Reverse Sexism? Not to Worry

I concur with John Robertson that preconception sex selection (PSS) would be morally objectionable if it were sexist, and that it is not necessarily sexist (anymore than post conception sex selection is necessarily sexist). ¹ I disagree, however, that PSS is morally permissible on grounds of procreative liberty or the right to reproduce. Further, I believe that PSS is more likely than not to be sexist in its intent or in its consequences. Robertson appears to think otherwise.

According to Robertson, procreative liberty is the "freedom to reproduce or not to reproduce in the genetic sense." It also includes the freedom to gestate "whether or not there is a genetic connection to the resulting child" (Robertson 1996, 22-23) He deploys this definition in support of PSS by arguing that a couple who wish to have a biologically related child only if the child is of one sex rather than the other are deprived of their "fundamental right" to reproduce if PSS is not available to them. This argument erroneously assumes that the right to reproduce implies the right to reproduce a child of a specific kind. As Rebecca Dresser observes, "helping people to have children is different from helping them to have a particular kind of child" (Dresser 2001). It would be as wrong to say a couple have a fundamental right to reproduce a child who is a clone of one of them or to reproduce a child who has the same disabilities that they have. Although Robertson may affirm procreative liberty in these situations also, neither right is implied by the right to reproduce.

In Children of Choice Robertson (1996, 22) acknowledges that the right to reproduce is separable from the right to raise a child, but he does not fully examine the implications of that separability for sex selection. This leaves me wondering how he might respond to scenarios not addressed in his article. Would he defend the right to reproduce a child of the desired sex solely on grounds of that right even if the reproducing person had no intention of raising the child? Would a sperm "donor," for example, be entitled to flow cytometry so as to ensure, or to maximize the chance, that any embryo developed from his gametes is male? ² Would a potential egg "donor" be entitled to require that embryos formed from her gametes be transferred to the recipient only if they are determined to be female? Or would a woman who desires to gestate the genetic offspring of another be entitled to exclude some embryos from that offer on grounds of their sex? In none of these cases is the rationale for sex selection necessarily sexist. But as Robertson defines it, the right to reproduce entails the right to sex selection in all of these cases, as well as those where the right to reproduce is exercised by those who intend to raise the child.

Neither does the right not to reproduce imply the right to terminate a pregnancy at any point during gestation for any reason. Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 113 [1973]) allows the states to proscribe abortion after viability only if the pregnant woman's health is not threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. The rationale for this caveat is not simply procreative freedom but the woman's right to avoid harm to herself. Even those who, like me, do not agree with Robertson's claim that the right to reproduce includes the right to PSS, may support PSS on this basis. We may argue, for example, that the anticipation of social stigmatization or ostracization may provide moral justification for PSS by individuals in particular cultural milieux. However, this is not equivalent to justification of permissive policies for PSS.

In addition to his affirmation of procreative liberty, Robertson apparently supports permissive policies for PSS because such policies are unlikely to be sexist in their intent or consequences. In contrast, I think that sexist intent and...