Abstract

The application of "thick" ethical concepts is best understood as a process of reflective rather than deductive judgment. Taking the form "B is as X as A," where X is a thick ethical concept and A and B are narrative wholes unified through X (for example, "Those who hid Jews from the Nazis were as brave as Achilles"), reflective judgment opens thick ethical concepts to transformation. Though interpretive, such reflective judgment may still be able to provide validity without recourse to "thin," purportedly context-neutral terms.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1527-2001
Print ISSN
0887-5367
Pages
pp. 115-126
Launched on MUSE
2005-07-14
Open Access
No
Archive Status
Archived 2009
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