Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire (review)

There is little as ephemeral these days as instant war books by network consultants, unless it is campaign books by defeated presidential candidates. Winning Modern Wars is half the first and half the second. The first half of the book, precisely, is the story of the first phase of the war in Iraq as it appeared from the consultant's chair at CNN occupied by, among others, General (Retired) Wesley Clark, former SACEUR during the NATO war with Serbia and the subsequent occupation of Kosovo, and the only member of the West Point class of 1966 to have won a state (Oklahoma) in a Democratic presidential primary election. (He came second in three others.) The second half of Winning Modern Wars is essentially a campaign tract, a candidate's critique of the incumbent (and ultimate winner) and broad vision of the sunlit uplands to which a wiser, steadier hand could lead (would have led) us. Former candidate Clark insists the views preceded the run he was prevailed upon to make. We don't have to believe that entirely.

The first half of the book presents a tidy telling of the march to Baghdad, an account that sticks firmly to the code of the flag officer: "generals will say nothing negative about other generals." There is almost no criticism of the military conduct of the operation and the author includes the obligatory paean to the courageous men and women who actually fought it, without actually becoming too involved in describing the war they saw. Almost everything disclosed has now been surpassed by more detailed accounts by service histories, Bob Woodward, General Tom Franks and a host of embedded journalists covering the low end. This account's principal value is limited to its short but comprehensive compass and the balanced judgments explaining with the career soldier's experienced eye how skillful adjustments to the plan are often the mark of the professional, not an indication of avoidable error.

The author's main thesis is that U.S. global strategy has become seriously derailed, both in objective and content. In objective, candidate Clark argues the invasion of Iraq was a serious diversion from the War on Terror, which he equates essentially with killing the instigators of 9/11. In content, the former NATO commander is disgusted with U.S. unilateralism and what he sees as naive rightwing neo-imperialism. To say the author's arguments failed to convince the electorate does not, ipso facto, mean they are wrong but there is little but an appeal to the already convinced. What the General does not do here, and failed to do as well in his retirement book, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), is lay out a synthetic view of what he believes modern war to be—beyond multilateral, dominated by precision weapons, and in full view of the global media.

As much as I admire my friend and West Point classmate, I can think of no reason why a member of the Society of Military History would want to invest in this book.