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Reviewed by:
  • Vietnam and the American Political Tradition
  • Gary R. Hess
Vietnam and the American Political Tradition. Edited by Randall B. Woods (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 324 pp. $60.00 cloth $20.00 paper

Vietnam and the American Political Tradition is a work of importance to historians and political scientists. Scholars interested in the Vietnam War, congressional-executive relations, the politics of dissent, and American political culture during the Cold War will benefit from this collection of essays, which are grounded in primary sources that illuminate the understudied role of Congress during the Vietnam War. The contributors, all historians of American foreign relations, blend narrative with interpretation. This conventional approach may disappoint readers looking for the application of quantitative analysis or international- relations theory. Yet, Woods offers an overarching argument in his [End Page 322] introduction, namely, that the disaffection of the seven senators whose careers are featured in the essays that constitute the heart of the book contributed to the erosion of the Cold War consensus. These senators, six Democrats (Ernest Gruening George McGovern, J. William Fulbright, Frank Church, Mike Mansfield, Albert A. Gore) and one Republican (John Sherman Cooper) tried to reverse Lyndon Johnson's escalation and to accelerate Richard Nixon's disengagement.

The essays address illuminating themes. First, each of the authors places his subject's dissent within the political culture that shaped his career. Framing this discussion are introductory essays by Frank Ninkovich on cycles of anti-imperialism between the 1890s and the 1960s and by Woods on the development of the post-World War II congressional Cold War consensus. Nearly all of the dissenters represented the progressive tradition of anti-imperialism, which was reinforced in some cases by a regional sense of a colonial status within America. Personal idiosyncrasies, such as Gore's pride in being a maverick and his antagonism toward Johnson, and the broadening effect of educational experiences, notable in the cases of Fulbright and McGovern, entered into the context of senatorial dissent. Regardless of background, they all studied the political situation in Vietnam (most fully Church, Mansfield, and McGovern) and concluded that the United States was embarked on a futile objective of dubious national interest.

Second, the essays provide case studies of the problems involved in challenging presidential leadership in wartime. They employed three techniques in the efforts to change policy: outspoken opposition, represented by Gruening, Gore, and increasingly McGovern; quiet entreaties to the White House, Mansfield's approach; and use of congressional power through hearings and legislation, on which Fulbright, Church, Cooper, and (to a lesser extent) McGovern relied. Each approach had its shortcomings. Gruening, as discussed by Robert D. Johnson) was easily marginalized; Mansfield (as studied by Donald A. Ritchie), for all of his eloquence and prescience, was politely ignored; the legislative approach accomplished more, but the tireless efforts of Fulbright, Church, McGovern, and Cooper on that front (as described by Woods, David Schmitz, Thomas Knock, and Fredrik Logevall, respectively) took years to achieve what turned out to be modest and compromised measures. These studies are thus a reminder of the courage required to challenge a president in wartime (even the most unpopular one in American history); four of the senators lost bids for re-election at least in part due to the backlash against dissent. An underlying sub-theme in the essays is the extent to which Vietnam was a "Republican War," as evidenced by the dependence of Johnson and Nixon on Republican support.

The senators, for all of their shortcomings and frustrations, look better in retrospect than the presidents that they battled. Concluding essays on Johnson by William Brands and Nixon by Robert Schulzinger underline how the Vietnam tragedy was shaped by one president whose "legislative style" prevented him from understanding broader strategic [End Page 323] interests and a successor whose secretiveness and highhandedness extended the war and brought relations with Congress to a nadir.

Vietnam and the American Political Tradition would have benefited from a brief concluding chapter. Furthermore, although the book is comprehensive in most respects, a strong case could be made for including a second Republican (Mark Hatfield of Oregon being the likely choice) and for devoting more attention to the role of...

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