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Stalinist Patriotism as Imperial Discourse: Reconciling the Ukrainian and Russian “Heroic Pasts,” 1939–45*

Serhy Yekelchuk

On 7 November 1941, Stalin concluded his Revolution Day speech by appealing to the Soviet people to draw inspiration from the “brave example of our great ancestors, Aleksandr Nevskii, Dmitrii Donskoi, Kuz’ma Minin, Dmitrii Pozharskii, Aleksandr Suvorov, and Mikhail Kutuzov.”¹ Notable for the absence of revolutionaries and Civil War icons, this list of Russian princes, defenders of the monarchy, and tsarist military leaders seems to have provided the multinational Soviet state a single heroic past with which to identify – the familiar Russian tsarist historical mythology. But, as Lowell Tillett demonstrated in his attentive reading of the then-available Russian-language publications, the state also promoted non-Russian martial traditions as long as they were subordinated to the dominant rhetoric of Russian patriotism within the ideological framework of the “friendship of peoples.”²

* Various incarnations of this article have been presented at the AAASS annual convention in St. Louis in November 1999, the Maryland Workshop on New Approaches to Russian and Soviet History in March 2000, and the Midwest Russian History Workshop in Chicago in October 2000. My sincere thanks go to all those who commented on these drafts, especially to two anonymous reviewers for *Kritika* and the journal’s editors. This article uses the Ukrainian spelling of all Ukrainian personal names, including those originally appearing in the Russian spelling in Russian documents. Similarly, all the Ukrainian place names are rendered in their Ukrainian form, with the exception of Kiev and the Dnieper that are standard English forms. This paper uses the following abbreviations for the names of the Russian and Ukrainian archives: RGASPI (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’noi i politicheskoi istorii), RGALI (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstva), TsDAHO (Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads’kykh ob’iednan’ Ukrainy), TsDAVOV (Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady i derzhavnoho upravlinnia Ukrainy), TsDAML (Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv-muzei literatury i mystetstva Ukrainy), and NAIU (Naukovyi arkhiv Instytutu istorii Ukrainy Natsional’noi Akademii nauk Ukrainy).

¹ *Pravda*, 8 November 1941, 1.

² Lowell Tillett, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 60–70. Still, his exclusive reliance on the Russian press sometimes overwhelms Tillett’s sophisticated argument about the “friendship” framework. At one point in his analysis of the war years, he concludes, “[w]hatever the fine points of distinction may have been between the new Soviet patriotism and old Russian nationalism, they were soon lost sight of in the great emergency” (61).

However, access to declassified archives and propaganda materials generated in a non-Russian republic provides a much more complicated picture of wartime Soviet patriotism. Ukrainian materials document the impressive growth of a distinct national mythology, which subsequently had to be reconciled with the Russian grand narrative within the framework of the “friendship of peoples,” yet never lost its significance as the historic foundation of Soviet Ukrainian identity. But the archival findings also shed an entirely new light on the inner workings of Stalinist culture and nationality policy. The local bureaucrats and intellectuals who interpreted the vague yet powerful signals from Moscow emerge as major players shaping Stalinist historical imagination. It was their interaction with the Kremlin, rather than simply Moscow’s totalizing designs, which produced the official line on non-Russian identities and national patrimonies. Moreover, the local ideologues and intelligentsia occupied the ambiguous position of mediator between the Kremlin and their non-Russian constituencies, and their survival and well-being depended on producing a socialist “national ideology” specific to their republic.³ This social group’s complicated relationship with the center, as well as the resulting cultural products, cannot be explained solely on the basis of familiar models of totalitarian controls or patron-client links. Insights from post-colonial theory are particularly helpful in making sense of the limits and possibilities of non-Russian patriotic culture under Stalinism.

This paper understands the Soviet experiment in constructing socialism in a multinational state as consisting of at least two stages with markedly different imagery and vocabularies. The original Bolshevik project laid claim to a kind of global universality based on class. Reconfigured by this core project, the essentially imperialist undertaking of keeping the nationalities of the Russian empire in a new state resulted in a program of nativization, endowing the toilers of various nationalities with presumably equal and full-fledged national institutions.⁴ However, Stalin’s turn to the “construction of socialism in one country” weakened the class ethos of Soviet ideology, and the emerging void was gradually filled by the default imagery of modern nations and nation-states.⁵

³ On the socialist polities’ need for “national ideology” and the role of intellectuals in its production, see Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaucescu’s Romania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). More generally on intellectuals and nationalism in Eastern Europe, see Michael D. Kennedy and Ronald Grigor Suny, “Introduction,” in *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*, ed. Kennedy and Suny (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 1–51.

⁴ The literature on “nativization” is voluminous. For an up-to-date, comprehensive treatment, see Terry Martin, “An Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923–1938” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1996).

⁵ A departure from Soviet identification with proletarian internationalism was an aspect of the general Stalinist turn toward conservative social and cultural values that the émigré sociologist

The “Stalin Constitution” of 1936 announced that exploiting classes no longer existed in the USSR. In fact, the notion of “class” had long been losing its utility for the state as a classification tool, precisely because the Bolsheviks had recast this sociological category to define an individual’s relationship to the state, as well as political rights and obligations.⁶ But in a “workers’ and peasants’ state” populated exclusively, at least on paper, by workers and kolkhoz peasants, the category of “class” lost its taxonomic value. Nationality then became the only universal label for classifying – and ruling – the Soviet populace.⁷ Not surpris-

Nicholas Timasheff famously diagnosed in 1946 as the “Great Retreat” from communism. Later scholars of the revisionist generation did not share Timasheff’s concept of communism, but adopted his term, while also explaining the process as a “Big Deal” between the Stalinist authorities and the new Soviet middle class. See Nicholas S. Timasheff, *The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia* (New York: Dutton, 1946); Vera S. Dunham, *In Stalin’s Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); and Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992). Both Timasheff’s theory and the “Big Deal” model invite further questioning, which cannot be undertaken in this article. It is interesting, however, that practically all accounts of the “Great Retreat” ignored contemporary developments in non-Russian republics. Nevertheless, as Yuri Slezkine has recently noted, high Stalinism did not reverse the policy of nation building in non-Russian regions. Since the mid-1930s, ethnicity became reified and all officially recognized Soviet nationalities were to possess their own “great traditions” – founding fathers, literary classics, and folkloric riches. See Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,” *Slavic Review* 53: 2 (Summer 1994), 414–52, here 442–47.

⁶ This argument is made by Sheila Fitzpatrick in “Ascribing Class: The Construction of Social Identity in Soviet Russia,” *Journal of Modern History* 65: 4 (December 1993), 745–70, where, referring to the tsarist social estate system in the last sentence of the article, she suggests “an intriguing possibility that the shadow of *soslovnost’* hung over the construction of national as well as social identity in the Stalin period.” This vision of “class” was originally articulated in Fitzpatrick’s 1988 article, “The Bolsheviks’ Dilemma: Class, Culture, and Politics in the Early Soviet Years,” *Slavic Review* 47: 4 (Winter 1988), 599–613, with critical comments by Ronald Grigor Suny and Daniel Orlovsky, 614–23. In his later work, Suny describes the same process while retaining class analysis as an analytical tool and stressing the role of the masses as historical agent. During the 1920s and 1930s, “the artificial manipulation of class categories and official restrictions on autonomous class activity undermined identification with and loyalty to class.” He then concludes that “with the emergence of an articulated civil society in the Soviet Union in the post-Stalin decades, identification with nationality was for most non-Russians a far more palpable touchstone than the eroded loyalty to social class” (Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993], 120–21).

⁷ Francine Hirsch has shown that the Soviet authorities had always used colonial (political and cultural, including ethnic classification) technologies in governing their multinational state (“The Soviet Union as a Work-in-Progress: Ethnographers and the Category Nationality in the 1926, 1937, and 1939 Censuses,” *Slavic Review* 56: 2 [Summer 1997], 251–78, and “Toward an Empire of Nations: Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet National Identities,” *Russian Review* 59: 2 [April 2000], 201–26). What interests me here is the difference between the two projects, the per-

ingly, nationalities ceased to be considered equal: those less important lost their territorial and cultural privileges; the remaining major peoples could be ranked in a hierarchy headed by the “great Russian people”; and a new category of “enemy nations” became possible.⁸ While in the 1920s the USSR was a state of equal nationalities and unequal classes, by the late 1930s it had become a state of equal classes and unequal nationalities, in which the party-state increasingly identified with the Russian nation.

The question of whether or not the Stalinist and post-Stalinist USSR was an empire has generated considerable debate in the literature. Most commentators agree that the Soviet Union was a composite state in which the center dominated many distinct ethnic societies, and that the relations of control, inequality, and hierarchy between the center and the periphery qualified the USSR as an empire. Not having been an ethnically “Russian empire,” the Soviet Union nevertheless pursued familiar imperial strategies of rule and exhibited recognizable imperial attitudes.⁹ Although the debate continues on the question of whether the USSR was a typical modern colonial empire, recent scholarship is more interested in finding out what new knowledge historians can generate by comparing the Soviet Union to other modern empires, and what fundamental characteristics of the Soviet system can be revealed by comparing the ways in which it and other empires sought to “civilize” their dominions.¹⁰

meable border between them located somewhere in the mid-1930s, in which these colonial technologies were used.

⁸ On the ethnicization of the Stalinist social imagination and the invention of “enemy peoples,” see Amir Weiner, “Nature, Nurture, and Memory in a Socialist Utopia: Delineating the Soviet Socio-Ethnic Body in the Age of Socialism,” *American Historical Review* 104: 4 (October 1999), 1114–55, and Terry Martin, “Modernization or Neo-Traditionalism? Ascribed Nationality and Soviet Primordialism,” in *Stalinism: New Directions*, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (New York: Routledge, 2000), 348–67.

⁹ See, most recently, Jörg Baberowski, “Stalinismus als imperiales Phänomen: Die islamischen Regionen der Sowjetunion 1920–1941,” in *Stalinismus: Neue Forschungen und Konzepte*, ed. Stefan Plaggenborg (Berlin: Arno Spitz, 1998), 113–50; Dominic Lieven, “The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 30: 4 (October 1995), 607–35; Alexander J. Motyl, “From Imperial Decay to Imperial Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Empire in Comparative Perspective,” *Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union*, ed. Richard L. Rudolph and David F. Good (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 15–43; Ronald Grigor Suny, “Ambiguous Categories: States, Empires and Nations,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 11: 2 (April–June 1995), 185–96; idem, *The Revenge of the Past*; Roman Szporluk, “The Fall of the Tsarist Empire and the USSR: The Russian Question and Imperial Overextension,” in *The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 65–93.

¹⁰ For the most recent discussion, see D. L. H. [David L. Hoffmann], “The Soviet Empire: Colonial Practices and Socialist Ideology,” *Russian Review* 59: 2 (April 2000), vi–viii; Paula A. Michaels, “Medical Propaganda and Cultural Revolution in Soviet Kazakhstan, 1928–41,” *ibid.*, 159–78;

This paper aims to push the discussion a step further by using insights from post-colonial theory to interpret Stalinist patriotism as an imperial discourse, and to analyze the complex entanglement of the Kremlin and non-Russian intellectuals in the shaping of Stalinist historical imagination. Recent work on empires and nationalism suggests that, far from being an assimilatory enterprise, an empire allows for an articulation of ethnic difference. Moreover, imperial rule necessitates the development of homogenizing and essentializing devices such as “India” or “Ukraine” that are useful both for imperial definitions of what is being ruled and for indigenous elites, who can claim a broad domain that their cultural knowledge qualifies them to govern.¹¹ Thus, Ukraine and other non-Russian republics remained distinctly different, albeit decidedly “junior brothers,” in a Soviet family of nations. Soviet Ukrainian ideologues and intellectuals both guarded their own historical mythology and promoted the meta-narrative of Russian guidance. In other words, understanding the Stalinist historical imagination as a subspecies of imperial discourse allows us to make sense of its hierarchy of national pasts.

Moreover, such an approach also sheds new light on the question of agency in Stalinist cultural production. In spite of the claims throughout post-Soviet Ukrainian historiography,¹² Stalinist representations of the Ukrainian past did not result from Moscow’s *diktat* and suppression of the “natural” national sentiment of the local intelligentsia. New archival evidence reveals that holding the party hierarchy in Moscow solely responsible for all ideological mutations in Ukraine is an over-simplification, for the republic’s bureaucrats and intellectuals played an active role first in developing new Soviet Ukrainian patriotism and then in harmonizing the Ukrainian historical mythology with the Russian. Nor can the material sustain an opposition between the local “servants of the regime”

Douglas Northrop, “Languages of Loyalty: Gender, Politics, and Party Supervision in Uzbekistan, 1927–41,” *ibid.*, 179–200; Hirsch, “Toward an Empire of Nations”; and Yuri Slezkine, “Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Socialism,” *ibid.*, 227–34.

¹¹ Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, ed. Cooper and Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 1–56, here 11–12; Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); V. Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988).

¹² See, for example, Vasyl’ Isakovych Iurchuk, *Kulturne zhyttia v Ukraini u povienni roky: Svitlo i tini* (Kiev: Asotsiatsiia “Ukraino,” 1995); Olena Volodymyrivna Zamlins’ka, “Ideolohichniy teror ta represii proty tvorchoi intelihtentsii u pershi povienni roky (1945–1947 rr.),” *Kyivs’ka starovyna*, no. 2 (1993), 73–80; Lesia Antonivna Shevchenko, “Kul’tura Ukrainy v umovakh stalins’koho totalitaryzmu (Druha polovyna 40-kh–pochatok 50-kh rokiv),” in *Ukraina XX st.: Kul’tura, ideolohiia, polityka*, ed. Viktor Mykhailovych Danylenko (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1993), 1: 119–30.

and cultural agents presumably promoting their national cause. Many of them, like Mykola Bazhan, Oleksandr Korniiichuk, and Pavlo Tychyna, alternated between ministerial positions and creative writing – and between promoting the national patrimony and denouncing it as nationalistic deviation. In many respects, the Ukrainian cultural agents of the time acted as classic indigenous elites who defined their difference and protected their cultural domain without challenging (and, in fact, facilitating and justifying) imperial domination itself.

The Ukrainian intellectuals of the time were neither natural Ukrainian nationalists terrorized by the regime into submission, nor simple cogs in the Stalinist ideological machine. Aside from the recently “reunited” Western Ukrainians, they were the generation of the 1920s for whom the construction of socialism and the Ukrainian national cause were potentially compatible projects.¹³ The private diary of the great filmmaker Oleksandr Dovzhenko, who was criticized in 1944 as a Ukrainian nationalist, and the later memoirs of the poet Volodymyr Sosiura, who suffered a similar fate in 1951, both testify to their authors’ sincere belief in socialism – as well as to their strong devotion to Ukraine.¹⁴ Within an imperial discourse, Soviet Ukrainian patriotism was hence articulated by the republic’s intelligentsia as a kind of Stalinist Ukrainian national idea.

Finally, this article analyzes the Stalinist patriotic discourse precisely as discourse, as a text that a society produced and interpreted. Because the party attempted to impose a tight ideological control over the public sphere, all interpretations were possible only within the limits marked by the acceptable Stalinist linguistic code. Furthermore, by the time of World War II, the thinking of many cultural agents was itself shaped by the Bolshevik ideology. Nevertheless, both the promotion of Ukrainian national patriotism and its subsequent reconciliation with the Russian master-narrative were accompanied by debates and frustrated by simultaneous alternative concepts of what constituted “orthodoxy” in the historical imagination. Far from being a coherent ideological doctrine, Stalinist imperial patriotism in the wartime period remained a contested discourse.

¹³ Thus, I share the understanding of the Stalinist subject that Igal Halfin and Jochen Hellbeck first formulated in their 1996 review article, “Rethinking the Stalinist Subject: Stephen Kotkin’s *Magnetic Mountain* and the State of Soviet Historical Studies,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 44: 3 (1996), 456–63. See also Halfin, *Class, Consciousness, and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999), chap. 4; Hellbeck, “Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi (1931–1939),” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 44: 3 (1996), 344–73; idem, “Speaking Out: Languages of Affirmation and Dissent in Stalinist Russia,” *Kritika* 1: 1 (Winter 2000), 71–96; Anna Krylova, “The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies,” *ibid.*, 119–46.

¹⁴ Oleksandr Dovzhenko, *Hospody, poshly meni syly: Shchodennyk, kinopovisti, opovidannia, fol’klorni zapysy, lysty, dokumenty* (Kharkiv: Folio, 1994); Volodymyr Sosiura, “Tretia Rota,” *Kyiv*, no. 1 (1988), 63–122 and no. 2 (1988), 69–122.

Stalin's Ethnic Patriots

By the end of the 1930s, many Russian princes, tsars, and generals who had been previously condemned as defenders of their class interests and exploiters of the people came to be praised as great statesmen, patriots, and military leaders.¹⁵ This rehabilitation involved a larger shift in the categories of historical analysis, with the Russian nation being added to, and later supplanting, class as the subject of historical narratives.

However, as Ukrainian materials show, similar ideological mutations were underway in the most populous non-Russian republic of the USSR. In Ukraine, official propaganda exalted the local equivalents of canonic Stalinist heroes Aleksandr Nevskii, Ivan the Terrible, and Peter the Great – Prince Danylo of Halych and the Cossack hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. Unlike the nobleman Pushkin, whose cult as the Russian national poet was reestablished only in 1937, the Ukrainian peasant-born national bard Taras Shevchenko had always been the Soviet icon as “rebel poet.” But from the late 1930s on, he was increasingly recast as the father of the nation. The Ukrainian media, literature, and the arts taught the population to identify with their great ancestors, the Cossacks, and with 19th-century nation-builders.¹⁶

In the best tradition of colonial narratives, the Ukrainian national history was written with the idea of Russian guidance in mind. In contrast to the 1920s, when Ukrainian historians and writers denounced tsarist colonial exploitation of their land, the late 1930s inaugurated the search for positive aspects of Russian imperial domination.¹⁷ While the Soviet Ukrainian nation was discovering its glorious national past, all episodes of anti-Russian struggle (such as Hetman Ivan Mazepa's rebellion against Peter I in 1709) were being either suppressed or condemned. Fortunately for Stalinist ideologues, the core event of Ukrainian historical mythology – the 17th-century Cossack war against Poland and the creation of the Cossack polity with Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi as its head – ended in the Cossack Ukraine's union with Muscovy in 1654, although the hetmanate preserved its autonomy and native elite for well over a century.

¹⁵ For details, see David L. Brandenberger and A. M. Dubrovsky, “‘The People Need a Tsar’: The Emergence of National Bolshevism as Stalinist Ideology, 1931–1941,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 50: 5 (1998), 873–92.

¹⁶ Serguei Ekelchik [Serhy Yekelchuk], “History, Culture, and Nationhood under High Stalinism: Soviet Ukraine, 1939–1954” (Ph.D. diss., University of Alberta, 2000).

¹⁷ Roman Szporluk, “The Ukraine and Russia,” in *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future*, ed. Robert Conquest (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 151–82, here 168–69; Stephen Velychenko, *Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia: Soviet-Russian and Polish Accounts of Ukrainian History, 1914–1991* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 138–46.

The rehabilitation of national heroes was not carried out by decree, but through the efforts of individual Ukrainian writers and historians who sensed new ideological currents and whose vision was open to public discussion.¹⁸ Initially, the debates centered on a contradiction between the Marxist principle of class analysis and the national-patriotic criteria by which the new great ancestors were chosen. The ideological reversal began with Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi – at once a symbol of Cossack glory and of union with Russia. Although Khmel'nyts'kyi had been previously denounced as a feudal seigneur who sold out the Ukrainian peasants to the Russian tsar and landlords, his possible restoration as a national hero was first signaled in the August 1937 Politburo communiqué on history textbooks, the same document that redefined the non-Russian peoples incorporation into the Russian empire from a colonial conquest to a “lesser evil.”¹⁹ The young Ukrainian playwright Oleksandr Korniiichuk, whose drama had already demonstrated his loyalty to the party, quickly completed a historical play, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi*, portraying the hetman as a great statesman and military leader, an essentially national hero who had liberated Ukraine from Polish oppression and created the Cossack state. (Significantly, the play did not stress the subsequent union with Muscovy.)²⁰ But precisely because the ideological turn was hinted at, rather than prescribed, Korniiichuk's vision of Khmel'nyts'kyi caused a debate.

¹⁸ The work by Kevin M. F. Platt and David Brandenberger shows that the rehabilitation of Ivan the Terrible by Russian intellectuals followed the same model (“Terribly Romantic, Terribly Progressive, or Terribly Tragic: Rehabilitating Ivan IV under I. V. Stalin,” *Russian Review* 58: 4 [October 1999], 635–54).

¹⁹ The commission registered the following major flaw in the manuscripts submitted to the textbook competition: “The authors do not see any positive role in Khmel'nyts'kyi's actions in the 17th century, in his struggle against Ukraine's occupation by the Poland of the lords and the Turkey of the Sultan. For example, the fact of Georgia's passing under the protectorate of Russia at the end of the 18th century, as well as the fact of Ukraine's transfer to Russian rule, is considered by the authors as an absolute evil, without regard for the concrete historical circumstances of those times. The authors do not see that Georgia faced at the time the alternative of either being swallowed up by the Persia of the Shah and the Turkey of the Sultan, or coming under a Russian protectorate, just as Ukraine also had at the time the alternative of either being absorbed by the Poland of the lords and the Turkey of the Sultan, or going under Russian control. They do not see that the second alternative was nevertheless the lesser evil” (*Pravda*, 22 August 1937, 2).

²⁰ Although Korniiichuk's later biographer maintained that he had commenced working on the play in 1935 and even spent some time researching in the archives, the writer's personal archive does not support this claim. The first rough copy of the drama, titled *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'ky: Heroica. Ukraine in the Seventeenth Century*, survived among other materials from 1938. Neither the play's content nor Korniiichuk's notebooks reveal any serious work with historical sources. The secret of the play's success was, rather, the result of a novel interpretation of familiar facts. See Ekaterina Nikolaevna Gorbunova, *Dramaturgiia A. Korneichuka* (Moscow: Iskustvo, 1952), 133; TsDAML f. 435, op. 1, spr. 33.

In late 1938, when the prestigious Malyi Theater company in Moscow accepted the play and went ahead with dress rehearsals, Korniiichuk was suddenly summoned to Moscow to answer to accusations that he had distorted history. The reviewer of the drama, the Moscow historian Vladimir Picheta, found that the text contained fictional characters and events and, more importantly, that the author did not present Khmel'nyts'kyi as a defender of landowners' class interests. The discussion of the play in the Malyi Theater on 16 October 1938 turned into a real battle over Khmel'nyts'kyi. Defending his emphasis on the national liberation rather than internal class struggle, Korniiichuk presented his work as a Soviet Ukrainian answer to Polish historical mythology. He reminded the audience of the famous 19th-century novel that had enshrined the Polish stereotype of the Ukrainian Cossacks, Henryk Sienkiewicz's *With Fire and Sword*: "That book argued that Ukrainians were beasts, infidels, that Poland was the master of Ukraine and that she should return to owning Ukraine ... It is not for nothing that the Polish fascists made that book a school text." The likelihood of a new war with Poland and Germany justified the promotion of Ukrainian national patriotism: "What other ideas do you want? And what kind of ideas are needed now, when the Polish gentry and the German fascists again intend to invade Ukraine, when the Ukrainian people might have to fight for their independence?"²¹

Korniiichuk prevailed over his critics. A further attempt by the literary critic Vladimir Blium to derail *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* by informing Stalin that it ignored the class approach to history failed. The Central Committee's Department of Propaganda and Agitation concluded that Blium had misunderstood the notion of Soviet patriotism.²² In the spring of 1939, both the Malyi Theater and several leading Ukrainian companies released the play. The republic's newspapers hailed *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* as a work developing in the spectator a "deep love, respect, and interest in our people's heroic past." *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* earned official approval and was staged by theater companies throughout the Soviet Union, including almost every theater in Ukraine. In 1941, the play received the highest Soviet artistic accolade, the Stalin Prize, First Class.²³

Historians were slower in adopting the new patriotic paradigm. While the Learned Council of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences' Institute of History de-

²¹ The minutes of the discussion are held at the archives of the Malyi Theater Museum and were not available to me. Quoted in Gorbunova, *Dramaturgiia A. Korneichuka*, 135, 137 and Iurii Svyrydovych Kobylets'kyi, *Kryla krecheta: Zhyttia i tvorchist Oleksandra Korniiichuka* (Kiev: Dnipro, 1975), 133–34.

²² RGASPI f. 17, op. 120, d. 348, ll. 63–71ob, 76–77. I would like to thank Karen Petrone and David Brandenberger for bringing this incident to my attention.

²³ *Komunist*, 1 April 1939, 3; Kobylets'kyi, *Kryla krecheta*, 149–51.

bated the new appraisal of Khmel'nyts'kyi, the resourceful Moscow writer Osip Kuperman (who published under the pen name K. Osipov), stole the historians' thunder by producing the first laudatory biography of the hetman, although the book's lionization of Khmel'nyts'kyi remained conditional. Throughout the text, Osipov stressed the hetman's "class interests" as a landowner and his cruel treatment of the Ukrainian toiling masses. Portrayed as a progressive event, the union with Russia was still labeled the "lesser evil."²⁴ In 1940, the Ukrainian historian Mykola Petrovs'kyi published the first scholarly revisionist account of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising, *The Ukrainian People's War of Liberation against the Oppression by the Poland of the Gentry and Ukraine's Incorporation into Russia (1648–1654)*. The book downplayed the internal class struggle, speaking of the Ukrainian people in general, and portrayed Khmel'nyts'kyi as a leader of the nation. At the same time, Petrovs'kyi presented the union with Russia as something like the teleological outcome of Ukrainian history: "The entire historical process, the entire history of Ukraine with inevitable logical succession led to the Ukrainian people's War of Liberation, to Ukraine's incorporation into Russia, to the unification with the fraternal Russian people."²⁵

In retrospect, this strategy of rehabilitating Ukrainian national history as a part of a larger imperial discourse by connecting it with the Russian grand narrative appears as a precursor of the later Soviet dogma. However, the leading Soviet historical journal, *Istoriĭ-marksist*, published a dismissive review of the monograph. The reviewer, A. Baraboi, himself a Ukrainian historian, plainly announced that Petrovs'kyi's theory "could not be characterized as Marxist." He doubted Cossack officers' early commitment to union with Russia and, more importantly, saw the book as failing to provide a Marxist critique of this class. According to Baraboi, the class struggle was the "inner moving spring of all historical developments in 1648–1654," whereas Petrovs'kyi turned a blind eye to the "class tensions" between Khmel'nyts'kyi and the "leader of the peasant

²⁴ On the prewar debates at the Institute of History, see TsDAHO f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 121; spr. 121, ark. 12. (These are later references to the discussion of which no documentary traces survived.) Osipov's book appeared in the prestigious series *Zhizn' zamechatel'nykh liudei* (Lives of Distinguished People) at the Komsomol publishing house Molodaia gvardiia: K. Osipov, *Bogdan Khmel'nitskii* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1939).

²⁵ Mykola Neonovych Petrovs'kyi, *Vyzvol'na viina ukrains'koho narodu proty hnytu shliakhets'koi Pol'sbchi i pryiednannia Ukrainy do Rosii (1648–1654)* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSR, 1940), quotation on 4. Petrovs'kyi (1894–1951) belonged to the so-called "old specialists." A priest's son, he received his education before the revolution, briefly worked with Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi during the 1920s, and was never admitted to the party. In 1942–47, he served as director of the Institute of History of Ukraine; in 1944–47, also as chair of Ukrainian history at Kiev University. See NAIU op. 1L, spr. 115; Valerii Andriiovych Smolii, ed., *Vcheni Instytutu istorii Ukrainy: Biobibliohrafichnyi dovidnyk* (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1998), 245–50.

masses,” Colonel Maksym Kryvonis. The reviewer concluded by recommending a complete rewrite of the book.²⁶

While the advocates of the concept of class history were fighting back in the scholarly journals, those of national history were triumphing in the mass media. In 1939–40, the director Ihor Savchenko was shooting, at the Kiev Film Studios, a full-length movie, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi*, based on Korniiichuk's play. Two prominent apologists for the hetman collaborated in the film's production; Korniiichuk wrote the script, while Petrovs'kyi served as a scholarly consultant. Savchenko announced that his main aim was to “purify the image of Khmel'nyts'kyi from the coating of lies, to show him as a leader of the people.”²⁷ *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* was released in April 1941 to become a major event in Ukrainian cultural life. With the beginning of the Nazi-Soviet war in June, the film passed for an important propaganda movie and was shown to the troops immediately before their departure for combat. (Conveniently, Savchenko and Korniiichuk presented the “enemies” as both the Polish nobles and their mercenaries, the German dragoons.) Interestingly, however, the film reviews reveal little emphasis on the resulting union with Russia. The critics and, likely, the general public, understood *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* primarily as a film about the “Ukrainian people's heroic struggle against the Polish gentry,” a picture promoting “patriotism, love for the Fatherland, and hatred of the enemy.”²⁸

The Great Ukrainian People

The Soviet invasion of Poland in August 1939 profoundly influenced the shaping of a new Ukrainian patriotism. Like many other imperial undertakings, this

²⁶ A. Baraboi, review of Petrovs'kyi, *Vyzvol'na viina ukrains'koho narodu proty hmitu shliakhets'koi Pol'sbchi i pryednannia Ukrainy do Rosii (1648–1654)*, in *Istoriik-marksist*, no. 7 (1940), 137–40. Although historians were still debating the proper appraisal of Khmel'nyts'kyi in 1940, the NKVD sniffed the new ideological winds as early as the autumn of 1937. During the early 1930s, the historian Trokhym Skubyts'kyi was denouncing the dean of Ukrainian non-Marxist historiography, Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, and other “nationalists” for idealizing the Cossacks and hetman Khmel'nyts'kyi. In October 1937, however, Skubyts'kyi was himself arrested for allegedly “idealizing the Cossacks and *slandering* Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi as a traitor for his union with the Muscovite state against the European barbarians” (Smolii, ed., *U leschatakh totalitaryzmu: Pershe dvadtsiatyrichchia Instytutu istorii NAN Ukrainy [1936–1956 rr.]*. *Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* [Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1996], pt. 1, 65; emphasis added).

²⁷ See RGALI f. 1992, op. 1, dd. 75 and 76 (correspondence between Savchenko and Korniiichuk and variants of script); TsDAML f. 435, op. 1, spr. 2137, ark. 3 (Petrovs'kyi); Mark Efimovich Zak, Lev Parfenov, O. Iakubovich-Iasnyi, *Igor' Savchenko* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1959), 252 (Savchenko's quote).

²⁸ RGALI f. 1992, op. 1, d. 80 (Savchenko's collection of newspaper clippings), here ll. 1–3; Iu. F. Holyns'kyi, *Heroichna tema v tvorchosti I. A. Savchenka* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1982), 50 (on use as war propaganda movie).

conquest reinforced the local population's distinct ethnic identity and generally confirmed ethnicity as the fundamental category of Stalinist ideological discourse.²⁹ The Red Army's westward march was accompanied by a propaganda campaign structured along national, rather than class lines. In his radio address on 17 September 1939, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Viacheslav Molotov presented the invasion as the protection of "our brothers of the same blood" in Western Ukraine and Belarus. The *Pravda* editorial on 19 September referred to the defense of "our brothers of the same nation [*natsiia*]," while the commander of the Soviet invading troops, Marshal Semen Timoshenko, issued a leaflet ending with the appeal "Long live the great and free Ukrainian people!"³⁰

As the contradiction between class and national narratives of the Ukrainian past was being suppressed, a tension surfaced within the new imperial discourse between the Ukrainian and Russian grand narratives of national history. In addition to numerous newspaper articles, two brief surveys of the history of Western Ukraine had been published in 1940 in Moscow and Kiev. The pamphlets revealed that the Soviet historians in the center and in the Ukrainian capital understood the new Soviet patriotism differently – and confirmed that any official Soviet pronouncement had some room for subtle interpretative debates. In Kiev, Serhii Bilousov and Oleksandr Ohloblyn built their narrative along the thesis of the "age-old Ukrainian land" and ethnic unity between Western and Eastern Ukrainians. In Moscow, Vladimir Picheta announced in the very first sentence of his pamphlet that Western Ukraine and Belarus were the "primordial Russian lands that had been part of the Rurikids' empire."³¹ Notwithstanding the apparent, though not irreconcilable, opposition between Russian imperialism and Ukrainian national patriotism, both pamphlets adopted a new term, already widely used by the press: the "great Ukrainian people."

²⁹ Yaroslav Bilinsky and Roman Szporluk have long argued that the addition of thoroughly "nationalistic" Western Ukrainians actually strengthened Ukrainian identity and national consciousness in the Ukrainian SSR. See Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Incorporation of Western Ukraine and Its Impact on Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine," *The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR*, ed. Szporluk (New York: Praeger, 1975), 180–228, and Szporluk, "West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication, and Linguistic Assimilation," *Soviet Studies* 31: 1 (January 1979), 76–98.

³⁰ *Komunist*, 18 September 1939, 1; *Pravda*, 19 September 1939, 1. The relevant documents from the Soviet press from 1939–40 are conveniently collected in P. Hudzenko and F. Shevchenko, eds., *Vozz'iednannia ukrains'koho narodu v iedynii ukrains'kii radians'kii derzhavi (1939–1949)* (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury, 1949), here 23, 26, 103–04, 160. Tymoshenko's leaflet is reproduced in Vladimir Ivanovich Picheta, *Osnovnye momenty istoricheskogo razvitiia Zapadnoi Ukrainy i Zapadnoi Belorussii* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1940), 128–29.

³¹ Serhii Mykolaiovych Bielousov [Bilousov] and Oleksandr Petrovych Ohloblyn, *Zakhidna Ukraina* (Kiev: Derzhpolityvydav, 1940); Picheta, *Osnovnye momenty istoricheskogo razvitiia Zapadnoi Ukrainy i Zapadnoi Belorussii*, 3.

This term, overlooked by scholars of Stalinism, represented a remarkable addition to the previous only “great” people of the Soviet Union, the Russians, who were promoted to this status in 1937.³² The official newspaper of the Ukrainian Communist Party, *Komunist*, first used this designation on 15 November 1939, in the text of the republic’s Supreme Soviet letter to Stalin: “Having been divided, having been separated for centuries by artificial borders, the great Ukrainian people today reunite forever in a single Ukrainian republic.” The letter also referred to the Ukrainians’ homeland as “their mother, Great Ukraine.” In addition, the text of the law on the incorporation of Western Ukraine was peppered with the epithet “great.”³³ The references to the great Ukrainian people decreased during 1940, and mushroomed again with the German invasion in June 1941, only to disappear, this time completely and for a long time, in about 1944. This curious episode of Stalinist semantics reflected the authorities’ attempt to use Ukrainian patriotism as a mobilization tool, but without abandoning the new imperial vocabulary. Since the Soviet Union already had a dominant “great nation,” the only way to boost the national pride of the largest non-Russian people of the empire was to promote them – temporarily – to “greatness” alongside the elder Russian brother.

With the beginning of the Nazi-Soviet war in June 1941, *patria* emerged as an even more important referent in Soviet ideology. In his famous first radio address to the population on 22 June, Molotov designated the conflict a patriotic (*otechestvennaia*) war, alluding to the tsarist name for the 1812 war with Napoleon.³⁴ The central press freely evoked Russian pre-revolutionary martial traditions. On 7 November, Stalin introduced his list of “our great ancestors,” from Prince Aleksandr Nevskii to Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov. The press took this refurbished catalogue of Russian tsarist great men as a new canon of national heroes, to supplement the Soviet iconostasis of the heroes of the Revolution and Civil War. In December 1941, *Pravda* published an unprecedentedly Russocentric article by Emel’ian Iaroslavskii, “The Bolsheviks Are the Heirs of the Best Patriotic Traditions of the Russian People.”³⁵

Although the Ukrainian press duly reprinted *Pravda*’s lead articles, the local functionaries and intellectuals did not simply proceed to glorify Nevskii and Kutuzov. Instead, the republican media intensified the promotion of Ukrainian

³² On the Russians’ official elevation to the status of a “great people,” see Gerhard Simon, *Nationalism and the Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society*, trans. Karen Forster and Oswald Forster (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 149–50; Velychenko, *Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia*, 55.

³³ *Komunist*, 15 November 1939, 1 and 16 November 1939, 1.

³⁴ *Pravda*, 23 June 1941, 1.

³⁵ *Pravda*, 27 December 1941, 3.

national patriotism. References to Danylo of Halych, who defeated the Teutonic knights, and the Cossacks, who prevailed over the German mercenaries, appeared in the press from the first days of the war.³⁶ Moreover, just as the Russians had fought a Patriotic war against Napoleon in 1812, so had the Ukrainians against the Poles and their German mercenaries in the mid-17th century. As the Ukrainian writers put it in their open letter to Stalin, “[i]t will not be the first time that the Ukrainian people smash the insolent German hordes. Danylo of Halych had beaten the German mongrel-knights and, during the 16th-century Great Patriotic War, the barbarous German mercenary cavalry learned well the strength of the Cossack saber.”³⁷ As early as 2 July, Petrovs’kyi published a lengthy newspaper article, “The Martial Prowess of the Ukrainian People,” which traced the Ukrainian military traditions all the way back to Prince Sviatoslav in the tenth century. The historian also coined a definition of Ukrainian history that did not refer to class struggle: “The entire history of Ukraine was filled with the people’s heroic struggle for their freedom and independence against all kinds of foreign aggressors.” The Institute of History of Ukraine announced on 28 June that its researchers were preparing a pamphlet series about Ukraine’s heroic past. The first pamphlet was to valorize Prince Danylo’s battles, and the last one the inevitable Soviet victory in the present war.³⁸

Although it was designed to imitate and supplement the Russian catalogue of great ancestors, the new canon of the republic’s historic heroes actually affirmed the Ukrainian concurrent claim to the foundation of the Russian grand narrative, Kievan Rus’. No writer claimed an exclusively “Ukrainian” character for the large medieval empire of East Slavs, but the 13th-century Prince Danylo of Halych and his Galician-Volhynian Principality could be designated publicly as the patrimony of the Ukrainian people. Given the principality’s prominence in the nationalist theories tracing Kievan heritage through Galicia-Volhynia to the Great Duchy of Lithuania to Cossack Ukraine, the valorization of Danylo was fraught with controversy. Could Ukrainians glorify the southwestern princes of Galicia-Volhynia if the Russians were extolling the northeastern princes of Vladimir-Suzdal’ as the heirs to Kievan grand princes? If Kievan Rus’ was a common heritage of the Russians and Ukrainians, where did their separate historical mythologies begin? For the moment, though, nobody objected to the “Ukrainization” of Prince Danylo.

On 7 July, the republic’s government, parliament, and party leadership issued an appeal to the Ukrainian people, affirming the new pantheon of great an-

³⁶ *Komunist*, 24 June 1941, 3; 28 June 1941, 1; 4 July 1941, 4; *Literaturna hazeta*, 28 June 1941, 2.

³⁷ *Komunist*, 4 July 1941, 1.

³⁸ *Komunist*, 2 July 1941, 3 (Petrovs’kyi) and 28 June 1941, 1 (series).

cestors, a pantheon modeled after the Russian one, yet unmistakably separate: “The fighters of Danylo of Halych cut the German knights with their swords, Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi’s Cossacks cut them with their sabers, the Ukrainian people led by Lenin and Stalin destroyed the Kaiser’s hordes in 1918. We have always beaten the German bandits ...”³⁹ Disproving this statement, the German advance, hurried evacuation, and the Kiev catastrophe in August left the republic’s ideologues no time to refine the new patriotic canon. The next time the authorities organized a major ideological rally, the First Meeting of the Representatives of the Ukrainian People, was in Saratov, Russia, on 26 November 1941. The meeting adopted a manifesto to the Ukrainian people that spoke of the “sacred Ukrainian land” and appealed to the “freedom-loving Ukrainians, the descendants of the glorious fighters of our native land, Danylo of Halych and Sahaidachnyi, Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi and Bohun, Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko, Bozhenko and Mykola Shchors” never to submit themselves to German slavery.⁴⁰

As the Russocentric undertones of the central press matured during 1942–43, the Ukrainian patriotic propaganda in the local press was not suppressed but actually intensified. The Second (30 August 1942) and the Third (16 May 1943) Meetings of the Representatives of the Ukrainian People adopted manifestos that historians of the war would later be reluctant to reprint in 1948 because “they did not mention the Bolsheviks.”⁴¹ “The great Ukrainian people” endured as a legitimate term in the official discourse. This was the title of the editorial *Radians’ka Ukraina* published after the Third Meeting, while the 1943 pamphlet survey of Ukrainian history (discussed below) was entitled *The Inflexible Spirit of the Great Ukrainian People*. “The freedom-loving Ukrainian people have always striven toward the unification [of the Ukrainian ethnic lands], toward the creation of their mighty state (*derzhavy*) on the banks of the Dniester and the Dnieper, without lords and slaves,” wrote the poet Maksym Ryl’s’kyi in *Radians’ka Ukraina* in May 1943.⁴²

³⁹ *Komunist*, 7 July 1941, 1.

⁴⁰ “Do ukrains’koho narodu: Zvernennia mitynhu predstavnykiv ukrains’koho narodu 26 lystopada 1941 roku v Saratovi,” *Naukovi zapysky Instytutu istorii i arkhheolohii AN URSR* [Ufa], no. 1 (1943), 5–7, here 6. Petro Sahaidachnyi was a Cossack hetman in the early 17th century; Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko were the two most prominent 19th-century writers and nation-builders; Vasyl Bozhenko and Mykola Shchors were Soviet heroes of the Civil War in Ukraine.

⁴¹ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 70, spr. 1154, ark. 15.

⁴² *Radianska Ukraina*, 2 June 1943, 1 (“The Great Ukrainian People”); 8 May 1943, 3 (Ryl’s’ky). The first attempt to study the role of the Meetings is made in Ielyzaveta Vasylivna Safonova, “Antyfashystski mitynhy predstavnykiv ukrains’koho narodu u roky Velykoi Vitchyznianoi viiny,” in *Druha svitova viina i Ukraina: Materialy naukovoï konferentsii 27–28 kvitnia 1995 r.*, ed. Mykhailo V. Koval’ (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 1996), 60–63.

During 1942, the Ukrainian State Publishing House in Saratov unveiled a series in Ukrainian of the pocket-size pamphlets “Our Great Ancestors,” beginning with Danylo of Halych, Petro Sahaidachnyi, and Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. Other pamphlets then in preparation featured portraits of Khmel’nyts’kyi’s colonels Ivan Bohun and Maksym Kryvonis, the leaders of anti-Polish peasant rebellions Semen Palii and Ustym Karmaliuk, writers Shevchenko and Franko, and Civil War heroes Shchors and Oleksandr Parkhomenko.⁴³ Late in 1942, a 200-page collectively-written *Survey of the History of Ukraine* was published in Ukrainian in Ufa. The book picked up the rhetorical device of the “great Ukrainian people,” further downplaying the class approach and emphasizing state- and nation-building. The narrative especially exalted the Cossacks; the authors designated the Khmel’nyts’kyi Uprising as the “War of National Liberation” and made no mention of the disagreeable class profile of the Cossack officers. The *Survey* earned a positive review in Moscow’s *Istoricheskii zhurnal*.⁴⁴

The *Survey* was intended to serve as a reference book, unlike the four-volume *History of Ukraine*, explicitly conceived as a university textbook. Edited by the leading “rehabilitationist” Mykola Petrovs’kyi, volume one covered the period from ancient times until 1654. The book not only continued the valorization of the Cossacks. The chapter on Kievan Rus’ also paid unprecedented attention to the princes, with separate sections devoted to Iaroslav the Wise and Volodymyr (Vladimir) Monomakh, primarily to their state-building efforts and the promotion of culture. The list of further reading contained many works of “bourgeois-nationalist” historians of the 19th and early 20th century: Mykola Kostomarov, Oleksandr Lazarevs’kyi, and Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi.⁴⁵

The working conditions in Eastern Russia and Central Asia, where the Ukrainian intellectuals spent the first two years of the war, hardly encouraged a serious elaboration of the historical genre in literature and the arts. Not a single historical novel was written there; the authorities “planned” to arrange the writing of two patriotic historical operas, *Danylo of Halych* and *Bohdan*

⁴³ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 70, spr. 48, ark. 6–7. See K. Huslysty, *Danylo Halych’kyi*, in the series *Nashi velyki predky* (Saratov: Ukrvydav pry TsK KPU, 1942); idem, *Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachnyi*, *Nashi velyki predky* (Saratov: Ukrvydav pry TsK KPU, 1942); Petrovs’kyi, *Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi*, *Nashi velyki predky* (Saratov: Ukrvydav pry TsK KPU, 1942).

⁴⁴ Kostiantyn Voblyi, et al., *Narys istorii Ukrainy* (Ufa: Vydavnytstvo AN URSR, 1942), esp. 61–75 on the Cossacks; S. Iushkov, review of *Narys istorii Ukrainy*, in *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 7 (1943), 89–90.

⁴⁵ Serafym Iushkov, L. Slavin, M. Petrovs’kyi (ed.), and K. Huslysty, *Istoriia Ukrainy* (Ufa: Vydavnytstvo AN URSR, 1943), vol. 1, esp. 38–97 on Kievan Rus’ and 183–313 on the Cossacks. The archives of the CP(b)U Central Committee preserved the advance copy with the publication date “1942” (TsDAHO f. 1, op. 70, spr. 50).

Khmel'nyts'kyi, but work apparently never moved beyond the planning stage.⁴⁶ However, in 1942, the poet Mykola Bazhan published a long patriotic poem "Danylo of Halych" depicting the prince as a great warlord and popular leader. Although the poem typically referred to the 13th-century ancestors of Ukrainians as Rus' or Slavs, twice Bazhan used the word "Ukraine": "All of Ukraine hears the tread of [Danylo's] troops" and "As the first warrior in Ukrainian fields."⁴⁷ Such appropriation of the Galician-Volhynian Principality as "Ukrainian" was apparently deemed acceptable during the war. Bazhan received the Stalin Prize, Second Class, for 1945 for *Danylo of Halych* and his other wartime poems.⁴⁸

Noticeable early in the war, the elevation of the Ukrainian "classical cultural heritage" constituted another significant dimension of the new patriotism. The party ideologues organized widely publicized celebrations of Shevchenko and the founder of the modern Ukrainian musical tradition, Mykola Lysenko, in Ufa and Samarkand in 1942–43. In 1943, the republic's Academy of Sciences considered the study of the Ukrainian cultural patrimony – the legacy of Shevchenko, Franko, the composer Mykola Lysenko, the writer Mykhailo Kotsiubyns'kyi, the 18th-century philosopher Hryhorii Skovoroda, and the 19th-century philologist Osyp Bodians'kyi – its primary aim. As soon as the republic's opera companies had moved to Soviet Asia, they were ordered to start working immediately and stage "as their first priority" such Ukrainian classical works as Semen Hulak-Artemovs'kyi's *The Zaporozhian Cossack beyond the Danube* (1863) and Lysenko's *Natalka from Poltava* (1889).⁴⁹

The patriotic writings of Shevchenko, Franko, and Lesia Ukrainka continued to be published in mass editions, even when all the territory of Ukraine remained under German occupation. Indeed, Shevchenko's poems and Franko's short stories appeared in special editions "for [distribution in] the occupied territories." In May 1943, the Ukrainian State Publishing House (then operating in Russia), released a new edition of Shevchenko's canonic collection of poems, *Kobzar*, in 20,000 copies. The tribulations of war notwithstanding, the Moscow

⁴⁶ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 23, spr. 441, ark. 5zv. The Ukrainian composer Kost' Dan'kevych would write the opera *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* in 1948–53.

⁴⁷ Mykola Bazhan, "Danylo Halyts'kyi," *Ukrains'ka literatura*, nos. 3–4 (1942), 47–59, here 52 and 53; also idem, "Danylo Halyts'kyi," in *Ukraina v ohni: Almanakh*, no. 1 (Ufa: Spilka radians'kykh pys'mennykiv Ukrainy, 1942), 75–89, here 80 and 82. In all post-1946 editions, "Ukraine" is changed to "Slavic land" and "Ukrainian fields" to the "field at Drohochyn" (Mykola Bazhan, "Danylo Halyts'kyi," *Virshi i poemy* [Kiev: Radians'kyi pys'mennyk, 1949], 210–14, here 206 and 208).

⁴⁸ *Literaturna gazeta*, 4 July 1946, 1.

⁴⁹ Iurii Iuriovych Kondufor, ed., *Kul'turne budivnytstvo v Ukrain'skii RSR: Cherven' 1941–1950* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1989), 27, 32, 54, 64 (celebrations); TsDAHO f. 1, op. 23, spr. 441, ark. 5zv. (Academy of Sciences); TsDAVOV f. 2, op. 7, spr. 345, ark. 85–86 (opera companies).

printing works ensured what a contemporary reviewer called “a luxurious quality of print.”⁵⁰ During 1942–43, the celebrated artist Vasyl’ Kasian produced a poster series, “Shevchenko’s Wrath Is the Weapon of Victory,” combining portraits of Shevchenko and lines from his poetry with background images of warfare. The series was reprinted as leaflets and dropped from planes over the occupied Ukrainian territories.⁵¹

At this point, some Ukrainian intellectuals were already sensing that the unreserved fostering of Ukrainian national patriotism threatened certain basic structures of imperial discourse. In November 1942, the writer Iurii Ianovs’kyi reported from Ufa to Moscow, to the Secretary for Ideology of the Ukrainian Central Committee, Kost’ Lytvyn, a fragment of a conversation among unidentified Ukrainian scholars: “Ukrainian nationalism passes during the war for patriotism, but after the war [the authorities] will square accounts with it.”⁵² This lapidary political language of the time disguised a major tension within the Stalinist historic imagination: the Ukrainian patriotic narrative had come dangerously close to completeness as a self-sufficient story of the nation’s heroic trials and victories. But an imperial meta-narrative by definition should stress the incompleteness of indigenous historical experiences, casting the indigenous past as a story of transition to normalcy – under the tutelage of the empire’s master-race.⁵³ Ironically, with the lines of historical inquiry being shaped by Stalinist vocabularies of statism and reified ethnicity, the major “incompleteness” of Ukrainian history subsequently “completed” under the Russian guidance was eventually conceptualized to have been the lack of a Ukrainian nation-state.

The Unbreakable Union

As the official rhetoric of Ukrainian patriotism exploded with the Red Army’s counteroffensive in the republic’s territory in the autumn of 1943, Soviet ideologues realized the need to reconcile the Ukrainian and Russian historical narratives within the imperial hierarchy of the “friendship of peoples.” In October 1943, the creation of the Order of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, the only Soviet military order named after a non-Russian hero, symbolized the reconfiguration of the Ukrainian national patrimony.

⁵⁰ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 23, spr. 451, ark. 1–3 (wartime publication of Ukrainian classical literature); *Radianska Ukraina*, 5 June 1943, 4 (review of *Kobzar*).

⁵¹ Leonid Vladych, *Vasyl’ Kasian: Piat’ etiudiiv pro khudozhnyka* (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1978), 75, 80.

⁵² TsDAHO f. 1, op. 70, spr. 68, ark. 29zv.

⁵³ Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for ‘Indian’ Pasts?” *Representations* 37 (Winter 1992), 1–26.

Declassified archival documents and recently published memoirs shed a new light on this interesting episode of Stalinist ideological evolution. The initiative in establishing the order belonged to the Ukrainian intellectuals and functionaries, and the idea itself can be traced to the prominent film director and writer Oleksandr Dovzhenko. As the Red Army advanced into Ukrainian territory, Dovzhenko, apparently mindful of the creation of the Orders of Aleksandr Nevskii, Mikhail Kutuzov, and Aleksandr Suvorov in mid-1942, talked to Khrushchev on 29 August 1943 about establishing the Order of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. According to Dovzhenko's diary, the Ukrainian Communist Party's first secretary accepted the idea "with delight."⁵⁴ The archives have preserved Khrushchev's original letter of 31 August to Stalin concerning this matter:

In connection with the liberation of Ukraine that has now begun, I think it would be expedient to establish the military Order of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, to be awarded to the officers and generals of the Red Army [stricken out: "for services in liberating the Ukrainian land from the German aggressors"]. The news that such an order has been established will raise the morale of Red Army fighters, especially Ukrainians. The Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian intelligentsia will greet the news about the creation of the Order of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi with particular pleasure and enthusiasm. Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi is a statesman and military leader who is very popular and beloved in Ukraine, who fought for Ukraine's liberation, as well as its drawing together [with Russia] and the union of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples. In this sense, establishing an order named after him would have a desirable political effect.⁵⁵

Thus, the republic's functionaries and intellectuals evoked the notion of the Russian-Ukrainian friendship as a tool for both promoting the Ukrainian historical mythology and establishing the subordinate position of the Ukrainian historical narrative.

On 2 September, Khrushchev advised one of his deputies about Stalin's approval: "I have received Comrade Stalin's consent in principle to establish the

⁵⁴ Dovzhenko, *Hospody*, 191. Compare the decrees on establishing the orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Nevskii in *Pravda*, 30 July 1942, 1. Dovzhenko belonged to a small group of leading Ukrainian writers who were commissioned to the army as senior political officers to produce propaganda materials.

⁵⁵ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 23, spr. 355, ark. 21–22. The document is the original letter, signed by Khrushchev in Kharkiv on 31 August and transmitted to Stalin on the same day by "VCh," the high-frequency secure telegraph channel used by the Soviet military command during the war. The letter survived among the poorly systematized wartime correspondence files of the Ukrainian Central Committee.

military Order of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi."⁵⁶ In the course of September, two groups of Ukrainian artists in Kharkiv and Moscow worked frantically to prepare sketches of the order. Interestingly, the Ukrainian leadership instructed them to use the Ukrainian, rather than the Russian, spelling of the hetman's name on the order. The winning project, by the Moscow-based Ukrainian graphic artist Oleksandr Pashchenko, represented a richly ornamented six-pointed star with Khmel'nyts'kyi's portrait in the center and the hetman's name in Ukrainian (with two soft signs instead of one as in Russian) beneath.⁵⁷

Before the order was unveiled, however, Stalin decided to magnify the propaganda effect by simultaneously renaming the city of Pereiaslav to Pereiaslav-Khmel'nyts'kyi. Whether he made this suggestion in writing or over the phone is not clear. Stalin's letters to Khrushchev, if they survived, are not available, but Stalin's role can be deduced from Khrushchev's reciprocal elaborations on when to announce the renaming "that you [Stalin] proposed."⁵⁸ Aware that Pereiaslav, the site of the 1654 Russian-Ukrainian union treaty, was about to be taken by the Red Army, Khrushchev instructed *Pravda's* editor, Petr Pospelov, to prepare the proper propaganda materials on Khmel'nyts'kyi in advance. This was to be done by employing the group of leading Ukrainian writers then in Moscow: Pavlo Tychyna, Mykola Bazhan, Maksym Ryl's'kyi, and Oleksandr Dovzhenko.⁵⁹

As soon as the Red Army took Pereiaslav, the central and Ukrainian newspapers unveiled a series of decrees and propaganda articles. On 11 October, *Pravda* published the decree (dated the previous day) establishing the Order of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. Written by or with the participation of Ukrainian intellectuals, the accompanying editorial stressed Khmel'nyts'kyi's role in uniting Ukraine with Russia:

The Ukrainian people hold sacred the name of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, the Russian people revere his name, all the peoples of the Soviet Union know his name and pronounce it with the greatest respect and love be-

⁵⁶ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 23, spr. 463, ark. 11; spr. 355, ark. 20.

⁵⁷ The sketches of the Kharkiv-based artists are in TsDAHO f. 1, op. 23, spr. 355, ark. 26–42; the spelling is specified on ark. 12. On additional competition in Moscow and Pashchenko's success, see A. Dmytrenko, *Ukrains'kyi radians'kyi istorychnyi zhyvopys* (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1966), 56.

⁵⁸ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 23, spr. 355, ark. 15.

⁵⁹ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 23, spr. 328, ark. 15. This story also provides an interesting example of how the Stalinist administrative system worked. The matter of renaming the city was decided between Stalin and his Ukrainian viceroy, Khrushchev, circumventing the apparatus of both the Ukrainian and All-Union Central Committees. Although himself one of the highest ideological bureaucrats, Pospelov learned about the decision from a handwritten note that Khrushchev dictated to his aide Lt.-Colonel Paulo Hapochka for delivery to Pospelov.

cause this name is linked inseparably to the Ukrainian people's struggle for liberation from the foreign yoke, to the history of reunification of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, the brotherly union of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples ... The greatest statesman of his time, [Khmel'nyts'kyi] understood well that the Ukrainian people could survive only in union with the fraternal Russian people ... The unification of two fraternal peoples, Russian and Ukrainian, was the greatest historical service of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi.⁶⁰

Ukrainian newspapers offered a similar interpretation. Writing in the official *Radians'ka Ukraina*, Mykola Petrovs'kyi exalted Khmel'nyts'kyi as a national hero – the “great military leader, the liberator of all Ukrainian lands from Poland.” However, the historian denounced the previously popular view that Khmel'nyts'kyi considered the Pereiaslav Treaty a temporary diplomatic maneuver and intended to break up with Muscovy in his later years. According to Petrovs'kyi, the hetman sought the union with Russia from the beginning of the war, and this desire reflected the age-old strivings of the Ukrainian people.⁶¹

The archives reveal that the new official interpretation of Ukraine's incorporation into Russia as fraternal union and the “only right path” instead of the “lesser evil” was elaborated in the apparatus of the Ukrainian Central Committee, and relied heavily on the writings of the court historian of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising and the leading “rehabilitationist,” Mykola Petrovs'kyi. Moreover, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's draft decrees creating the Order of Khmel'nyts'kyi and renaming the city of Pereiaslav, as well as the accompanying propaganda materials, had been prepared in Kiev. All these texts featured the “only right path” theme.⁶² By confirming the relation of domination between the Russian and Ukrainian national mythologies, the republic's ideologues found a license to continue the Ukrainian patriotic propaganda. On 13 October, both the central and republican press announced the rechristening of Pereiaslav as Pereiaslav-Khmel'nyts'kyi, “in memory of the great son of the Ukrainian people, statesman and military leader Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi.” While stressing the hetman's services in uniting Ukraine with Russia, *Radians'ka Ukraina* featured the most frenzied samples of patriotic rhetoric, elevating Khmel'nyts'kyi to the stature of the father of the nation: “Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's ardent blood streams, boils up in our people's veins.”⁶³

⁶⁰ *Pravda*, 11 October 1943, 1.

⁶¹ *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 12 October 1943, 3.

⁶² TsDAHO f. 1, op. 23, spr. 328, ark. 1–7.

⁶³ *Pravda*, 13 October 1943, 1; *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 13 October 1943, 1.

As the Red Army was taking one Ukrainian city after another beginning in September 1943, *Radians'ka Ukraina* featured articles on these cities' role in the national history. The pieces were filled with references to the "traditions of our freedom-loving ancestors," the princes of Kievan Rus' and the Cossack leaders.⁶⁴ On 31 October, the same authoritative newspaper allotted its entire page three to Mykola Petrovs'kyi's long article "The Inflexible Spirit of the Great Ukrainian People." Also published as a pamphlet, the article scanned the entire history of Ukraine from Kievan Rus' to the Great Patriotic War. The work designated princes Sviatoslav, Volodymyr Monomakh, Roman Mstyslavych, and Danylo of Halych as "great leaders" (*vozhdī*); presented the Zaporozhian Host as the "beginning of a new Ukrainian state" (implying that Kievan Rus' had been the *old* Ukrainian state); and dropped any mention of the "lesser evil" theory in favor of a more optimistic construct: "In 1654, Ukraine concluded with Russia an unbreakable fraternal union." Finally, in the opening sentence of the article, Petrovs'kyi coined a new Hegelian definition of Ukrainian *Volksgeist*, a statement to be reworded often in subsequent Ukrainian scholarship and political pronouncements: "The history of the Ukrainian people is a history of the long and fierce struggle against various foreign invaders, against social and national oppression, for unification within the Ukrainian state, and for establishing the unbreakable union with the fraternal Russian people."⁶⁵

After the Red Army took Kiev on November 6, Khrushchev and other Ukrainian leaders issued a manifesto, "To the Ukrainian People," celebrating the liberation of the "glorious and ancient capital of Ukraine" and referring to the "glory of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, Petro Sahaidachnyi, Taras Shevchenko, and Mykola Shchors" – an abbreviated, familiar Soviet Ukrainian canon of great ancestors. As Dovzhenko's diary discloses, a group of Ukrainian writers headed by Iurii Ianovs'kyi prepared the appeal.⁶⁶ In Moscow, the premier Ukrainian poet Maksym Ryl's'kyi gave a speech, "Kiev in the History of Ukraine," at a special convention of the All-Union Academy of Sciences. A carry-over of the pre-1943 Ukrainian patriotic rhetoric, Ryl's'kyi's speech was nothing less than a comprehensive survey of the development of Ukrainian culture from ancient times to the present that particularly emphasized the early modern period and the 19th-century national revival. Downplaying post-1917 achievements, Ryl's'kyi spoke of the "uninterrupted development of Ukrainian culture" across

⁶⁴ *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 24 September 1943, 3; 25 September 1943, 4; 29 September 1943, 3. The quotation is from the title of Petrovs'kyi's article in the 24 September issue.

⁶⁵ *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 31 October 1943, 3 and Petrovs'kyi, *Nezlamnyi dukh velykoho ukrains'koho narodu* (Kharkiv: Ukrains'ke derzhavne vydavnytstvo, 1943), 4, 6, 10. The opening statement is on 3.

⁶⁶ *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 18 November 1943, 1; Dovzhenko, *Hospody*, 195.

the centuries. He praised the Cossacks as “Ukraine’s sharp sword” and exalted the “brilliant representatives of Ukrainian historical scholarship”: Kostomarov, Kulish, Antonovych, Lazarevs’ky, Levyts’kyi, the collaborators of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, and, finally, Hrushevs’kyi with his “monumental” *History of Ukraine-Rus’*. All of these figures had been stigmatized before the war as “bourgeois nationalists,” and would be again condemned as such after the war. *Radians’ka Ukraina* dutifully reported the speech in full.⁶⁷

The continuing patriotic rhetoric made the Ukrainian elites aware of the need to reconcile it with Moscow’s increasing praise of Russian historical greatness. In addition, they felt obliged to stress that their own patriotic discourse differed from the nationalistic narrative of the Ukrainian heroic past promoted by the “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists” in the occupied territories. To map the direction of ideological change, the Ukrainian party leadership used an otherwise insignificant occasion, the 290th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty in January 1944. In late October 1943, Khrushchev wrote to Stalin:

18 January 1944 will mark 290 years since Ukraine’s incorporation [*prisoedinenie*] into Russia according to the Pereiaslav Treaty concluded by Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi in the city of Pereiaslav-Khmel’nyts’kyi [sic]. The CP(b)U Central Committee asks that the celebration of this anniversary be permitted, given the furious anti-historical propaganda against the unification of the Russian and Ukrainian people that the German fascists and Ukrainian-German nationalists have conducted in Ukraine ... During the entire period that the Soviet power has existed in Ukraine, an anniversary of this event would be commemorated for the first time.⁶⁸

The plans for this unprecedented celebration of such an odd anniversary of the union were quite modest, being mostly limited to articles, leaflets, and meetings in major cities. Stalin had apparently approved the plan, and the Ukrainian authorities properly celebrated the 290th anniversary of Pereiaslav on 18 January 1944. While the rehabilitation of Khmel’nyts’kyi had national liberation and statehood as its principal referent, the renewed cult of Pereiaslav symbolized the eternal union with Russia. The media did not mention that in 1654, Ukraine had joined *tsarist* Russia, and the editorials entitled “The Sacred Union” seemed to revise the “lesser evil” theory irrevocably.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ *Radians’ka Ukraina*, 10 December 1943, 3–4.

⁶⁸ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 70, spr. 91, ark. 44. This copy of the letter does not show the date, but the other materials of the file point to late October 1943. The list of the planned festivities is in ark. 45–47.

⁶⁹ *Radians’ka Ukraina*, 18 January 1944, 1; *Radians’ke mystetstvo*, 18 January 1944, 1–2.

On 8 July 1944, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences held a festive convention and concert to commemorate an even less “round” jubilee than that of the 290th of Pereiaslav, the 235th anniversary of the Battle at Poltava. Poltava, where Peter the Great and the Ukrainian Cossacks who were loyal to him defeated Charles XII of Sweden and his ally Hetman Mazepa in 1709, ideally suited the current ideological requirements. The speakers praised the unbreakable union of Ukrainians and Russians and condemned the contemporary “Ukrainian fascist nationalists.”⁷⁰

Serious concern with concurrent nationalist propaganda surfaced in the Soviet Ukrainian press and ideological documents in late 1942 and early 1943. However, neither the actual activities of the Ukrainian nationalists (who were discouraged and harassed by the Germans), nor the Soviet authorities’ knowledge about their activities (as documented in the Ukrainian party archives) seems to have justified such an alarm. Perhaps the republic’s ideologues denounced Ukrainian nationalism so strongly precisely because they had been aware of the tensions within their own historical imagination: between the notions of “class” and “nation,” as well as between those of the “great Russian people” and “great Ukrainian people.” Fierce anti-nationalist rhetoric may have reflected the functionaries’ and intellectuals’ own inability to fashion a Soviet Ukrainian historical mythology that would be completely separate from a “bourgeois-nationalist” notion of national patrimony.

Ranking Friends and Brothers

Although this analysis stresses the Ukrainian bureaucrats’ and intellectuals’ initiative in subordinating the Ukrainian national mythology to the Russian one, Moscow did interfere on its own. After regaining the strategic initiative in the war by late 1943, the party hierarchy indicated its unhappiness with the proliferation of non-Russian patriotisms by denouncing the *History of the Kazakh SSR*,⁷¹ but the press did not report the incident until 1945. The center primarily condemned the cult of the Kazakh national heroes who had fought against tsarist Russia, a crime that Danylo of Halych and Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi never committed, but Moscow also demonstrated its dissatisfaction with the growth of

⁷⁰ *Radians’ka Ukraina*, 9 July 1944, 2.

⁷¹ The classic account of the developments around the *History of the Kazakh SSR* is in Tillett, *The Great Friendship*, 70–83. The archives of the All-Union Central Committee confirm that the book was nominated for a Stalin Prize, but the reviewer Aleksei Iakovlev objected to its glorification of anti-Russian uprisings in Kazakhstan as heroic anti-colonial struggles. The book’s co-editor, Anna Pankratova, complained to the Central Committee’s Administration of Propaganda and Agitation, but its head, Georgii Aleksandrov, only condemned the work even more vigorously as “anti-Russian.” See RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 224, ll. 4, 23–25, 36–43.

Ukrainian mythology. After the liberation of Kiev, the Ukrainian authorities enlisted a group of writers to compose a solemn open “Letter from the Ukrainian People to the Great Russian People.” Significantly, the text did not designate Ukrainians as a second “great” nation of the USSR, although it claimed that the two fraternal peoples achieved all their historic victories together. A paean to Russian-Ukrainian friendship and Russian guidance, the letter attempted to present all the Ukrainian “great ancestors” as comrades-in-arms of the contemporary Russian heroes. However, Aleksandrov interpreted the text as presuming that there were “two leading peoples in the Soviet Union – the Russians and the Ukrainians,” while it was “known and universally accepted that the Russian people [were] the elder brother in the Soviet Union’s family of peoples.” Aleksandrov also dismissed as fictitious the Ukrainian claims that Danylo of Halych had somehow assisted Aleksandr Nevskii in his victories over the German knights during the early 1240s. In the end, *Pravda* published a report about the mass meeting in liberated Kiev, rather than the letter itself.⁷²

Nevertheless, the signals from Moscow remained confusing. Just as Aleksandrov was criticizing the unfortunate letter for its insufficient worship of the great Russian people, Dovzhenko learned, on 26 November, that Stalin had banned his novel and film script *Ukraine in Flames*. In January 1944, the Politburo convened in the Kremlin with a group of Ukrainian functionaries and leading writers to discuss the faulty work. During the meeting, Stalin personally accused Dovzhenko of “revising Leninism” by emphasizing national pride over the principle of class struggle.⁷³ Although the national pride in question was Ukrainian, Stalin did not call it excessive or claim that it detracted from the Russians’ greatness; instead, he resented the opposition of Ukrainian patriotism to allegiance to the working class, party, and the kolkhoz system. This intervention for a short time obscured the actual direction of current ideological change: ahead to the empire, rather than back to class solidarity.

A new brief survey of Ukrainian history, Mykola Petrovs’kyi’s *The Reunification of the Ukrainian People within a Single Ukrainian Soviet State*, appeared in early 1944, when the Red Army had crossed the old Polish border and entered Western Ukraine.⁷⁴ The official party journal *Bol’shevik*, with a circulation of

⁷² RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 190, ll. 25–37, here 26–27. Dovzhenko noted in his diary that the letter was prepared by the same group of Ukrainian writers headed by Iurii Ianovs’kyi (Dovzhenko, *Hospody*, 195).

⁷³ The text of Stalin’s comments has been recently published as I. V. Stalin, “Ob antileninskikh oshibkakh i natsionalisticheskikh izvrashcheniakh v kinopovesti Dovzhenko ‘Ukraina v ognе,’” *Iskusstvo kino*, no. 4 (1990), 84–96. The novel’s initial negative assessment by the Administration of Propaganda and Agitation is in RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 212, ll. 1–3.

⁷⁴ Petrovs’kyi had completed a longer monograph under the same title in 1941, but the manuscript and proofs perished during the evacuation of Kiev. In Ufa, the historian quickly restored an

100,000 copies, published a shortened version in Russian, while the complete text appeared in Ukrainian in the republic's major newspaper, *Radians'ka Ukraina*. It also appeared as a separate pamphlet printed in 42,000 copies and, in Russian, in a Moscow edition of 25,000.⁷⁵ Petrovs'kyi's survey offered a slightly revised definition of Ukrainian history: "The history of the Ukrainian people is a history of the masses' age-old struggle against social and national oppression, for reunification within the Ukrainian state, for union with the fraternal, blood-related Russian people." Petrovs'kyi's new definition seemingly restored social struggles to their prominent position, yet in the text itself, the author highlighted three main themes: Ukrainian statehood, Western Ukraine as an "age-old" Ukrainian land, and Ukraine's historic ties with Russia. As the unabridged pamphlet version explained, union with Muscovy did not contradict the interests of the Ukrainian state-building: although Khmel'nyts'kyi's Ukraine was an "independent state" in the form of a "Cossack republic," "by joining Russia, Ukraine preserved its statehood." However, neither the union with Russia nor the Revolution represented a teleological outcome of Ukrainian history. Petrovs'kyi reserved this role for the Ukrainians' historic reunification within their own nation-state, which was accomplished in 1939.⁷⁶ Thus, all the references to class struggle notwithstanding, Ukrainian history was cast as the grand narrative of the nation, albeit a nation that found its Hegelian-Stalinist self-realization within a multinational empire.

Despite all the efforts at subordinating it to the new Russian imperial mythology, the "neo-national" narrative of the Ukrainian heroic past often competed with the Russian interpretation of the same events. In *Istoricheskii zhurnal* in 1943, the Russian historian Vladimir Pashuto presented Danylo of Halych as a "Russian (*russkii*) prince" reigning over "Russian" people in "South Russian" lands.⁷⁷ The writer Aleksei Iugov similarly designated Danylo and his people as "Russian" in his 1944 pamphlet on the prince, claiming, moreover, that "the

abridged version of the text in Russian and even suggested to Secretary for Ideology Lytvyn that the work should be nominated for the Stalin prize. See TsDAHO f. 1, op. 70, spr. 840, ark. 1–106 (the restored text in Russian; the story of the book is given in the footnote on ark. 1); spr. 68, ark. 26zv. (letter to Lytvyn).

⁷⁵ Petrovskii, "Vossoedinenie ukrainskogo naroda v edinom ukrainskom sovetskom gosudarstve," *Bol'shevik*, no. 2 (1944), 42–55; *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 29 February 1944, 4 and 1 March 1944, 3–4; Petrovs'kyi, *Vozz'iednannia ukrains'koho narodu v iedynii ukrains'kii radians'kii derzhavi* (Kiev: n. p., 1944); idem, *Vossoedinenie ukrainskogo naroda v edinom ukrainskom sovetskom gosudarstve* (Moscow: OGIZ Gospolitizdat, 1944).

⁷⁶ See Petrovskii, *Vossoedinenie ukrainskogo naroda*, 31, 33. The pamphlet earned a laudatory review in *Istoricheskii zhurnal*: Boris D. Grekov, review of Petrovskii, *Vossoedinenie ukrainskogo naroda v edinom ukrainskom sovetskom gosudarstve*, in *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 12 (1944), 74–75.

⁷⁷ Vladimir Pashuto, "Daniil Galitskii," *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, nos. 3–4 (1943), 37–44.

people of Galicia, Bukovyna, and Volhynia preserved and carried over as sacred their Russian language, fathers' faith, and unquenchable ardent love to Great Rus' through the crucible of all historic ordeals."⁷⁸ Boris Grekov wrote on the Polish period of Galician history without ever referring to the formation of Ukrainian or even proto-Ukrainian nationality.⁷⁹

Ukrainian historians and writers simultaneously advanced their interpretations, often on the pages of the same journals. Their publications never directly challenged the Russian imperial grand narrative, but the archives preserve traces of their subtle struggle to affirm Ukraine's ethnic difference and historic separateness from Russia – the two notions that actually *enabled* one to talk about Ukraine's beneficial union with Russia or about Soviet Ukrainian identity. Thus, Oleksandr Korniiichuk in 1944 dismissed the manuscript of Picheta's pamphlet on Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. In his review, the Ukrainian playwright demanded the revision of "South-Western Rus'" and "Russian" in the text to "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian" throughout, a more inspiring portrayal of Khmel'nyts'kyi as a great military leader and statesman, and the exaltation of the Pereiaslav Treaty. In his conclusion, Korniiichuk added sarcastically: "Comrade Picheta not long ago publicly argued that Khmel'nyts'kyi was a feudal lord and an ardent enemy of the people. Now he has changed his point of view." Instead of Picheta, the powerful writer recommended using Mykola Petrovs'kyi, the "best Ukrainian specialist on this period," as an author.⁸⁰ During the Ukrainian historians' conference with the republic's ideologues in early 1945, Professor Kost' Huslysty raised the issue of the "Russification" of Danylo of Halych in the central press. He particularly castigated Pashuto's 1943 article in *Istoricheskii zhurnal* and Iugov's pamphlet as seeing the Galician-Volhynian Principality "through the glass of the 'indivisible Russian people' and not connecting it directly with the history of Ukraine." Both the Ukrainian party ideologues and fellow historians listened without objections to Huslysty's statement that "Danylo of Halych was one of the great ancestors of the Ukrainian people in the same way as Aleksandr Nevskii was one of the great ancestors of the Russian people."⁸¹

⁷⁸ Aleksei Iugov, *Daniil Galitskii* (Moscow: OGIZ Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1944), the quotation is on 55. Iugov would eventually publish an acclaimed historical novel about Aleksandr Nevskii and Danylo of Halych, *The Warriors*: A. Iugov, *Ratobortsy* (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel', 1956).

⁷⁹ Grekov, "Sud'by naseleniia galitskikh kniazheskikh votchinn pod vlastiu Pol'shi," *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 12 (1944), 37–43.

⁸⁰ A copy of the review, dated 7 January 1944, is preserved in Korniiichuk's personal archives: TsDAML f. 435, op. 1, spr. 508, ark. 1–3.

⁸¹ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 70, spr. 388, ark. 4.

Stalinism's ideological mutation into a self-acknowledged successor of the Russian empire involved the rehabilitation of the legacy of prominent pre-revolutionary Russian historians such as Sergei Solov'ev and Vasilii Kliuchevskii. During the war, the Ukrainian intellectuals likewise proceeded to reinstall Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi to his stature as the patriarch of Ukrainian historiography, although in the 1930s he had been denounced as bourgeois nationalist and even as a "fascist." The exaltation of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi provided Petrovs'kyi with an opportunity in 1943 to clear his teacher's name. Writing in *Radians'ka Ukraina* the day after the Order of Khmel'nyts'kyi had been unveiled, Petrovs'kyi announced that Hrushevs'kyi's works were "of great importance" for the study of the hetman's time. Hrushevs'kyi allegedly concluded in volume 9, part 1 of his *History of Ukraine-Rus'* that the Cossack leader had no intention of ever breaking the union with Russia (as the Ukrainian nationalist historians claimed), a conclusion which would support Petrovs'kyi's own idea that Khmel'nyts'kyi had always sought a union with the fraternal Russian people. In another article, Petrovs'kyi claimed that Hrushevs'kyi made this important conclusion in volume 9, part 2, and volume 10, which was never published and the manuscript of which was subsequently lost.⁸²

Ukrainian intellectuals also pushed for the rehabilitation of such a confirmed 19th-century "reactionary" as Panteleimon Kulish, whose 125th anniversary was celebrated in August 1944. A Ukrainian nationalist in his youth and a Russian monarchist in his senior years, Kulish was beyond redemption as a historian, but he reemerged as the revered author of the first Ukrainian historical novel, which was also the first novel in Ukrainian – *The Black Council* (1857).⁸³ In 1945, a Ukrainian literary critic suggested that the "time has come to reevaluate the legacy" of another prominent 19th-century historian and Romantic writer, Mykola (Nikolai) Kostomarov: "Under [tsarist] colonial oppression, the awakening of national consciousness, which the Romantic writers promoted in their works, represented a progressive phenomenon of public life."⁸⁴

⁸² *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 12 October 1943, 3; N. N. Petrovskii, "Prisoedinenie Ukrainy k Rossii v 1654 godu," *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 1 (1944), 52. The text of volume 9, parts 1 and 2 of *History of Ukraine-Rus'* does not support Petrovs'kyi's assertion. See Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1996–97), vol. 9, part 1, 720, 784; part 2, 1492–1508. On 1494–95, Hrushevs'kyi says that, for Khmel'nyts'kyi, the Pereiaslav Treaty was just a military union, "valuable in given circumstances, one more [agreement] in addition to unions with the Tatars, the Turks, and Moldavia."

⁸³ *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 8 August 1944, 2 and 23 August 1944, 4; *Literatura i mystetstvo*, 7 August 1944, 3–4. Interestingly, Petrovs'kyi protested the commemoration of Kulish, who in his later years, wrote disapprovingly of such national icons as the Cossacks and Shevchenko (*U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 3).

⁸⁴ Ivan Pil'huk, "Mykola Kostomarov," *Ukrains'ka literatura*, nos. 4–5 (1945), 122–31, here 122.

At the height of the “national heritage” campaign, in the summer of 1945, the Ukrainian Central Committee gathered the writers, critics, and managers of the republic’s publishing houses to discuss the grandiose project of the “Golden Treasury” of Ukrainian literature. The three-year plan envisaged the publication of 148 volumes by 21 pre-revolutionary Ukrainian writers, while plans were also made for the immediate release of one-volume selected works of the major classics.⁸⁵ The drive to promote national history and cultural heritage continued unabated in Ukraine until mid-1946.

Epilogue

The denunciation of wartime national patriotism became the major component of the *Zhdanovshchina* campaign in Ukraine that started in the late summer of 1946. The *Zhdanovshchina* is usually understood as a reassertion of the party’s ideological control over culture in order to purge literature and the arts of Western influences. While intellectuals in Moscow and Leningrad did experience the campaign as a crusade against liberalism and heterodoxy, the Russian national mythology was rarely attacked. The Ukrainian *Zhdanovshchina*, however, from its very beginnings aimed primarily at “nationalism,” particularly in history. During the writers’ conference on 27–28 August 1946, Secretary of Ideology Lytvyn frankly defined the ideological turn in terms that did not appear in the official documents of the time:

Why did the comrades make serious mistakes? Because they proceeded from the wrong assumption that the party had changed its policy during the war. To foster popular patriotism, much has been written about Aleksandr Nevskii, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. Several patriotic manifestos to the Ukrainian people paid great attention to the heroic traditions of our people’s past, Shevchenko’s *Kobzar* was published in a pocket-size format and smuggled beyond the frontline [to the occupied territories] together with many leaflets that used Shevchenko’s poetry in purely propagandistic aims. Some people wrongly interpreted this to the effect that the liberation of Ukraine was happening under the banner of Shevchenko, under the banner of Kulish. Excuse me for the sharp words, but this is what happened. These comrades decided that all the previous critique [of national patriotism] should be abandoned because the party’s policy had changed, because the party had conceded.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1604, ark. 1–3.

⁸⁶ TsDAHO f. 1, op. 70, spr. 514, ark. 25–26.

During the ensuing campaign, Lytvyn and other Ukrainian ideologues uncovered nationalist deviations in Bazhan's poem "Danylo of Halych," Ryl's'kyi's speech on the history of Kiev, and other works espousing the wartime Ukrainian patriotism.⁸⁷ In August 1947, the Ukrainian Communist Party's new First Secretary, Lazar' Kaganovich, pushed for a similar crusade against "nationalism" in Ukrainian historiography.⁸⁸

Although the ideological campaigns of 1946–47 ostensibly prescribed the return to class history, the neo-imperial Russian grand narrative remained the kernel of the Stalinist historical imagination, allowing (or forcing) the Ukrainian ideologues to retain a similar "national" approach to their history. Rather than promoting proletarian internationalism as such, the republic's bureaucrats and intellectuals again attempted to ascertain that the Ukrainian historical mythology was safely subordinated to the dominant Russian one in the foundational myth of the friendship of peoples. But this proved no easy task. With ethnicity reified as a principal category of Soviet political taxonomy, historical narratives of the postwar period remained in essence "national histories" disguised by the superficial rhetoric of class and amalgamated into the imperial patriotic meta-story. Tracing the various nations' historical trajectories as leading into the Russian empire and the Russian-dominated Soviet Union thus inescapably involved the constant affirmation of the peoples' ethnic difference – at once a cornerstone and a time bomb built within all imperial discourses.

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⁸⁷ See for example TsDAHO f. 1, op. 1, spr. 729, ark. 10–11, 138–41. This ideological purge is examined in more detail in Serhy Yekelchuk, "Celebrating the Soviet Present: The *Zhdanovshchina* Campaign in Ukrainian Literature and the Arts," in *Provincial Landscapes: Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917–1953*, ed. Donald J. Raleigh (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 255–75.

⁸⁸ On the campaign against Ukrainian historians and their subtle resistance, see Serhy Yekelchuk, "How the 'Iron Minister' Kaganovich Failed to Discipline Ukrainian Historians: A Stalinist Ideological Campaign Reconsidered," *Nationalities Papers* 27: 4 (December 1999), 579–604.