Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism (review)

If I were teaching a course on biological weapons, I would make this book required reading for my students. It is a clear, well-written general survey of the history of the biological weapons (BW) programs developed by the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Japan, South Africa, and the U.S.S.R. In its coverage of bioterrorism, it eschews the sensationalism and fear mongering which surrounds much of the current literature on that frightening subject. Although chiefly based upon secondary sources, it taps a number of primary materials. This reviewer finds only one serious disagreement with Professor Guillemin's analysis. In summarizing the allegations made by the Communist countries that the United States used biological weapons in Korea, she concludes that: "The allegations are still a matter for study" (p. 100). Although old stories never die, these allegations (like those regarding the use of "Yellow Rain" in Southeast Asia by communist forces) are fodder for propaganda, not for serious scholarship.

Professor Guillemin's book stresses several key points central to an understanding of her subject. First, the BW programs were closely linked to chemical warfare programs. Second, biological weapons are essentially strategic weapons, designed to target civilians; their tactical utility on the battlefield is questionable. Third, she points out that it is impossible to distinguish completely between defensive and offensive research and development activities. Given the legal commitment of the United States and, as of December 2004, 153 state parties to the renunciation of the production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of biological weapons, this impossibility of distinguishing completely between offensive and defensive BW activities creates problems regarding compliance. How do nations know that their potential enemies are adhering to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention? Claims that the intent of a BW program is defensive are only persuasive to those who are willing to be persuaded. Suspicion and mistrust fuel arms races. The scuttling of the proposed BW verification protocol by the United States has tragically compounded this problem.

The major theme which dominates the author's analysis is the national security dilemma: how does a nation balance the need to protect legitimate national secrets with the need for openness in a democratic society? Professor Guillemin rightly points out that the BW programs of the United States, the United Kingdom, and other nations were developed in secret. Secrecy insured that BW policy, unlike the nuclear and chemical weapons programs, was never publicly debated. Moreover, in the current political atmosphere, dominated by fears of bioterrorism, the imperatives demanded by secrecy have assumed obsessive dominance. The dangers of such a continued course of action are evident. Too much secrecy can hamper defensive planning, coordination, and response in case of a BW attack. The first responders may be hindered during and after a terrorist attack by being denied the intelligence and information necessary for their rescue and recovery operations. Professor Guillemin, a firm believer in internationalist rather than unilateral solutions to the challenge posed by the BW threat, eloquently argues for the cause of greater openness in national security policy.