In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat (review)

Washington Post reporter Rick Atkinson has emerged as one of the best military history writers of this generation. Pulled from his research on the U.S. Army in World War II, Atkinson found himself "embedded" with the 101st Airborne Division's command group in the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. This book is far more than the subtitle, A Chronicle of Combat, would suggest. Atkinson's previous books (The Long Gray Line, Crusade, and an Army at Dawn), and his familiarity with Army leaders, qualified him more than any other journalist in Iraq to understand the dynamics of division command. The soldiers that the author accompanied were generals and field grade officers, those who are responsible for planning and directing operations with such competence that enlisted soldiers and junior officers do not die in vain.

For over two months, the author shadowed the division commander, Major General David H. Petraeus, from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to Baghdad. He was privy to almost all of his meetings and conferences and was present when battle reports, good and bad, arrived at headquarters. He interviewed officers in the division and brigade staffs and made it a practice to wander around and listen to soldiers' gossip and complaining. Atkinson routinely accompanied Petraeus around the battle area and was able to gain understanding as to what motivated this incredibly dedicated and professional commander. He sat in on all of the command's daily briefings and had access to V Corps situation reports and many other official documents. He enlarged this account by consulting a wide array of journal, newspaper, and scholarly articles. What emerges is a superb account of the difficult nature of command in an increasingly digital, sophisticated, political, and public environment. Technological superiority over the enemy counted for very little during sand storms, when the opponent behaved differently than expected, or if the commander did not even know whom he was fighting. In addition, one becomes acutely aware of the disparity between events on the battlefield and commentary by the political leadership for public consumption. Finally, the author clearly presents a picture of the competence and dedication of the Army's leaders. Atkinson's thesis is that these were professionals of whom the nation should be proud. His bias towards his "Screaming Eagles," however, does not make him a fan of the Bush administration. Mirroring the officers he interviewed, Atkinson is critical of decisions that sent the Army into war under dubious circumstances without sufficient combat power or logistical support. His most profound comment is that "They [the soldiers] were better than the cause they served"(p. 294).

This is an excellent read, as one would expect from a Pulitzer-Prize winner. This book is a must for anyone interested in the problems of command in the post–Cold War era. It will remain an essential source for anyone researching this conflict. I highly recommend it to readers of this journal.