Hat in the Ring: The Birth of American Air Power in the Great War (review)

Bert Frandsen's study of the First Pursuit Group, the United States's cadre of fighter pilots in 1918, describes the evolution of this early unit and the "successful case in technology transfer" (p. 266) represented by its absorption of British and French experience and use of French aircraft to develop American fighter aviation. The adoption of its techniques by other American fighter squadrons confirmed its key role in the early history of American airpower.

Frandsen's vivid narrative focuses on individual pilots as well, including aviators ignored in previous histories who played crucial roles in early American fighter aviation. He explores the different cultures of the pursuit pilots trained by the British and the French and the personal and political machinations behind the scenes of the embryonic American fighter arm. He also devotes due attention to fighter aviation technology—discussing American pilots' initial preference for the Nieuport's climb and maneuverability over the SPAD's speed and sturdiness, the "teething" difficulties of the SPAD's 200-horsepower engine, and the fragile Nieuport's distressing tendency to shed its top wing in combat, which prompted its relegation to second-line fighter behind the SPAD.

Frandsen should have contextualized this highly focused history of the First Pursuit Group more firmly within the development of Entente aviation on the Western Front. For example, he attributes the choice between the Nieuport and the SPAD to fighting styles and asserts that "the more aggressive squadrons of the British tradition preferred a dog-fighting aircraft" (p. 270), clearly referring to the rotary-engined Sopwith Camel. However, by 1918 the RAF had relegated Camel squadrons to low-level operations and ground strafing. For fighter/pursuit duties the British preferred the speedy and more stable SE5a—occasionally called "the British SPAD" because of its Hispano-Suiza engine—to the older and slower Camel. The offensive nature of French and British aviation required a fast fighter that could engage and break off combat over enemy lines at will, not a "dog-fighter" without the speed to escape when necessary. More discussion of the Hispano-Suiza's revolutionary nature would also have helped readers understand the choice.

Frandsen believes that the preeminence of pursuit aviation reflected the importance of aerial superiority and consequently equates fighter aviation with combat aviation—and thus the story of this unit with the birth of American airpower. However, the U.S. Air Service maintained a balance of pursuit and observation craft, with a tiny percentage of bombers, and constituted only 10 percent of Entente airpower on the Western Front. Frandsen virtually ignores the operations of more than half of the American air arm—all of which were combat aircraft in the wider sense—and of the much larger French and British air arms.

Frandsen might also have noted that American, British, and French aviation plans for 1919 all emphasized two-seat fighters over single-seaters, a reversal of their composition in 1918. The success of the British Bristol reconnaissance fighter and highly maneuverable German two-seaters had impressed all observers with their versatility in long-range bomber escort, ground strafing, and fighter reconnaissance. Single-seaters would concentrate on the more defensive task of interception in 1919.

Consideration of such examples, indicative of the rapidly evolving nature of air war and aviation technology between 1914 and 1918, might have prompted Frandsen to avoid the strong implication of linear development entailed in his assertion that these origins of pursuit aviation in 1918 are "the reason that air superiority continues to be first priority for American combat aviation" (p. 273). An organization's origins set the mold; they do not predetermine its evolution, as the complex history of American airpower amply demonstrates. Finally, this well-researched work would have benefited from a bibliography. These criticisms notwithstanding, Frandsen has written a fine study of the First Pursuit Group's role in the...