Discourse of Silence (review)

This slim volume treats the neglected and difficult subject of silence in a very careful and particular fashion. Recognizing that silence can have many meanings depending on context, Kurzon is careful to define the particular contexts he takes on. While the discussion addresses only small parts of the larger topic of silence in discourse, the careful delimitation allows K to address them meaningfully.

Avoiding mention of what he will not treat, K lavishes care on what he does discuss. The title, for example, is parsed in the three-page preface for its meanings as explored in the book. Ch. 1 constructs a semiotic analysis of silence as sign and opposing silence to speech, paralanguage, and kinesics, which is the grounding of K’s analysis. Abrief four-page literature review is idiosyncratic, especially regarding literature in psychology and conversation analysis.

The particular kind of silence K examines is that which occurs in dyadic interaction of question-answer adjacency sequence where silence is the response. Ch. 2 develops a linguistic modality analysis built in part upon the semiotic framework; K constructs a static model and transforms it into a process model for unambiguous interpretation of a silent response in normal discourse. The semiotic and modality analyses form the basis of discussion in Ch. 3 of silent responses in legal settings, with specific attention to the accused’s right of silence in American, British, French, and Israeli settings, centering on court cases involving legal definitions and interpretations of silent response on the part of the accused. The discussion of court cases demonstrates the powerful ultimate significance—which is neither semiotic nor modal, but legal guilt or innocence—of the way in which certain kinds of silent responses are interpreted. Determination by a British court that ‘silence is not positive conduct’ is in contradiction to K’s semiotic/modal process model where ‘silence is regarded very much as an activity, especially when the silence is intentional’ (57).

A discussion of the transitivization of silence grows out of the legal discussion and is extended into discussion of literary examples: ‘The authority or power to silence is found not only in the context of state organs, whether it be courts or governments . . . but also among individuals—journalists, news editors and writers for example’ (73). The last three chapters are devoted to ‘The silence and silencing of’ characters in various modes of artistic expression: fiction—Darcy in Jane Austen’s Pride and prejudice; biblical and musical—Moses in Genesis and in Arnold Shoenberg’s opera ‘Moses und Aron’; and film—primarily the character Benjamin in Mike Nichols’ film ‘The Graduate’.

In a two-page postscript, K acknowledges having moved out of the scope of his initial carefully delimited models, but by this point, he has convincingly demonstrated the legal and artistic power of transitivized silence.