The Battle of the Bulge: Hitler's Alternate Scenarios (review)

This collection of counterfactual essays by Christopher Anderson, James Arnold, Kim Campbell, David Isby, Dr. Sean Maloney, Dr. John Prados, Peter Tsouras, Andrew Uffindell, and Charles Vasey looks at ten strategic events of the last year on the Western Front during the Second World War and provides the reader with alternative outcomes. Each essay is presented as history with appropriate documentation, the fictional endnotes are clearly marked, and the essays are accompanied by a brief description of what really happened. The quality of the essays varies but they are all entertaining and do lead the reader to think about possible alternative outcomes to the key strategic decisions of the war. Peter Tsouras, the editor, argues in his introduction that the strategic controversies represent roads not taken and that had they been taken the war would have been shorter and thousands of lives would have been saved. Perhaps he is right but the leaders of World War II could have made alternate decisions that led to a longer war, more death, and greater destruction. There is no evidence that alternate paths led only to victory. The problem with writing counterfactual history is the inability to accurately determine what is realistic and plausible.

The alternative histories have Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery taking Caen on D-Day; the Allies closing the Falaise Gap and ending the war early; General George Patton launching a narrow thrust through the Ardennes to win the war early; Field Marshal Montgomery getting across the Rhine, drawing in all the German reserves, and enabling the US to get to Berlin; German success in the Ardennes leading to a Soviet withdrawal from the war; a German commando unit destroying the U.S. 3rd Army Headquarters and the Canadian First Army stopping the Germans on the Meuse; Field Marshal Montgomery successfully holding the northern shoulder of the Bulge; and the Germans reinforcing the 7th Army and sending it against the U.S. 3rd Army to stop Patton and still lose.

The most effective use of counterfactual history here is the essay in which it is argued that the Germans could have moved a little faster and crossed the Meuse River if they had only encountered a little less friction and gotten a few breaks here and there. Counterfactual history is most useful at the tactical-operational level where one can attempt to reduce the number of variables. Could the Germans have reached the Meuse in greater numbers? Faster? The essay demonstrates they could have but argues that in the end the Germans still lose the battle due to Allied air power and logistical problems. The least effective essay starts with the key assumption that the Germans won a decisive victory in the Ardennes. There is no reasonable basis for such an assumption. Without air power and appropriate logistical support the Germans were not going to win in the Ardennes. Having made the assumption that the Germans won the Battle of the Bulge it is then argued that the defeat almost led to a Soviet takeover of the United States that was only averted by the U.S. Army staging a coup against the pro-Soviet President, Henry Wallace. This story starts with so many assumptions, many of which are at the very least implausible, that it is little more than fiction and of limited use to the historian.

The history buff or member of the general public looking for an entertaining read will find this book very interesting. The professional historian will find it of limited use.