Abstract

Despite normative and legal injunctions against targeting civilians in war, as well as doubts regarding the effectiveness of such strategies, belligerents have frequently turned their guns on noncombatants. Two variables—desperation to win and to save lives on one's own side in protracted wars of attrition, and the intention to conquer and annex enemy territory—explain this repeated resort to civilian targeting. According to the desperation logic, costly and prolonged wars of attrition cause states to become increasingly anxious to prevail and to reduce their losses. Adopting a policy of civilian victimization permits states to continue the war while managing their losses and hopefully coercing the adversary to quit. In the appetite for conquest model, by contrast, belligerents specifically intend to seize and annex territory. Attackers in this model employ civilian victimization to eliminate enemy civilians, who can threaten the aggressor's immediate military position and present a future threat of rebellion. Multivariate analysis of interstate wars between 1816 and 2003 corroborates the importance of these factors, and a case study of the British starvation blockade of Germany in World War I supports the plausibility of the desperation mechanism.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1531-4804
Print ISSN
0162-2889
Pages
pp. 152-195
Launched on MUSE
2006-05-08
Open Access
No
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