frames may decrease the odds of repression or increase the odds of political alliances with state elites. It follows that political opportunities are more dynamic and dialogically emergent than previously theorized.


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pp. 197-229
Launched on MUSE
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