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  • War and Ruin: William T. Sherman and the Savannah Campaign
  • Alan C. Downs
War and Ruin: William T. Sherman and the Savannah Campaign. By Anne J. Bailey. (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2003. Pp. 144. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $19.95.)

The history of the American Civil War is replete with controversial personalities, perhaps none more so than William Tecumseh Sherman. In the minds of many contemporary Southerners, Sherman's name is synonymous with the antichrist—an association derived in large part from the mythology that evolved concerning his 300-mile march from Atlanta to Savannah in late November and December of 1864. Following in the footsteps of John Marszalek, Anne Bailey's War and Ruin does an admirable job of cutting through the layers of regional memory tainted by the realities of war, the bitter era of Reconstruction, and the constructs of Hollywood—Gone With the Wind being the most obvious example—no easy task for the historian. Arguing that Sherman's march was more devastating psychologically to Georgians than physically destructive, Bailey's concise overview of this important campaign paints a portrait of Sherman and his march that is as balanced as it is informative. [End Page 333]

As a logical extension of Bailey's earlier work, The Chessboard of War: Sherman and Hood in the Autumn Campaigns of 1864 (2000), War and Ruin places Sherman's march to the sea into a broad military and political context. Bailey gives due attention to Sherman's options following his occupation of Atlanta, Confederate responses to the blue-clad invaders as they moved through southeastern Georgia, the varied military and political personalities on both sides of the campaign, the dashed expectations of the region's black population, and the experiences of civilians as they faced the unimaginable. Woven throughout the narrative are vivid descriptions of the prominent places associated with the march—particularly Atlanta, Milledgeville, and Savannah.

Bailey's thesis is persuasive if not entirely new. Civilians living in the projected path of Sherman's advance into southeast Georgia suffered anxieties created by circulating oral and written accounts of the devastation in Atlanta. "This result was what the general intended," the author suggests, "for the psychological effects of such anxieties could be as draining as the actual event; Sherman did not have to devastate the landscape to evoke a terrified response" (54). In fact, Sherman's bark was typically louder than his bite. Using blustery language, Sherman often implied much more than he actually delivered. Notwithstanding his declaration to "make Georgia howl" and that "war and individual ruin are synonymous terms," evidence of complete devastation to civilian property is at best limited. This is not to say that civilians fared well in the wake of the Federal advance—they most certainly did not—but the hardship created by the loss of livestock, crops, and (in some cases) personal possessions falls substantially short of the "scorched earth" policy commonly associated with the march to the sea. Today, numerous antebellum homes along Sherman's route to Savannah provide evidence to the contrary.

Desiring to avoid the incessant bloodshed characteristic of Grant's campaign in Virginia, Sherman sought to use an unorthodox military undertaking as a vehicle to end the war as quickly as possible with the least amount of bloodshed. He hoped to break the morale of the Southern populace by making it "feel the Effects of the war [and see] how the Power of the United States can reach him in his innermost recesses" (130). Bailey correctly concurs with Sherman when she states: "Battles were not always as important as the intimidation of the civilian population" (135). Nevertheless, the nature and legacy of this intimidation is still open to discussion. Was the march to the sea an example of total war? If so, to what degree should Sherman be found culpable for its adoption? Bailey outlines in her epilogue the status of this ongoing debate as well as Sherman's contribution to military strategy in general and to the American way of war in particular. Concluding that Sherman was "a precursor [End Page 334] of the concept that war is not won by armies alone," Bailey nevertheless rightly argues...

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