The Military History of Tsarist Russia, and: The Military History of the Soviet Union (review)

As Frederick W. Kagan and Robin Higham observe in their introduction to these two exceptional volumes, the "paradox of power and weakness is one of the hallmarks of Russian military history" (p. 9). Russia's enormous size contributes to the paradox by limiting its navy to regional fleets and separating potential theaters of war by vast distances. Consequently, Russia's size has rendered her "at once almost invulnerable to subjugation and almost unable to defend herself with any degree of economy" (p. 2).

Volume One, The Military History of Tsarist Russia, commences with Professor Brian Davies's examination of "The Foundations of the Muscovite Military, 1453–1613" and is followed by essays by recognized experts covering specific periods of history arranged in chronological order up through David R. Jones's article, "The Imperial Army in World War I, 1914–1917."

Davies asserts that the anarchy of civil war (1425–53) "convinced the aristocracy to acquiesce to the sovereign's claims of autocratic power" (p. 11). His account of autocracy's tightening grip over the service nobility and, thus, the middle and lower service classes from 1453 is concise and persuasive. But his explanation of autocracy's collapse during the "Time of Troubles" cannot satisfy anyone who has read Chester S. L. Dunning's study of the subject (Russia's First Civil War: The Time of Troubles and the Founding of the Romanov Dynasty [University Park, Pa.: Penn State University Press, 2001]).

Paul Bushkovich examines Russia's "adoption of Western methods and equipment" (p. 33) after the "Troubles," culminating in Peter the Great's historic reorganization of the Russian Army and founding of a navy. Significantly, he credits Peter's military successes against the West with helping to "bring Russia into Europe and into the modern age" (p. 42).

Bruce W. Menning's two successive chapters examine the "golden age" of Russian military history while covering Peter's successors through Paul I. The period saw extraordinary military leadership, especially in the persons of P. A. Rumiantsev and A. V. Suvorov, the development of military doctrine, "something approaching a truly national army" (p. 71), and significant improvements in "recruitment, organization, controlling structure, armament, supply, maintenance, finance, and doctrine" (p. 103).

Nevertheless, Professor Kagan claims that it took reforms modeled on Napoleon's Grande Armée, especially "the establishment of regular and highly articulated staffs at the army, corps, and divisions levels" (p. 116) to enable Russia to defeat France. Moreover, Russia's subsequent fear of war with Europe, when combined with its failure to free its serfs (which prevented the military from establishing a "cadre-and-reserve system" (p. 121) compelled it to maintain a postwar "standing army so large that it bankrupted the already poor state" (p. 121).

Russia's weaknesses were exposed during the Crimean War. But, as Robert F. Baumann writes, military defeat made it politically possible to liberate the serfs and implement Dmitri Miliutin's deservedly famous military reforms.

In his chapter devoted to Russia's navy, Jacob W. Kipp calls the Crimean War a "misnomer," because "Anglo-French strategy sought decision in the Baltic where naval expeditions deployed in 1854 and 1855 . . . were the primary mover in the Russian attempt to achieve naval self-sufficiency and led to experiments with galvanic mines, screw-gunboats and primitive ironclads" (p. 163).

Examining the Russo-Japanese War, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye cites daunting logistical difficulties, heavy losses, and the disaster at Tsushima for sapping "what little will remained" (p. 199) to continue the highly unpopular conflict. Although that fiasco would be studied for the next decade, Bruce Menning concludes that such lessons were "imperfectly" applied during...