Chasing the Silver Bullet: U.S. Air Force Weapons Development from Vietnam to Desert Storm (review)

Kenneth Werrell asks why the United States Air Force developed the technology it has used over the past half-century, and how effective that technology has proved to be in wartime. He is at his best in digesting the statistics of success or failure—tallying how many sorties were flown, how many of those aircraft returned, and how many accomplished their job. While those types of statistics might seem to be commensurate over five decades and many types of aircraft, there are important differences in the way they were generated and interpreted, and Werrell does not shy from stating his own opinion about which aircraft deserve to be called successful. There is a pattern to most chapters in Chasing the Silver Bullet: The air force establishes a need and mission for a type of aircraft, studies and proposals ensue, politics skews development, commanders identify the optimum use of the aircraft, pilots draw first blood, success or failure is reckoned up.

What Werrell ultimately provides is a solid, comprehensive summary of major developments in aircraft from the 1960s through the early 1990s. His is the usual airframe-centric view of air technology, though with due recognition given to the importance of munitions, electronics, and other facets of weapons systems. And even though high-performance fighters play the starring roles in his analysis, he pays proper attention to the A-10 Warthog close-air-support aircraft, various bombers, command-and-control aircraft, aircraft for logistics and transport, and other less glamorous planes.

Some of the more interesting sections of Chasing the Silver Bullet deal with the development of gunships in Vietnam, the operational success of the F-117 stealth fighter, and the modern military uses of satellites. The last two chapters describe how, given the long lead times needed to move equipment to the Persian Gulf in 1991, planning the air campaign required a comprehensive assessment of what "silver bullets" the air force might have available. Finally, there is an examination of kill rates for weapons used in the first Gulf War.

Most unfortunate is the timing of this book. For his treatment of the 1991 Desert Shield phase of the Gulf War, Werrell relies on the flurry of secondary materials that appeared prior to 1995. Much of that analysis has been obviated by new information from the second phase of the Gulf War, when American and coalition forces attacked Iraq in March 2003. For example, Werrell notes that American aircraft were ineffective in targeting Iraqi nuclear facilities; it now seems clear that there was little to target. Furthermore, we now know that, because of mismatches between ground and air intelligence, American bombers were much less successful in targeting Iraqi bunkers than had been thought. And, most importantly, we know that, as happened in Vietnam, the obvious superiority of American air power—established in 1991, continuing through the "no-fly-zone" years of the conflict and into the present—did nothing to help establish control on the ground after May 2003.

Historians of technology will find other reasons to be frustrated by this book. Werrell says little about the engineering process or about the costs of any of this hardware, and he seldom identifies key decision makers or even units within the air force. Where he starts to explore newer topics, such as Stealth aircraft, he relies almost entirely on secondary materials. Finally, his analysis isolates airframes and technology, showing little understanding of how the entire air-controlled battlefield is an integrated technological system. Still, this is a solid account of how the reputations enjoyed by discrete technologies in the air force have waxed and waned as the aircraft have seen service.