Implications of the Accession of Cyprus to the European Union for Greek-Turkish and Euro-Turkish Relations

Convoluted and controversial developments preceded the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union on 1 May 2004. They demonstrated anew that important foreign power centers were bent on deciding, on self-serving grounds, the very nature of Cyprus's postoccupation regime. Their main instrument was the Annan Plan, named after United Nations secretary-general Kofi Annan, coupled with skillful propaganda and asphyxiating political, economic, and diplomatic pressures. While the plan's rejection by the Greek Cypriots on 24 April 2004 was their inalienable right, its exercise was followed by the orchestrated undermining of President Tassos Papadopoulos and further unconscionable pressures, tantamount to the "punishment" of the Republic of Cyprus.

While evaluating the effects of Cyprus's EU accession on Greek foreign policy—and, by implication, on Greek-Turkish and EU-Turkish relations—in this essay, I expose disingenuous (and immoral) features of current Cyprus-related mythology by crystallizing cardinal facts regarding the legally established substance of the Cyprus problem. These facts are also presupposed by the subsequent inquiry into whether Nicosia and Athens pursue rational policies regarding the peaceful and dignified resolution of their disputes with Turkey. After demonstrating that Ankara's current policies—two years after the ascent to power of Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan—remain arrogant and aggressive, I argue that the quality of Greek-Turkish détente and collaboration is connected to the Cyprus issue. Finally, I show the EU's opportunity to score a diplomatic triumph by mobilizing its legal culture and "Moralpolitik," as against the Realpolitik employed by some power centers toward Cyprus and Greece, which is cynically immoral and hostile to the postwar global legal regime.

The Puzzle

Cyprus has held center stage in Greek foreign policy since the early 1950s. Even after Cyprus's EU accession, and despite a recently broadened Greek foreign policy agenda, Cyprus remains at the heart of Greece's foreign relations for several reasons. First, 37 percent of the Republic of Cyprus's territory remains occupied by Turkey following the 1974 invasion. Second, more than 90 percent of all legitimate Cypriots residing today in the republic are hyphenated or ethnic Greeks. Third, Athens has long invested in détente and collaboration with Turkey, supporting warmly Turkey's EU orientation—for obvious mutual benefit—and expecting Ankara's change of course on Cyprus. And yet instead of reciprocating, and from behind superficial appearances, Ankara pursues not only a policy of blackmail in Cyprus but also revisionism in the Aegean Sea amounting to provocative expansionism. Therefore, the following puzzle arises: Given Turkey's passionate pursuit of EU membership, what could explain such policies toward Cyprus and Greece when both these countries are now EU member-states capable of raising decisive obstacles to Ankara's EU trajectory?

Addressing this puzzle, Greek and Greek-Cypriot analysts commonly advance three main theses:

1. Some Turkish elites—and especially the "pashas," as Eric Rouleau refers to Turkey's powerful generals¹ —do not really wish their country to accede to the EU;
2. Turkey traditionally counts on US and North Atlantic Treaty organization favoritism to tolerate and forgive its revisionist behavior; and
3. Turkey's policy makers first raise maximalist demands to appear accommodating in subsequent retreats.

All three theses contain or imply reasonable hypotheses. They are, however, inadequate to resolve the puzzle. Therefore, I argue that Ankara's troubling policies must be assessed by considering primarily some revealing aspects of its sui generis political culture. I would stress that Greek and Cypriot policy toward Turkey is solidly premised on international law norms and decisions, challenged or ignored by Ankara. Revisiting these premises will demonstrate, inter alia, precisely why the international community—until the Annan Plan—consistently censored and condemned Turkey's 1974 invasion and the illegal occupation. Thus, instead of rehearsing decades of convoluted history, I explain through international law pronouncements both why...