In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Reviewed by:
  • Arms and the State: Sir William Armstrong and the Remaking of British Naval Power, 1854–1914
  • Kurt Hackemer (bio)
Arms and the State: Sir William Armstrong and the Remaking of British Naval Power, 1854–1914. By Marshall J. Bastable. Aldershot, Hants., and Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2004. Pp. xii+300. $89.95.

Marshall Bastable's subtitle suggests that his subject is the Royal Navy's modernization and expansion in the decades before World War I, but his book offers much more than that. In challenging the prevailing historiography that sees Sir William Armstrong (1810–1900) as representative of the failure experienced by Victorian entrepreneurs, Bastable offers a valuable glimpse at the origins of military-industrial-political relationships from the British perspective and suggests that Armstrong's acumen in managing technological change put him ahead of his time.

Armstrong was an established engineer when the Crimean War broke out. Responding to obvious shortcomings in British artillery, he proposed a revolutionary new breech-loading wrought-iron field piece that quickly earned a reputation as one of the world's best. Proving that to be true, especially against the equally innovative cannon designed by Joseph Whitworth, required not only engineering expertise but also the ability to navigate the social and political environment of the time. Armstrong prevailed, becoming the Engineer of Rifled Ordnance at the Woolwich Arsenal while preserving [End Page 652] the independence of Elswick, his private company that also sold ordnance to the British government. The relationship abruptly ended in 1863, when, despite the impressive technological advantages that Armstrong's guns offered, the government canceled its contract with Elswick because it could see no discernable strategic threats on the horizon.

Rather than leave the ordnance business, Armstrong refocused and began selling cannon and warships globally. In doing so, Bastable argues, he was among the first to develop a world market for his wares, and he changed the armaments business forever. Even as Armstrong's fortunes waned in Britain, he made Elswick an international financial success. Britain was at peace, but much of the rest of the world was at war in the 1860s and 1870s. Armstrong capitalized on the absence of British governmental restrictions on his ability to export arms and aggressively marketed his technologically superior ordnance and innovative warships around the globe. As competitors like Krupps challenged Elswick with equally sophisticated technology, Armstrong's ability to navigate the political and social landscape became as important as technology in determining the company's success. Although it suffered occasional setbacks, Elswick succeeded more often than not and flourished abroad even as many of its Victorian counterparts floundered in rough economic times at home. This success also ensured that the company maintained an active research and development program when its domestic competitors and government arsenals did not.

Elswick found itself well-positioned for the naval arms race that preoccupied the major and emerging powers from the late 1880s until 1914. Its expertise was appropriated by the British government for national goals, changing yet again how the company did business. Rather than managing its own affairs and selling to all available customers, Elswick found that the government now decided not only who got to buy what, but also what designs would be manufactured. Industrial capacity became more important than technological innovation; the company's interests could barely be distinguished from those of the state.

In return, Elswick profited from increasingly large arms appropriations, much as it had before 1863, and the largesse continued through the Great War. However, when hostilities ended and the British government no longer needed Elswick's wares, the company could not make up lost sales by selling elsewhere, for the world was generally at peace, or at least pretended to be. Elswick tried to diversify into nonmilitary production, but, despite all its technological expertise, it could not overcome the economic downturn of the 1920s and 1930s or popular disdain for the "merchants of death" on whom the Great War was blamed. The social, political, and economic context in which the company operated ultimately exerted more influence on its fortunes than its ability to produce innovative technology, and Elswick disappeared in 1937.

Armstrong's story is interesting, and Bastable's...

pdf

Share