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Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs 2004 (2004) 35-43



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Jacob Vigdor: Unfortunately, race riots are not a thing of the past. From Benton Harbor, Michigan, to Sydney, Australia, violent and destructive outbreaks in minority neighborhoods continue to make headlines in the twenty-first century. As William J. Collins and Robert A. Margo note, a considerable amount of social science research has sought to determine the causes of riots, perhaps in the hope that public policy offers some remedy that can prevent future events. Any such remedy, whether in the guise of governmental reform or redistributive policy, is likely to impose significant costs on society. To determine whether these costs are worth bearing, a complete accounting of the social costs of riots is indispensable. Collins and Margo make an important point: that the social costs of riots are likely to extend far beyond the bricks-and-mortar costs of rebuilding and revitalizing individual neighborhoods. As the authors' analysis and my comments should make clear, the costs identified in this paper are likely to represent only a fraction of the total. As Collins and Margo note, however, this work is but the beginning of an extensive, well-planned, and important research agenda.

Riots, by altering the risk perceptions of firms and households, should make certain neighborhoods less attractive places to live and work. Collins and Margo note the labor demand impact of this change—indeed, it serves as the central motivation for this study—but there are several other noteworthy implications. Demand for residential location in high-risk neighborhoods should decline as well: property destruction is presumably a disamenity to both firms and consumers. It is thus a straightforward [End Page 35] prediction that rents will decline in riot-prone neighborhoods.55 Owners of property will experience negative wealth effects; renters will witness a reduction in housing costs to offset some or all (or even more than all) of the utility loss associated with increased risk.


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Table 7
Long-Term Trends in Census Tract 185, Detroit, Michigan

Table 7 presents some basic evidence consistent with these implications. The table tracks basic census statistics for a single census tract in Detroit Michigan—sixteen blocks incorporating the epicenter of the 1967 riots. The neighborhood at the heart of the riot had within the past generation "tipped" from an ethnic enclave populated largely by Russian and Polish immigrants and their children to an overwhelmingly black neighborhood. Through this transition, the population was trending gradually downward, while vacancy rates remained stable and average rents maintained some premium over the citywide average. Three years after the riot, the census recorded an accelerating population decline, a significant relative drop in rents, and a noteworthy uptick in vacancy rates. Changes in census tract boundaries preclude the further tracking of this neighborhood through time, but the immediate response of the local property market to the riot seems consistent with basic economic logic.

What of the labor market implications of riots? As Collins and Margo point out, there are reasons to think any such impact would be muted. In the long run, we expect people to move out of a geographic area rather than stay perpetually unemployed. Moreover, if households are more averse to riot-prone neighborhoods than firms, remaining households [End Page 36] might witness a relative increase in job prospects. To believe that riots have long-term labor market effects, one must believe that residents of affected neighborhoods face obstacles to relocation and to taking jobs in areas outside their own neighborhood. Theoretical arguments in favor of such barriers have been made for many years, but empirical evidence on the spatial mismatch hypothesis, and of the influence of neighborhood on labor market outcomes in general, has been quite mixed.

Table 7 confirms the notion that the impact of riots on labor market outcomes is more ambiguous than the impact on property markets. As the neighborhood surrounding the epicenter of the 1967 riot transitioned from white to black between 1940 and 1960, residents' labor market outcomes tracked downwards. As of 1960...

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