Abstract

In Vietnam during 1966 and 1967, the United States Army expended nearly half of its artillery ammunition in unobserved Harassment and Interdiction (H&I) strikes. By June 1970, the army had nearly eliminated H&I. The reasons for this shift inform the ongoing debate over American strategy during the Vietnam War. Although both General William C. Westmoreland and his successor, General Creighton W. Abrams, emphasized that poorly applied firepower could cause collateral damage, neither leader viewed H&I as inherently counterproductive. Indeed, both leaders responded to budgetary pressures, rather than concern over civilian casualties, when reducing H&I. Neither reduced H&I fire as part of a radical shift in strategy.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1543-7795
Print ISSN
0899-3718
Pages
pp. 91-122
Launched on MUSE
2006-01-09
Open Access
No
Archive Status
Archived 2010
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