The Shift in Ben-Gurion's Attitude toward the Kingdom of Jordan

The year 1958 was a period of turmoil and disruption in the Middle East. In Israel, events in the region stimulated expectations about rectifications on the eastern border. After careful consideration of the changing situation, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion decided to preserve the status quo along Israel's eastern frontier. This decision signaled the start of a shift in his attitude toward the Kingdom of Jordan. At the beginning of the decade, Ben-Gurion had defined the border with Jordan as "ridiculous." ¹ He claimed that "Jordan is an artificial state with no future." ² Toward the end of the decade, he had come to perceive Jordan's independent existence as an important factor for contributing to Israel's security, and worked to maintain the status quo along the borders of the two states.

There were many indicators of significant change in the region. On 22 February, Egypt and Syria merged to become the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.). The rulers of Jordan and Iraq reacted to this move by proclaiming a union between their two kingdoms. An armed uprising, fueled by support from neighboring Syria, raged in Lebanon. ³ A military coup erupted in Iraq, wiping out the monarchy and its leading figures. There was a distinct danger of the takeover of Jordan and Lebanon by the U.A.R., a threat which exemplified the sturm und drang of Arab nationalism. In these fluid conditions around her borders, Israel had to re-examine her policy in the light of possible changes in Jordan's status.

In 1958, too, American Marines landed on the Lebanese coast to block Syria from taking control of the country. At the same time, Britain flew in thousands of soldiers to defend the Hashemite regime in Jordan. In response to an American request, Israel permitted British planes carrying troops and military equipment to fly to Jordan through Israeli air space. This consent elicited sharp criticism from the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, who demanded an immediate cessation of the flights; and when Israel indeed stopped them, President Eisenhower criticized Israel for surrendering to Moscow's threats. ⁴ For his part, Khrushchev "repaid" Israel's termination of the flights by omitting her from the list of countries invited to the summit conference he initiated to discuss the crisis in the Middle East. Due to Chinese objections, Kruschev later withdrew his summit initiative, ⁵ but the insult remained.

The anxiety on Israel's eastern border even increased, when, following the overthrow of the Hashemite king in Baghdad, pressures grew to depose his cousin, King Hussein, in Amman. For years, Ben-Gurion had publicly warned that Israel reserved the right to freedom of action if foreign armies entered the territory of the Jordanian Kingdom. It appeared as if the moment for action had come when the Iraqi army threatened King Hussein after he announced that he was now the king of both Jordan and Iraq. Nevertheless, Ben-Gurion maintained "air silence" and refrained from repeating his previous warnings. Moreover, he was cautious not to confirm proposals by his aides for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to take advantage of this apparently convenient moment to carry out rectifications along Israel's eastern frontiers.

What caused this shift in Ben-Gurion's stand? Why did he not order the IDF to deploy along the Jordan River and thus realize his "latent dream?" The conventional explanation is that, since the Arabs did not flee from Gaza during the Sinai Crisis of 1956, Ben-Gurion concluded that expanding Israel's borders could endanger the Jewish majority in the State of Israel. This interpretation is based on comments Ben-Gurion made about the danger of eroding the Jewish majority in Israel, but it is not compatible with the diplomatic activity he undertook to ensure U.S. support for the plan to promote a possible partition of the Kingdom of Jordan or to react to it by...