Help from Above: Air Force Close Air Support of the Army, 1946-1973 (review)

Close air support (CAS) is the fallout from the Air Force's separation from the Army in 1947. Like the child of a divorced couple, CAS is an issue that draws them reluctantly back together and has remained a flashpoint. In this well written work, retired U.S. Air Force colonel and distinguished Air Force historian, John Schlight, presents a comprehensive and scholarly study of the CAS issue in the post-World War II years through the Vietnam War.

His research and exposition go deep into the controversy. He provides a historical background of CAS, then traces the vagaries of the relationship through the major episodes of this period: post-World War II, the Korean War, New Look nuclear deterrence, Kennedy's Flexible Response, and the Vietnam War. Within each of these episodes Schlight examines the subissues that comprised the overall CAS question. These include aircraft, communications, joint training, aircraft basing, ordnance, policy, doctrine, combat success and the all-important issue of command and control.

This is an institutional history and as such can be expected to put the Air Force's best foot forward regarding a vexing issue; and the author does, although judiciously. He points out the Army's failure to fulfill its obligations regarding the joint CAS system and the Air Force's shortcomings as well. Ultimately, however, this book is a justification for the Air Force CAS efforts or lack thereof. The underlying tone of the book suggests that the root cause of the controversy was "the Army's eternal quest for control of CAS," (p. 169) instead of a belief within the Army that CAS could be done better, regardless of who owned the airplane.

A key contention Schlight makes is that the Air Force provided the Army the best air support for the dollar. It is only because the U.S. is a wealthy nation that each service can have its own CAS system. The author contends that even with organic helicopter gunships, airmobile tactics used in Vietnam required more Air Force support than conventional infantry tactics. He dismisses the much-touted Marine Corps CAS system as much too extravagant, arguing that CAS was the sole mission Marine aviators had to worry about and it was too decentralized—every Marine ground commander had his penny-pack of Marine airplanes. He makes the incredibly obtuse observation that Marine CAS was "seldom delivered in concert with other types of firepower" (p. 375). Ironically, however, as Schlight traces the story of how the Air Force improved their CAS system, we find them implementing procedures developed years earlier by the Navy and Marine Corps. This includes a fire support coordination center (FSCC), to integrate air support into surface-based fires and a direct air support center (DASC) to provide for "decentralized execution and centralized control" (p. 378) of air support.

Despite having an Air Force-centric tone, Schlight's work is recommended reading for the professional military. His research is impressive and much new material on the CAS controversy is presented. Perhaps a more balanced approach could have been achieved if he and an Army historian could have written the book jointly.