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  • The End of the Silver Lining:A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance

Enhanced security ties between Washington and Tokyo since the mid-1990s, particularly during the past few years, have transformed the U.S.-Japanese alliance and reshaped the East Asian security environment. Although external threats to Japan today are at a historic low, the transformation has created room for Tokyo to pursue a more active and aggressive security policy. From dispatching troops to Iraq to listing Taiwan as one of the "common strategic objectives" between the United States and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan has shown increased assertiveness and willingness to work militarily with the United States. Impressed by Japan's enthusiasm and dynamism in promoting security cooperation, U.S. deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage, an enthusiastic proponent of strong U.S.-Japanese security ties, remarked satisfactorily on the achievements in the U.S.-Japanese alliance at the end of the first Bush administration: "[I]f you look back to where we were in 2000 and where we are now, oh, so many things have changed. So many things."1 Yet, as the United States and Japan have expanded their security ties to reflect changes in their respective threat perceptions and regional security strategies, strong concern has arisen in other countries.

This is particularly true in Beijing, which believes that enhanced security cooperation between Washington and Tokyo compromises China's security interests. For years, many Chinese analysts regarded the U.S.-Japanese alliance as a useful constraint on Japan's remilitarization. Developments since the mid-1990s and especially during the past few years, however, have convinced them that the alliance has become an excuse for Japan to pursue a more active security policy. Moreover, the "China factor" has played an [End Page 119] even stronger role in U.S.-Japanese security cooperation under the Bush administration than in previous years. Concern with checking rising Chinese power and deterring a possible Chinese use of force in the Taiwan Strait has caused Washington to push for more assertive Japanese security policy, shaping both the form and substance of U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. Indeed, as Beijing continues to expand its material power and influence in Asia, Washington has sought to balance China's rise through its campaign to return Japan to a "normal nation." Contrary to past policies, the United States is now driving rather than constraining Japan's rearmament. In the foreseeable future, short of a major adjustment of U.S. regional security strategy, the U.S.-Japanese alliance will act as a propellant of, rather than as a cap on, Japan's military development. At least as far as China is concerned, the bright side of the U.S.-Japanese alliance seems to be gone.

From Protégé to Partner: Redefining the U.S.-Japanese Alliance since the 1990s

The U.S.-Japanese alliance has come a long way, even since the mid-1990s when the Clinton administration redefined Washington's security ties with Tokyo. Revisions of the U.S.-Japanese defense guidelines in 1996 and 1997 transformed the former Cold War security arrangement from an instrument to protect Japan against external threat into one designed to cope with contingencies on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait, as well as for balancing against a rising China. Japan's role in the alliance expanded significantly as Tokyo moved from protégé to partner. Efforts to strengthen the alliance also reduced the possibility that Japan would pursue a security policy independent of the United States. Nonetheless, the Clinton administration exercised some caution by not overtly advocating that Japan revise its constitution and remove the ban placed by Article 9 on its rights of collective defense, which stands at the core of the "Peace Constitution" imposed by the United States after World War II. The scope of U.S.-Japanese security cooperation was focused on the Asia-Pacific region, defining the alliance's parameters as regional rather than global. Finally, although the Clinton administration worked hard to strengthen security ties with Japan, it also made efforts, particularly in its second term, to engage China to develop a "constructive strategic partnership." Such...

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Additional Information

ISSN
1530-9177
Print ISSN
0163-660X
Pages
pp. 119-130
Launched on MUSE
2005-11-22
Open Access
No
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