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  • Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity
  • Steven E. Sidebotham
Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity. By J. E. Lendon. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-300-10663-7. Maps. Illustrations. Glossary. Notes. Bibliographical notes. Index. Pp. viii, 468. $35.00.

Lendon contends that the attitudes and battlefield behavior exhibited by classical Greek soldiers—primarily the heavily armed hoplite infantry in the [End Page 208] phalanx, but also cavalry and lightly armed skirmishers—and by Roman troops, both legionaries and auxiliaries, derived from seemingly contradictory exempla in their distant heroic pasts. In this respect his book complements V. D. Hanson's Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power (2001), which posits the military superiority of Western armies over adversaries throughout the centuries as the result of the ethos of the landed citizen-soldier, which is deeply rooted in Greek and Roman history. Lendon observes that the Greeks imitated the heroic behavior of warriors in the Iliad. The Romans also drew on the Iliad, as well as their own heroes from the period of the Monarchy (753–509 B.C.) and early Republic (first few centuries following the Monarchy) though later leaders also provided inspirational examples.

Lendon selects specific campaigns and individuals to illustrate his points. In the Greek period he focuses on the Persian War (480–479 B.C.), the Battle of Delium during the Peloponnesian War (431–404 B.C.), certain examples from the fourth century B.C., Alexander the Great's victory at Issus (333 B.C.), and some campaigns of the Hellenistic era (331–23 B.C.). For the Roman phase, Lendon covers some events in the early annals of their history, selected episodes from the Second Punic War (218–201 B.C.), the Battle of Pydna (168 B.C.) during the Third Macedonian War, some battles of Julius Caesar's Gallic and subsequent Civil Wars (58–45 B.C.), the Battle of Strasbourg (357 A.D.), and the emperor Julian II's (the Apostate) ill-fated Persian campaign of 363 A.D. The Roman defeat at Adrianople (378 A.D.) is also examined.

Lendon demonstrates that there was constant tension in the ancient Greek mind regarding how to fight an adversary, either fellow Greek or "barbarian." One-on-one confrontations, such as occurred among the heroes of the Iliad, were admired and emulated. Yet, balanced against this, cunning was also valued (cf. Odysseus) whereby vanquishing the foe relied as much on brain (outwitting him) as brawn. Direct and forthright confrontation on the one hand and stealth on the other were alternately valued and deemed appropriate in different circumstances. Use of stealth and cunning was, however, sometimes seen as undignified. Keeping in ranks, fighting as a team and holding one's ground, which was the sine qua non of Greek infantry phalanx battle for centuries and which required direct, unflinching confrontation with the opponent on the battlefield, were quite the opposite of the ideal of heroic single combat and of the more "indirect" approach to fighting implied by Odysseus's behavior. Yet these contradictory "methods" existed side by side well into the period of Alexander the Great and beyond; they were essential complementary approaches to glorifying and inspiring both the individual soldier and the army as a whole.

Tension between opposing traditions was apparent in Roman ranks as well. This could best be summed up as competition between the concepts of virtus and disciplina, between individual soldiers or small groups of soldiers taking the fight to the enemy on their own initiative contrary to orders or to the general wellbeing of the army as a whole vs. obedience to orders and the [End Page 209] maintenance of discipline, of holding one's position in the battle line at all costs. This was a tension that had to be kept in fine balance. Roman commanders shuddered when individuals or small groups took the initiative without higher sanction thereby potentially jeopardizing the situation. This could lead pell mell to disorganized fighting on the battlefield, such as was the case with the initial assault on temple mount in Jerusalem in 70 A.D. Yet...

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