Dark Victory: America's Second War Against Iraq (review)

In his critique of the 1991 Gulf War (Hollow Victory, Brassey's, 1993), defense analyst Jeffrey Record predicted that while a great tactical and operational success, that victory was incomplete and American forces would have to return to finish the job. His was one of the few dissenting voices among a plethora of books heaping praise on the administration and its armed forces for the dramatic defeat of the Iraqi Army. Of course, events of the last two years have validated Record's controversial evaluation and U.S. troops, supported by a small British contingent, returned to the Gulf and put an end to Hussein's Ba'athist regime. Again Record has taken the lead in criticizing American strategy with Dark Victory: America's Second War Against Iraq and the most important study of this conflict to date.

What make's Record's analysis significant for readers of this journal is his exploration of the linkage between politics, strategy, and operations. Writing shortly after the end of the ground combat, and before the conflict broke into an insurgency, he argues that the attack against Iraq was doomed to failure because it was devoid of a legitimate strategic purpose that could lead to a successful political result. The author builds a convincing case that American strategic thinking in regards to Iraq was irrational and accuses the George W. Bush administration of standing Clausewitz on his head by using this war as a substitute for political discourse. While he believes that the use of force against the Taliban in Afghanistan was justified, combining Saddam Hussein into the "war on terror" was a mistake of the first order, as he and his regime were not connected to Osama Bin Laden's war against the United States. Hussein, Record argues, posed no direct and imminent threat to this nation or its interests in the Middle East. Ignoring the concerns of the international community and professionals within the armed forces, the President embraced a neoconservative, values-based, ideology and ordered the attack on Iraq. Believing the myth that war would be short, he failed to provide the operational means to stabilize Iraq in its postcombat phase, contributing to the current insurgency. Furthermore, from Record's perspective, the American assault was not a "preemptive war" as portrayed by the administration but a war of aggression and alien to traditional American values. Consequently, this conflict will have long-term consequences for both the United States and world stability.

Many of Jeffrey Record's arguments have now found their way into the mainstream press, especially as a result of a series of monographs published as Visiting Professor at the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute. Of course, this book has all the deficiencies of any history written before the event is over and historians have time to gain perspective. Other than speeches by government officials and documents they release, the author relies almost exclusively on secondary sources. However, he meticulously uses this information to create a sophisticated analysis of the policy and strategy that propelled American and British forces into Iraq. His are controversial arguments. However, members of this society should read and consider Record's analysis. Most likely it will become, and remain, this conflict's standard evaluation of senior decision making until this administration declassifies and releases its most important internal records.