Who Voted with Hopkins? Institutional Politics and the WPA

Scholars of the politics of public social policy have engaged in contentious debates over "institutional" and "political" theories. ¹ Institutional theories hold that U.S. social policy is inhibited by fragmented political institutions and weak executive state organizations. Political theories hold that the United States lacks a left-wing political party and a strong labor movement to push for social policy. Both theories are thus pessimistic about and cannot account for advances in U.S. social policy.

But there have been big steps forward in U.S. social policy, most notably during the 1930s and the 1960s. During the New Deal, the Social Security Act was passed--including Old-Age Assistance, old-age and unemployment insurance, and Aid to Dependent Children. Also adopted was the understudied "Works Program." This program, operated mainly by the Works Progress Administration (WPA), was at the center of New Deal social policy. In its day the WPA cost more and affected more Americans than all the Social Security Act programs combined and was the most prominent political issue in U.S. social policy. The Works Program was authorized before the Social Security Act and was meant to be the centerpiece of a permanent social policy reform. Franklin Roosevelt considered the social security legislation a "companion measure" to the Works Program. By the end of the 1930s, largely because of spending for the Works Program, the United States jumped to world leadership in social policy effort. ²

Here we provide a theoretical synthesis that includes both institutional conditions and political actors and can account for both restrictions on and advances in U.S. policy. Combining institutional and political theoretical arguments has its advantages because each theory is limited in ways that are complementary. Institutional arguments discount the role of political actors in influencing policy; political arguments ignore the possibility that these actors may have impacts that vary according to institutional settings. Our theory, however, does not merely combine existing arguments.

On the institutional side, we argue that democratic procedures have a greater influence on social policy developments than does the centralization of political authority. Public policy is more likely to aid everyday people to the extent that they have a say in politics, for office seekers and holders have to take them into account. We also argue that the relative orientation of a political party system toward either programs or patronage greatly influences social policy. Patronage-oriented parties tend to dampen categorical reforms--especially reforms with national standards, administration, and controls.

On the political side, we argue that the executive and legislative representatives of political parties are most likely to win public spending struggles when they form what we call a "reform-oriented regime." A reform-oriented regime comprises a president allied with pro-spending groups and a Congress in which left and center legislators dominate. In America for most of the twentieth century, this amounted to the control of the government by Democrats from outside the underdemocratized South and from non-patronage-oriented party systems, augmented by radical third-party legislators. We also argue that social movements can bolster these regimes.

Programs can take forms that might influence their future. It is often argued that programs with many beneficiaries will grow, while restricted programs will decline. We argue, however, that whether a program allows discretion to local polities in directing benefits also influences its fate. Programs providing discretion may win support from representatives from underdemocratized or patronage-oriented polities. But such discretion may also reduce support from other actors--people opposed to unfairness in social policy and patronage-oriented politicians excluded from the spoils.

To appraise our arguments, we consider American social policy by way of the WPA. We examine the WPA's historical trajectory--the struggles over its size and form from its inauguration in 1935 to its demise in 1943. We also address WPA-related congressional roll-call votes, which are numerous...