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  • Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher
  • Nicolas Russell
Ann Hartle , Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. 303. $60.00.

Following the example of Montaigne, Professor Hartle claims to have written something completely new: a book that treats the essayist as a genuine philosopher in the deepest sense of the term. French philosophers, admittedly of a different breed, have given Montaigne a good deal of attention, but their American cousins have on the whole ignored him, treating him at best as a marginal figure in the history of philosophy. Hartle goes against this trend, claiming that Montaigne "takes up the most fundamental philosophical questions in a profoundly original, comprehensive, and coherent way" (1).

The starting point for Hartle's analysis of Montaigne's philosophy is an irreverent passage from the "Apology for Raymond Sebond," where Montaigne describes his attitude toward philosophical discourse and calls himself an "accidental philosopher." Hartle develops the notion of accidental philosophy and uses it to provide a general and comprehensive account of Montaigne's thinking. Accidental philosophy is the discovery of pre-philosophical truth that is a part of everyday, non-philosophical life. Its method is dialectical and circular: it starts by considering the common opinions, customs, and habits of everyday life, then sets these in opposition to theoretical learning, and finally returns to the experience of everyday life and sees it anew, recognizing a truth in this experience that was always there.

In support of her description of Montaigne's philosophy, Hartle presents a broad overarching argument that takes into account, on the one hand, several formal aspects of the Essays—such as Montaigne's use of quotation and example, the dialectical and circular nature of his arguments, and the nature of the essay genre—and, on the other hand, Montaigne's thinking in a wide range of philosophical fields—such as metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, religion, ethics, and politics. Hartle's numerous illustrations of accidental philosophy do not present us with a systematic philosophical method but rather with several interconnected habits of mind, joined not by logical relations but by Montaigne's own character.

Readers of this volume will take a particular interest in chapters 7-8 of Hartle's study, which focus on Montaigne's ethics. We can recognize several characteristics of accidental philosophy in [End Page 111] Montaigne's distinction between the philosophical notion of virtue and the more common notions of naïve goodness or innocence, a distinction that Hartle describes as central to Montaigne's moral philosophy. Naïve goodness chooses the good instinctively whereas philosophical virtue chooses the good through reason and the will, overcoming the temptations of human nature through a process of self-mastery. However, Montaigne claims that the most perfect soul incorporates virtue into habit and no longer needs to struggle against nature but instinctively acts virtuously. Thus, it comes to resemble natural goodness (199-203).

The broad scope of Hartle's argument does not leave room for close, detailed readings of particular essays, which is unfortunate since the complex structure and style of individual essays is so much a part of Montaigne's intellectual character. This, however, does not diminish the accomplishment of Hartle's book, which is an important and welcome addition to Montaigne scholarship.

Nicolas Russell
Smith College
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