The Middle East: Unbearable Status Quo versus Unpredictable Changes

Let us put aside the literary phrase "We are brothers but others are dividing us.". . . We in Iraq and elsewhere are not brothers—there are problems we inherited from our own history and social makeup, which were not helped by oppressive modern regimes. . . . Let's be frank: the Shiites today scare the Sunnis; the Sunnis and the Shiites together scare the Kurds; and the Kurds scare the other minorities. . . . All the ethnic groups of Iraq have the responsibility of putting nation building above their selfish and conflicting calculations.

—Arab writer Hazem Saghieh

Of late, the Middle East, a region of considerable historical, political, economic, religious, cultural, and above all strategic importance, draws international attention primarily for all the wrong reasons. The birthplace of the world's three most prominent and widely followed monotheistic religions is increasingly becoming the worm of all forces of instability, violence, and even evil. Once heralded as the home of human civilization, it is now seen as the host of political illegitimacy, social intolerance, and religious militancy. Even those who benefit from the region are no longer able to escape from the harsher downsides of their associations with the Middle East. Each passing event merely accentuates and sharpens the debates over the internal crisis facing the region.

The context of the relationship between this region and the outside world, however, is neither new nor unprecedented. Left behind by European modernization, the Middle East never recovered from the consequences of the defeat, disintegration, and disappearance of the Ottoman Empire. The defeat of one of the greatest Islamic empires resulted in the formation of numerous and often unviable political entities and marked the end of one of the cornerstones of the Islamic empire: the office of caliphate, which symbolized the unity of the ummah. Imperial interests and colonial calculations, with their shortsightedness, prevented the post-Ottoman leaders of the Middle East from modernizing their societies. Political repression, often backed by the West, and economic largesse vis-à-vis their own citizens were considered sufficient by states to maintain reasonable stability and survival. Even periodic violent upheavals and coups did not bring about any fundamental change in the Middle East.

The 11 September attacks in the United States and their aftermath, however, were a reminder that the Middle East could no longer afford to ignore the unbearable status quo, a status quo that symbolizes the absence of political accountability and the lack of transparency. They opened eyes to the need for internal reforms that would address prolonged repression, nonrecognition of minorities and the denial of their basic needs, religion-inspired and -sanctioned political violence, and the growing internal tensions emanating from the disparities between public policies and popular expectations. Some of the features of globalization, such as technological achievements and growing population mobility, have significantly eroded the ability of most Middle Eastern rulers to present a sanitized version of internal peace, progress, and prosperity.

Similarly, the outside world could no longer afford to be indifferent toward the upheavals within the Middle East. Popular discontent that often transforms into violent protests not only undermines the region but also affects the peace and development of the rest of the world. Turmoil in the region has global resonance, and most of the outside world has been sucked into the Middle Eastern quagmire. As the Madrid bombings of 2004 and British elections of 2005 indicate, even domestic politics in Europe can be affected by the events in the Middle East. The erstwhile policy of maintaining "correct relations" with the government and ruling elites is no longer a safe strategy. The muted and carefully orchestrated American criticisms of President Hosni Mubarak should not be seen as an aberration or abandonment of erstwhile allies. The United States could not afford to repeat the mistake it made by backing the domestically unpopular shah in the late 1970s.

Likewise, Western imperialism, colonialism, or conspiracy theories are insufficient to explain the problems...