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Biblical and Philosophical Foundations

Introduction

A SURROGATE MOTHER is left with twins she is carrying for a couple who no longer wants them. The twins were conceived in a petri dish with the man's sperm and a donor egg from an unknown woman.¹ A young man whose father is referred to as Batch 28 struggles with his identity. His mother, a single parent, was impregnated with the frozen sperm of a Nobel Prize winner.² Infertile couples adopt leftover embryos in fertility clinics.³ All these increasingly common scenarios raise profound questions of the relationship of these children to their biological parents. Who actually is the biological parent, and what effect on the child and family results from such nonnatural interventions in the process of conception and gestation?

The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 1987 issued "Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation" (*Donum Vitae*), which offers fundamental guidelines for evaluation of the new reproductive technologies such as in vitro fertilization and surrogate motherhood, and which forthrightly states,

Heterologous artificial fertilization violates the rights of the child; it deprives him of his filial relationship with his parental origins and can hinder the maturing of his personal identity. . . . It brings about and manifests a rupture between genetic parenthood, gestational parenthood and responsibility for upbringing. Such damage to the personal relationships within the family has repercussions on civil society: What threatens the unity and stability of the family is a cause of dissension, disorder and injustice in the whole of social life.⁴

With modern technologies, the heretofore integrity of the procreative process has been fundamentally ruptured. This reaches its climax in such procedures as cloning, in vitro fertilization, and surrogacy. But as reproductive science moves more deeply into this twilight zone, there is generalized unease about the meaning and direction of these techniques. In effect, they are forcing us back to the fundamental question of personhood and its relationship to the body.⁵ In this paper, we will present perspectives from both biblical and philosophical anthropology. We hope it will help in the development of an adequate critique and evaluation of many modern developments in the biotechnological field that are incompatible with the dignity of the human person.

*Part One: Scripture*⁶

It is precisely on the issue of modern developments in biotechnology that the revelational witness of Sacred Scripture can be brought to bear in a fruitful manner. Obviously, modern biotechnological procedures are not morally evaluated within the biblical canon, and we cannot find specific and direct answers to the complex moral questions being raised by biotechnology. But we can discover principles in the text that will provide a framework and parameters within which a response can be properly constructed. In the first part of this paper, we will accordingly address discovering these

foundational elements through careful exegetical study. At a fundamental level, Scripture reveals the constitutive design of our created human reality. As the clearest expression of this is to be found in Genesis, chapters 1 to 3,⁷ we will accordingly confine our exegetical study primarily to these texts.⁸

There are two objectives of the first half of this paper. The first is to discover the extent of (constitutive) intelligent design within the created order and where it lies. The second is to articulate the foundational principles operative in the creation account that reveal the interior structure of human personality and the integral nature of human conception.⁹ By way of advanced warning, this is an approach that is “under construction.” This paper is therefore presented as an initial effort to articulate principles that will inform a proper and adequate analysis of modern biotechnological advances.

CONSTITUTIVE STRUCTURE

The most fundamental question is whether human nature itself and the nature of human conception are a given reality that must be respected in their integrity or whether they are fundamentally malleable and can be re-created or reconfigured according to the prevailing scientific dogmas or biotechnological procedures that obtain at any given time. Put another way, is there an inherently intelligible design, deriving from the divine will, which determines the parameters of human conception and nature or can they be engineered according to any given set of principles? It is here that the scriptural revelation can shed light. The easiest way to appropriate the profundity and freshness of the biblical revelation is by seeing it against its pagan backdrop.

Mythological Background

With its opening words—*bereshith barah elohim* (in the beginning God created)—Genesis shattered the ancient mythological understanding of creation. At the heart of the Hebraic revelation was the

profound understanding that Yahweh alone was Creator and willed all things into existence. This stood in contrast to the ancient pagan mythologies that, though they varied by nomenclature from area to area nevertheless had a similar conception of the nature of the world and of man. In this system, the gods were not supreme rulers or the sole creators who determine the world. Instead, they came out of the primordial chaotic mass.¹⁰ The gods also were not the only forces to be placated—there also existed the fates.¹¹

In addition, men understood themselves to be creatures created to alleviate the drudgery of certain divine beings; thus they understood themselves to occupy the role of slave within the created order.¹² Last, life was understood as bound by the cyclic rhythms of nature that were, in fact, divinized. Therefore, time took on a cyclical quality with no end point toward which all was progressing.¹³ In essence, the gods were not the ground of being for all of created reality. This fundamentally intrinsic relationship between matter and creation and the gods did not exist.¹⁴

Into this environment burst the Hebraic revelation:

bereshith bara' 'elohim 'et hashshamayim ve'et ha'arets

In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.

Each part of this verse plays a critical part in the new understanding of the divine will and intelligence that informs all of creation.

First, *bereshith* (in the beginning) carries within it the implication that there is also an end, something toward which all things move. As Ludwig Kohler writes, "To the beginning there corresponds an ending, to creation a completion, to the 'very good' here the 'perfect' yonder; they correspond, each to each; in the theology of the Old Testament creation is an eschatological conception."¹⁵ But this end always has reference to the will and intellect of God.

Second, the phrase *bara' 'elohim* reinforces the sovereignty of Israel's creator God in creation. There is a marked absence of other

gods or divine forces at play in the creative process. Only the God of Israel acts, and through Him all things come into being. This uniqueness is heightened by the use of the verb *bara'* (to create) because the only subject ever used with this verb is God, and as Walter Eichrodt notes, "it is a verb which never occurs with the accusative of the material used in the creative act."¹⁶

Third, the phrase *hashshamayim ve'et ha'arets* (the heavens and the earth) is an inclusive term of the whole created order. Hebrew did not have a collective term that encompassed all things, so used this phrase instead.¹⁷ Hence, the use of this phrase shows there was not some other force that either influenced or affected the creative order, nor was there any part of creation that was outside of the creative and informing will of God.

Taken together, this evidence affirms the uniqueness of God's position relative to the creation. The biblical text proceeds to specify the type of relationship that existed between God and His creation. This is done in three ways:

1. *veruach 'elohim merachepeth 'al-peney hamayyim*
and the Spirit/Wind of God hovered upon the face
of the waters

Unlike the deist's concept of the absent watchmaker, this verse, at the very least, rules out the image of an unconcerned Creator. Instead, it establishes a relationship (somewhat undefined) between the Creator and the created (via spirit or wind). The use of the verb *merachepeth*, which has the sense of "parental hovering over," suggests there is some personal connection at this point.¹⁸

2. *vayyo'mer 'elohim*
And God said

This phrase is used eleven times in the first chapter of Genesis. It is clear that each part of creation is willed into existence directly by

God Himself.¹⁹ Genesis does not portray the creation as emerging from a haphazard explosion of hydrogen and other molecules that then impersonally develop on their own into the present creation.²⁰ Instead, each separate part of the created order is personally willed and called into being by God, and His personal Word is intimately involved in its creation.

3. *ki-tov*

It is good

The relational dimension is further confirmed by the subsequent divine valuation (*ki-tov* / it is good), which is pronounced as each segment of the creative process is completed.²¹ The Creator does not merely create and leave the creation to its own devices but pronounces and reveals the essential nature of the created entity. There is evidenced here a personal concern and regard on the part of God.

Last, the interplay between the opening verse, Genesis 1:2 (which describes the initial creation as *tohu vabohu*, that is, an inchoate mass), and the rest of the account powerfully portrays the divine will as the constitutive element of all created reality. Pre-scinding from the complex exegetical history of this phrase, it is nonetheless clear the dramatic action present within the text moves from formlessness to form. The inchoate mass receives its form only as the divine Word is uttered. The biblical revelation shows it is precisely the Word and the will of God that informs the *tohu vabohu*, and it is the divine will that determines the structure of reality.²²

The primary theological thrust of the creation account is summarized by Eichrodt:

This understanding of the creation as the work of the covenant God not only clarified Israel's vision of the world, it also endued the will of the Creator from the start with the characteristics of personal and spiritual activity, and of moral purpose. Where Yahweh was acknowledged as Creator, it was

inconceivable that the creation should be based on impulsive caprice, or the unpredictable and aimless sport of kindred or hostile divine powers; the sovereignty of God experienced in the present meant that it could only have been transcendent rationality and moral force which determined the character of the created order.²³

The Hebraic witness affirms that the structure of the created order, which includes the human realities of personhood and conception, is determined and informed by the will of God. This does not mean we cannot cooperate with Him in these areas. Inasmuch as we are free agents, we have the freedom to choose. But we do not have the freedom to determine what is good or evil. Responsible human action requires that we conceive ourselves primarily as contingent beings who, in any intervention—biotechnological or otherwise—must respect the divinely constituted structure of our human reality.

This leads us to an examination of the texts to find the five constitutive principles that may enlighten us in our evaluation of any such interventions. These interrelated concepts form the basis of a genuine biblical anthropological outlook. As we shall see, the five principles concern (1) original prior unity, (2) differentiation, (3) the body-soul unity, (4) the generations, and (5) the one-flesh reality.

THE PRINCIPLE OF ORIGINAL UNITY AND DIFFERENTIATION

A careful examination of both²⁴ Genesis 1 and 2, shows the creation is principally founded on a dynamic of continuous differentiation that proceeds out of an original unity. Thus, there is a creative tension²⁵ that lies at the center of creation and which, in some way, articulates the relationship that exists between differing parts of the created order. This principle is critical because it shows how all (future) differentiation is grounded ontologically in a prior unity that is consequently intrinsically connected to what later emerges.

Prior Unity

As noted, Genesis 1 begins with the *tohu vabohu*. But in successive verses, this formless mass is gradually transformed as it receives God's Word. In verse 7, God divides the waters that are below from the waters that are above by means of the *haraqia'*. What already exists is divided now, forming two parts of the created order—yet they were originally one. Similarly, in creating the land in 1:9, God causes the waters that covered the earth to be gathered into one place in order to allow dry land (*hayyabashah*) to appear. This can be understood as separating out the two components from the original composite reality. In 1:24, God accomplishes the creation of the *animalia* by commanding them to emerge from the ground.²⁶ While the two components are highly differentiated, there is, nonetheless, an underlying organic commonality. As can be seen, in some instances, that which is brought forth is already hidden in some fashion within the original ground. In others, there is a greater degree of differentiation while preserving the organic link between the two. What is key in these texts is that a prior organic relationship precedes the further differentiation; that is, there is an original common ground out of which something issues forth.

This becomes critical in man whose body is made from the dust ('*aphar*') of the earth. While substantially differentiated from the created ground, he nonetheless retains an organic connection with it. This becomes evident in the judgments that follow the primordial transgression in Genesis 3. The sentence is given in 3:19: *ki-'aphar 'atah ve'el-'aphar tashuv* (because you are dust and you shall return to dust). The identity of man is predicated on that from which he came and which is evidenced in his mortality.

Differentiation

The obverse side of prior unity is the principle of differentiation. It is clear that this principle of separation is one of the key principles active within the creative process and indeed is central to the whole

covenantal understanding of Israel.²⁷ This is evidenced in several ways. First, there is the whole movement of continuous differentiation of the *tohu vabohu*. Second, Genesis 1 uses the verb “to separate” or “divide” (*badal*) five times (1:4, 6, 7, 14, and 18) to show how light is separated from darkness (1:4), how the firmament (*haraqia*‘) separates the waters above from the waters below (1:6, 7), and how the day is separated from the night by creation of the sun and moon (1:14, 18). Third, by extension, one can see the same principle at work in a slightly different way in both the creation of the dry land and the *animalia*. In 1:9 and the following verses, the waters are commanded to be gathered into one place to allow the dry land to appear. In this case, the land can be understood to have been separated out from the waters. In 1:24 and the following verses, the earth is commanded to bring forth (*totze*‘) the animals. Within this thematic scheme, this becomes a separating out of the animals from the ground. In different instances, the principle may be applied differently, yet, nevertheless, the principle of differentiation remains an overarching theme of the creative process.

CREATION OF MAN AND WOMAN

In the second chapter of Genesis (often referred to as the Yahwist account of creation),²⁸ the focus is on the creation of man and woman. Here, too, the principle of differentiated unity holds true. The text, itself, is constructed on a profound and delicate tension that is critical for articulating the relationship between man and woman. The subtle, yet profound precisions found in the text are essential as the text steers clear of both androgyny²⁹ on the one hand and autonomous independence on the other. The woman is not simply pulled out of the man or created as an autonomous and isolated principle:

And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall on the man and he slept and He took one of his ribs. . . . And the Lord God

built [*vayyiben*] the rib which He had taken from the man
[*ha'adam*] into a woman and brought her to the man (Gen.
2:21-22).

Human nature is not constructed on the coming together of two autonomous subjects. Instead, reflecting the same insight as Genesis 1, this text understands the complex of human nature to emerge from the differentiation based on a prior original unity. This avoids the understanding of sexuality as two autonomous principles striving for domination against each other. That would be to insert an unresolvable dualism into human nature. Also, this is not the separating out of an already intact female personality. There is a common ground in that the source of woman is from the body of the man, but the text clearly safeguards the integrity of the woman by the use of the verb *banah*—to build. The creation of woman is immediately done by God and requires His active intervention and will.

In the concluding movement of this primordial drama, Yahweh presents the woman to man. Upon seeing her, the man exclaims,

zo't happa 'am 'etzem me'atzamay ubasar mibbesari
lezo't yiqqare' 'ishshah ki me'ish luqachah-zo't

At length, this one is bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh.
This one shall be named woman [*'ishshah*] because from man
[*'ish*] this one was taken (Gen. 2:23).

This text clearly shows the dynamic tension between differentiation and original organic unity. What is particularly important here, however, is the name that the man gives to the woman. The text presents the name of woman as the feminine form of the man. Here, the identity of the woman is predicated on the specific relationship to the primordial man. In a real sense, she is bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh. However, she is never a mere appendage because she has a specific dignity and integrity that flows from her being created

directly at the hands of Yahweh. But her identity, nonetheless, is intrinsically tied to her organic connection to the man. It is here, with the explication of the creation of man and woman, that the principle we have been exploring reaches its greatest intensity. There is clearly an active principle of differentiation that effects the fuller realization of creation. However, this differentiation of male and female emerges precisely from an original unity that is never totally destroyed. It is this specific original organic unity that helps constitute the identity of the differentiated creature.³⁰

THE PRINCIPLE OF BODY-SOUL UNITY (*NEPESH HAYYAH*)
AND THE GENERATIONS (*TOLEDOTH*)

One of the critical questions that lies at the heart of the debate over biotechnological procedures is the precise relationship of the human person to the body. Here, Scripture can provide a critical contribution for the evaluation of this issue. But as Jean de Fraine has said, in order to understand the Scriptures we must first divest ourselves of our Cartesian thought patterns and develop the Semitic categories of thought.³¹ This is particularly true of the Hebraic understanding of the body-soul complex. The key text here is Genesis 2:7:

*vayyitzer adonai 'elohim 'et-ha'adam 'apar min-ha'adamah vayyipah
be'apav nishmat chayyim vayehi ha'adam lenepesh chayyah*

And the Lord God formed the man [from] dust from the
ground and breathed into his nostrils [the] breath of life and
the man became a living soul [*nepesh chayyah*].

The Hebrew concept of the person does not allow for the instrumentalizing of the body. The person is not simply consciousness or spirit encased in a physical organism. Rather, the body is intrinsic to the person. It is clear that the body and soul—as one intrinsically bound unity—is the definition of the person. As Eichrodt notes

concerning the Hebraic concept, "Strict separation between the body and soul is here unknown; Man does not *have* a body and a soul, he *is* both of them at once."³²

In Hebrew thought, as Johannes Pedersen clearly shows, the body-person is understood as the specific instantiation of all those who have preceded the body-person in his clan.³³ This helps to explain the critical importance of the *toledoth*³⁴—the generations in the Hebrew mind. Consonant with the principle of differentiation of organic prior unity, the Hebraic notion of the generations shows the importance of the specificity of the body and its fundamental effect on the determination of personhood. As Pedersen states, "This is the relation between the individual and the family. The individual Moabite is not a section of a number of Moabitic individuals, but a revelation of 'Moabithood.'"³⁵ Here, the organic body is intrinsically linked to the generations. The body-soul unit carries within it the specific differentiation in space and time of the prior generations. The concept of the autonomous individual is inconceivable to the Hebraic mind.

This principle needs to be understood more deeply. For the modern mind, the realism it accords the corporate dimension of the human personality is difficult to grasp. But this realism is essential in forming an adequate analysis of the relationship between body and person, child and family.

THE PRINCIPAL OF ONE FLESH (*BASAR 'ECHAD*)

Closely aligned to the principle of body-soul unity is the concept of "one flesh." This corporate dimension has significant importance for the sexual union of man and woman. In Genesis 2:21–25, a mystery is revealed concerning this primordial union. The properly constituted relationship between man and woman results in a third reality, which is called "one flesh." On one level, this reflects back on the creation of the woman as she was taken from man. In a sense, there is a return to an original unity. Yet, there is now the

reality of two persons differentiated by gender who enter into a specific communion. It is precisely in this unity that the blessing of fecundity, recorded in Genesis 1:28, will be realized. It is not merely the manipulation and combining of genetic materials that effects the blessing, but it is fruit of the one-flesh reality of man and woman.

This, too, is consonant with one of the dynamics effective in creation: the differentiation of a prior unity. As with the woman, identity is intrinsically connected to the original ground. Her identity, *'ishshah*, is predicated on the *'ish*. Similarly, in Genesis 4:1 and 5:3, the children that result from this oneness in flesh represent a further differentiation and instantiation of the original ground: "And he [Adam] begat [a child] in his likeness, according to his image."

By way of extension, one can see how the principles operative in these texts adumbrate a response to modern biotechnology. The scriptural revelation shows that being and identity are intrinsically linked to their original ground. Progenitors are not mere contributors of genetic particles but possess an inherent organic unity with the future generations. Viewed in the context of the Hebraic understanding of the *toledoth*, the "emerging" others are never understood to be autonomous individuals.

Individual personhood is safeguarded by the very physicality of the body that links people to the one-fleshness from which they were constituted and to the generations to which they are organically linked and represent. The individual person, like each separate constitutive part of creation, has both its own integrity, and, at the same time, participates in its being in the overarching corporate structure of creation. Indeed, the individual's being is constituted by this participation.

In essence, the person is fundamentally relational. He or she exists not as an isolated individual but as one whose being and identity is organically and intrinsically linked to both a fundamental prior unity (the one flesh of his or her parents) and to the preceding

generations, and, indeed, to the rest of creation (see Rom. 8:19 and the following verses). In the Hebraic world, the profound tensions of corporateness and individual personalism were fundamentally linked to bodily reality and contained within the person. It would seem that if this relationship and the anthropological principles previously mentioned are part of the intelligent design willed by the Creator, they must be accounted for in any assessment of new biotechnological procedures.

Part Two: Philosophical Anthropological Perspectives

It has been constant Church teaching that fundamental truths about creation can be known through reason.³⁶ It is our purpose in part two to show that the anthropological principles cited in part one, especially the body-soul unity, the intrinsically relational reality of the human person, and the one-flesh reality can also be discovered through reason. Many arguments have already been developed opposing these technologies from a moral philosophy perspective. This paper goes beyond discussion of their moral good and evil to the nature of the human person and the one-flesh union as the foundation for an adequate critique.

Issues raised include the right of the child to be treated as a subject not an object, the right to be conceived in a marital union, and the right to life. Many of the issues come to the fore in the debate on the licitness of rescuing frozen embryos through implantation in the womb of a woman who is not the embryo's biological parent. Because this situation places in relief the issues at stake for the person as substantive relation, we will use it for a brief analysis.

Several contemporary moral theologians and philosophers, such as William E. May, William E. Smith, Germain Grisez, Mary Geach, Helen Watts, Nicholas Tonti-Filippini, and Geoffrey Surtees have vigorously addressed the question of embryo implantation.³⁷ Some, like William E. May, argue in favor of this practice because, in his

view, the object of the implantation is saving the life of the child, not the surrogacy that *Donum Vitae* condemns.³⁸ Others argue against such “rescuing” because it violates the good of marriage. Mary Geach, for example, voices concern that “a relationship between mother and child is formed, which excludes her husband in a manner harmful to the marital union.”³⁹ The child forms a bond with the gestational mother that Tonti-Filippini calls “without parallel.” It is also argued this embryo rescue creates a “third parent,” namely, the gestational mother (bearer), besides the embryo’s biological mother and father. Last, this surrogacy breaks the continuum of generation.

Helen Watts regards a gestational adoption as similar to a post-birth adoption. (Wet-nursing used to prevail among the women of the nobility and even the bourgeois and was commonly practiced in the case of abandoned babies.⁴⁰) Yet Watts admits “there is . . . some sense in which the significance of pregnancy and birth in regard to origin is more important than its significance with regard to future care,”⁴¹ but she is not sure why. In reviewing these diverse positions, Francis De Rosa concludes that the type of relationship the gestational mother forms with the child, which excludes the husband, is not an “accidental difference.” It differs markedly from nurturing the newborn: “The bodiliness of the woman/embryo relationship is morally significant, especially as we do not accept a dualist anthropology.”⁴²

Donum Vitae places importance on genetic parenthood and links it to the “maturing of his [the child’s] personal identity.” We will explore whether the genetic relation of children to their parents is significant far beyond simply determining physical characteristics. We will draw on philosophic arguments to show that the person is a body-person and intrinsically relational. We will show that when the genetic blueprint, which is inscribed in the body and constitutes the child’s relation to its natural parents,⁴³ is deliberately ignored or tampered with through heterologous in vitro fertilization or ignored through surrogacy, it affects not only the child’s identity but, as

Donum Vitae says, “the unity and stability of the family with damaging effects on society.”

We will first review philosophic arguments on the human being as a body-person and as intrinsically relational. After outlining these arguments for the person as substantial relation, we will argue that the physical relation with the parents takes the initial form of a genetic bond with the biological parents. We will then draw on the phenomenology of consciousness and the experience of adoptees to show how the identity of the child is intimately formed, although not ultimately determined, by this genetic bond.⁴⁴ The bond may be transcended, and, in fact, is transcended as we become adopted children of the Father. There is also a certain transcendence in adoption by human parents. But to deliberately ignore or tamper with this original, biological genetic bond is to jeopardize the identity of the child and the fulfillment of the child through relation. The child’s genetic inheritance also unites him or her to siblings, aunts, uncles, cousins, and to all preceding generations. The cavalier disruption of such relations has profound consequences for the child, the family, and society.

THE PERSON AS A UNITY OF BODY AND SOUL

The argument hinges on the person as a unity of body and soul and intrinsically relational. Christian philosophy has adopted the hylo-morphism of Aristotle to describe the soul-body unity. The soul is the form of the body;⁴⁵ together, they form an individual substance of a rational nature—a human being with spiritual faculties of intellect and will but also with a body like an animal. This classic hylo-morphism was denied by Descartes, who adopted a radical split between body and soul. The distortion was a gradual process beginning with the corruption of the notion of “substance” (literally, “what lies under”) from its original meaning of self-referential being (*ousia* in Greek) to the matter or substrate of the being.⁴⁶ The reduction emphasized the permanence of the being as a self-referential entity,

but made all relations to it accidental and coming from outside. The shift was accelerated by the rise of a mechanical view of the physical universe, which viewed all things as discrete quanta and continually in collision with each another.⁴⁷ Such a view relegated mind to the purely subjective dimension of existence. In order to retrieve the human subject, Descartes posited not the unity of body and soul as the self-referential entity but the mind alone. Everything outside the mind became an object external to it and that included the human body.⁴⁸ Kant refined this subjectivism further so that, as Kenneth Schmitz says, “we have advanced from self-referential mind to *self-referential consciousness*.”⁴⁹ Because the gap between subject and object could not be bridged by this turn to the subject, post-Cartesian philosophers ignore substance, or the “thing-in-itself.” But post-Kantian subjectivity has expanded the horizon of consciousness to take in the world of experience. Instead of a metaphysics of being, phenomenology and the hermeneutics of consciousness are the hallmark of contemporary post-Kantian subjectivity.⁵⁰

It is perhaps ironic that it is precisely phenomenology, which explores the realm of lived experience, that is restoring the unity of body and soul. Gabriel Marcel is foremost among modern philosophers to employ a phenomenological perspective on the body as “lived.”⁵¹ He asks, “How does the body appear to me, myself? We do not experience any separation between body and soul but rather a ‘mysterious unity,’ bound and realized in acting;”⁵² my body is present to myself in consciousness. Marcel links the subjective “I” with the body. For example, the body always belongs to someone in particular. No body would be nobody at all. The more real my experience, the more I am aware of the body.⁵³ There is an essential ambiguity in the relationship we have with our bodies. Marcel distinguishes between the body-object and the body-subject. Sometimes we treat our bodies as instruments, but we can only do this if we take for granted that the body can never be a mere instrument because we are also a body-subject. What Marcel means by a

body-subject is “the *situation* of a being who appears to himself as fundamentally, and not accidentally, connected to his body.”⁵⁴ The living bond between ourselves and our bodies is identified by the body-subject.⁵⁵ Marcel also maintains there is a relation between “my body” and the world similar to the one between myself and my body—it is the “landmark” of my experience of the world. Joe McCown describes Marcel’s view of the body’s relations with the world as follows:

The body is at once an object of perception and the foundation of every act of perceiving. It is this essential and mysterious ambiguity of the body which is somebody’s which gives it the character of an initial or fundamental availability. The body manifests our identity and is the condition of our identification and communication with otherness. . . . Our bodies present and “presence” us to the world.⁵⁶

In other words, we are a mysterious unity of body and soul. Bodily life is essential to us as personal beings.⁵⁷

A central thesis in the works of Germain Grisez is that “bodily life is an essential component in the make-up of a human person.”⁵⁸ Because we directly experience our actions as composite, the subject of our actions is experienced as a unified whole. Arguing from experience, however, can still leave open the charge of subjectivism; Patrick Lee cites those who deny any substance to the person and grant only a “set of experiences united by memory and other psychological connections.”⁵⁹ To counter this, Lee takes the third-person perspective, drawing on Aquinas’s argument against Platonic dualism that to sense is a bodily act performed by a bodily agent. The agent both senses and understands, therefore it is a bodily entity that understands, it is not simply a spiritual entity.⁶⁰

Lee argues that animals are persisting agents by observing their activities over time. Their actions explain what kind of a persisting agent they are—that is, a dog eats meat, a horse pastures. He also

shows that in nonhuman animals, sensation is an organic act. The body is not a mere instrument of the animal's body and the senses are not some nonmaterial part of the body. In the same way, in a human being, sensation is an organic act comparable to that in animals. The thing that does the sensing is a "bodily organic being," and it is identical to the being that understands. What understands is referred to as an "I." Lee concludes "the word 'I' refers to a bodily, organic being." Because organisms that sense are classified as animals, it follows that human beings are animals.⁶¹

Lee cites other arguments to show that human intelligence has an intrinsic requirement and operational orientation to the body. Aquinas is again the source of the argument. The human soul is incomplete by itself; its distinctive actions of intellect and will need the body. By themselves, the intellect and will are incomplete. Although, after death, an act of understanding can be performed without a bodily organ, in this life it not only needs some sense presentation but is specified by them. By its nature, our intellect is disposed to sense presentations. It cannot function without the material world: "There is intelligibility *in* the material world and it is that intelligibility that is proportionate to our human minds."⁶²

We have here cogent arguments for the nature of a human being as an organic substantial unity of body and soul.

THE HUMAN PERSON AS INTRINSICALLY RELATIONAL

The concept of the human being as person also reaches back to the pre-Christian West. Whereas Aristotle's individual substance is a self-contained unit, the concept of "person" always contained the notion of dialogue or communication.⁶³ Both *persona* in Latin and *prosopon* in Greek originally refer to the roles played by actors. The concept was taken up by Christian philosophers to describe both the relationality of the persons in the Trinity and the hypostasis of Christ as one person with two natures, divine and human.⁶⁴ Although Aquinas deemed it fitting to call God a person because a person is

the highest category in nature, he did not attribute to human persons the intrinsic relationality of the divine Persons.⁶⁵

Richard of St. Victor's definition of the human person as *naturae divinae incommunicabilis existentia* (an incommunicable existence of a divine nature) came closer to a relational notion, but it was Aquinas's definition that predominated. Nevertheless, the modern philosophical movement called personalism, which places the human person at the center of inquiry, has gone a long way to establish the intrinsically relational dimension of the human person.

For the purposes of this paper, we shall cite two or three such philosophers representing the various schools of thought. The personalism movement developed distinctive French, German, Polish, and American expressions. While Neo-Thomists such as Maritain sought to ground their personalism in the metaphysics of Aquinas and scholastic philosophy, Gabriel Marcel adopted the descriptive phenomenological approach of Edmund Husserl.⁶⁶ Both philosophic traditions have been influential in the movement. Christian revelation, which was the stimulus for the development of the term "person" in the early Christian era, has also served as a major influence. All three influences can be seen in the work of Karol Wojtyła (John Paul II).

Jacques Maritain clearly roots his personalism in the doctrine of Saint Thomas. "Thomistic personalism," he says, "stresses the metaphysical distinction between individuality and personality."⁶⁷ The image of God is found in intellectual creatures alone. Maritain posits the human being as caught between two poles—the material pole of individuality and a spiritual pole that is true personality.⁶⁸ Only individual realities are capable of existing, and in the case of humans, their difference lies in matter, not in individual essences like angels, who are pure spirits. But humans are also persons, which means that their whole beings "[subsist] in virtue of the subsistence of the spiritual soul."⁶⁹ Only spiritual beings are capable of transcendence by way of knowledge and love. The concept of "person" is related not

to matter like the individual but to the spiritual sphere. The mere fact of personhood requires communication with others in the order of knowledge and love. Above all, personhood requires communication with the Other who is absolute love.⁷⁰

W. Norris Clarke draws out of Aquinas's philosophy itself the relational notion of the human person. He argues that his dynamic notion of being is intrinsically self-communicative and relational through action.⁷¹ By the very fact of existence, a being is in act. It is a being's nature to communicate its perfection, to be self-communicative. Clarke says, "not only is activity, active self-communication, the natural consequence of possessing an act of existence (*esse*), St. Thomas goes further to maintain that self-expression through action is actually the whole point, the natural perfection or flowering of being itself, the goal of its very presence in the universe."⁷² Being does this for two reasons: because it is poor and needs to draw from the richness around it, and because it is rich and seeks to share its riches with others. What is implied, says Clarke, is that "*relationality* is a primordial dimension of real being, inseparable from its substantiality, just as action is from existence."⁷³ He concludes,

It turns out, then, that relationality and substantiality go together as two distinct but inseparable modes of reality. Substance is the primary mode, in that all else, including relations depend on it as their ground. But since "every substance exists for the sake of its operations," as St. Thomas has just told us, being as substance, as existing *in itself*, naturally flows over into being as relational, turned *towards others* by its self-communicating action. *To be* is to be *substance-in-relation*.⁷⁴

Kenneth Schmitz expresses a similar conclusion, "The unity of each being is no longer to be understood simply as *ens indivisum*, but as *conatus*, that is, as the drive for self-expression. Each being *in-sists*, *re-sists*, and *ex-sists* in relation to others."⁷⁵

Joseph Ratzinger is critical of Aquinas for applying the relational notion of the human person to the Trinity but not to man made in the image of God.⁷⁶ Taking as his starting point Richard of St. Victor's definition of the human person, Ratzinger points out that the notion of person does not lie at the level of essence but of existence.⁷⁷ Ratzinger argues that "it is in the nature of spirit to put itself in relation." The person both *is* and *knows* about itself. It possesses itself. Also, by reaching beyond itself, it comes to itself: "Being with the other is its form of being with itself."⁷⁸ Furthermore, it can think about itself and also the other—God. If the person comes to itself by being with other human persons, then it becomes more itself by being with the wholly other—God. Ratzinger concludes, "the human person is the event or being of relativity."⁷⁹

Yet another contemporary source for reflection on human relationality is the two-in-one flesh union of spouses that issues in a third person—the child.⁸⁰ John Paul II has been in the forefront of developing this view, although primarily from a theological perspective in his theology of the body.⁸¹ This is the very relation under discussion in this paper. If the person is intrinsically relational, as we have attempted to show, and the genetic relation in the body links the child unequivocally to its biological parents, the question arises whether the genetic relation has a significance far beyond simply determining the physical characteristics. The body itself provides a mechanism for bonding the child to its biological parents. During sexual intercourse, birth, and breastfeeding, the hormone oxytocin (called the nurturing hormone) is released. It predisposes the parents to bond with each other and the mother to bond with the child.⁸² In *in vitro* fertilization, this natural bonding mechanism is completely bypassed. In surrogate motherhood it is fractured.

We can say that in the case of a child conceived, gestated, and born in the conjugal union of husband and wife, the child is "grounded ontologically in their prior unity," and the parents are "consequently intrinsically connected to what emerges." And "it is the

specific original unity which helps constitute the identity of the differentiated creature”—the child. On the contrary in the case of in vitro fertilization, a prior unity does not exist, or if it exists, it is imposed through technology.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND LIVED EXPERIENCE

We may well ask what the consequences are for the conscious identity of the child of these reproductive technologies. The modern turn to the subject places great emphasis on consciousness.⁸³ Karol Wojtyla has argued that consciousness is an essential attribute of the person along with intellect and will. He accepts Aquinas's definition of the human being but goes further:⁸⁴ the human being is a suppositum in the metaphysical sense but only *in experience* is the human being given to himself *as* a suppositum.⁸⁵ Human beings who act are conscious of their actions. Through action they become aware of themselves as personal subjects. It is through their acts that human beings disclose themselves, and in disclosing themselves, constitute themselves as a subject so that the suppositum manifests itself as personal subjectivity.

Consciousness, says Wojtyla, is fundamental for understanding the human self. The human suppositum must manifest itself as a personal subjectivity. Subjectivity belongs to it by nature. This differs from Max Scheler's "states of consciousness," which do not have their roots in the suppositum. For Wojtyla, the roots of consciousness are always in the suppositum and not simply in acts of consciousness.⁸⁶

Wojtyla, in *The Acting Person*, distinguishes between what happens in humans and what they choose to do. The somatovegetative and psychomotive functions are part of what happens in humans. These would include digestive processes and even the rise of the sexual urge. Usually they occur below our consciousness but can be brought to consciousness. They come to consciousness especially when they cause us pain or pleasure.⁸⁷ In other words, the body is able to give

us information and affect our consciousness.⁸⁸ In the case of adopted children who have not been given information about their birth parents, the body itself gives information from facial and bodily structure—even mannerisms that link them to their birth parents. When these come to consciousness, they often give rise to questions of identity. In the case of the adoption of children born from a sexual union, there is ample evidence that the search for identity becomes an important step in establishing a secure identity.⁸⁹

In the case of heterologous reproduction, the child's search for identity is greatly complicated. This search may mean discovering an anonymous father who donated sperm, a surrogate mother who gestated the child in her womb, or possibly another "mother" who donated an egg.⁹⁰ Furthermore, the child lives with the consciousness that his or her conception took place not in the one-flesh union of a couple but in a petri dish.⁹¹ Far from being a gift of a loving union, the child was an object of technical manipulation by a third party who does not enter in any way into the constitutive identity of the new person. As John Paul II has amply shown in *Love and Responsibility*, shame accompanies any threat to the subjectivity of the person.

We already know something about the child's search for his or her identity from experience with adopted children who seek out their birth parents. A comprehensive study of adoptees and their birth and adopting parents reveals the dimensions of the experience. One adoptee states, "Always the experience of growing up adopted is clearly different from growing up in one's birth family. The quest to 'validate' one's existence by seeking one's roots is a basic human need and a fundamental right."⁹² In one study of adoptees reuniting with birth parents, most valued was the resolution of "identity issues, the knowledge they had gained about themselves and their family background."⁹³

There is no ideal solution to an out-of-wedlock pregnancy whether the mother severs ties with the father to bring up the child

alone or ties with both parents are preempted by adoption. Yet the child's conception is still not something outside a sexual union. (Often such a child is called a "love child" in recognition of the attachment—no doubt misplaced—of the parents to each other).⁹⁴

Conclusion

If human beings have bodies like animals, and if human beings are intrinsically relational as people, then the genetic imprint of a mother and father inscribed in the body of a child has profound significance for the child's identity. Furthermore, if consciousness is rooted in the substratum of a personal being, the identity of a child is harmed by heterologous reproductive technologies that alter the natural biological process of conception and gestation. When parents bypass the conjugal act and introduce a third or even fourth "parent" into the act of reproduction, the child's conscious identity is gravely threatened and the child's sense of belonging to his or her family is jeopardized. This alienation may affect not only the parent-child relation but also relations with extended family, to the great detriment of the family and society.

Much lies ahead in further articulating these principles. But we hope their importance can be seen. At a seminal level, these principles give us an understanding of the processes active within creation, of the critical relationship of the person to the body and of the person to the physical generations, and should thereby help us to develop an adequate framework to evaluate biotechnological procedures.

Notes

1. "Surrogate Sues Couple Over Abortion Deal," *Washington Times*, August 11, 2001, A3.
2. "'Designer Baby' Now Grapples with Expectations of Society," *Washington Times*, March 6, 2001, A2.
3. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Clinics Full of Frozen Embryos Offer a New Route to Adoption," *New York Times*, February 25, 2001.

4. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "The Instruction on the Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation," *Origins* 16 (19 Mar. 1987): 698–711. A later Vatican document dealt with such issues as parthenogenesis and cloning.
5. It is interesting to note that with the recent stem cell debate, the discussion has gone beyond the morality of using human embryos as research subjects. It has brought into the public forum the morality of in vitro fertilization itself, which had been widely accepted.
6. All translations of the Hebrew texts are from Joseph Atkinson, except where noted; other translations have been consulted. This paper will use a modified transliteration script.
7. The focus of this paper is foundational anthropology, and, therefore, the primary texts will be found within the Old Testament canon. It is certainly legitimate to ask how redemption affects this anthropology, but that is beyond the scope of this paper, which is attempting to establish the primary principles active and constitutive of basic human nature.
8. Some other Scriptures incidentally deal with the theme of creation but none in the developed and sustained way as Genesis. To understand the relationship of other accounts to the Genesis account is beyond the scope of this paper. See A. Heidel, *The Babylonian Genesis*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); G. von Rad, *Old Testament Theology*, vol. 1, trans. D. M. G. Stalker (New York: Harper & Row, 1962); Walter Eichrodt, *Theology of the Old Testament*, vol. 2, trans. J. A. Baker (London: SCM Press, 1964); as well as works by J. Wenham. For specific Jewish exegesis, see *Midrash Rabbah*, and U. Cassuto, *A Commentary on the Book of Genesis*, trans. I. Abrahams (Jerusalem: Mignes Press, 1961).
9. At the heart of the issue is the idea of relationality—that is, is there an intrinsic link between identity and being and the generations. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger remarks on a critical insight developed by Augustine that may help in this regard. Augustine says, "Wherefore nothing in Him is said in respect to accident (*per accidens*), since nothing is accidental to Him, and yet all that is said is not said according to substance . . . they [the Father and the Son] are so called, not according to substance, but according to relation (*sed secundum relativum*), which relation, however, is not accident, because it is not changeable." *De Trinitate* 5, 5, 6 (PL 42, 914) quoted in *Many Religions—One Covenant* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999), 76n.18. Ratzinger comments, "Even if the entire scope of the process is not yet clear, we can see the refashioning of the inherited categories in Augustine."
10. "The emergence of the gods from the chaotic primordial ground of the universe stamped them as deified natural forces. . . . Only the stuff of the universe, basic matter, is eternal." Eichrodt, *Theology of the Old Testament*, 99.
11. See Irving Zeitlin, *Ancient Israel* (Glasgow: Bell and Bain, 1984).
12. See portions of the text *Enuma Elish* in which the creation of human beings is spoken of: "Blood I will mass and cause bones to be. I will establish a savage, 'man' shall

be his name. . . . He shall be charged with the service of the gods." J. B. Prichard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 68a. The translation is from V. H. Matthews and D. C. Benjamin, *Old Testament Parallels* (New York: Paulist Press, 1991), 13: "The Savages will set The Gods free."

13. "The Babylonian epic . . . is an explicit Nature myth . . . hence the gods are not eternal, but emerge like everything else from the chaotic primordial matter. . . . If Nature thus shows itself stronger than the deity, it is only natural that in the end it will also provide the organizing principle by which heaven and earth are controlled. Hence it is the law of cyclic recurrence." Eichrodt, *Theology of the Old Testament*, 116.
14. "The creator god can never be more than a craftsman, a Demiurge, who forms the world out of already existent chaotic materials." *Ibid.*, 99.
15. Ludwig Kohler, *Old Testament Theology*, 3rd ed., trans. A. S. Todd (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953), 71. Cited by Bernhard W. Anderson, *Creation or Chaos* (New York: Association Press, 1967), 110. Compare Eichrodt's comment: "It is even possible that the writer already has in mind in his very first word, *beresit*, in the beginning, a distant goal of the world process, the '*aharit hayyamim*, the end of the days.'" Eichrodt, *Theology of the Old Testament*, 110.
16. Eichrodt, *Theology of the Old Testament*, 103.
17. See *Ibid.*, 104. Contra this is the position of Cassuto, *A Commentary on the Book of Genesis*, 20, but his reasoning does not apply to the meaning of this phrase as referring to the totality of the created order. What is helpful is his point that "the ancient Hebrew conceived God alone as unity." There is therefore a fundamental unity to all of created reality and out of which it proceeds.
18. See *Ibid.*, 25, where Cassuto shows that the Hebrew derivation can be linked to Deut. 32:11 and its application to eagles looking after their young: "Only the care of their [the eagles'] parents, who hover over them, enables them to survive and develop, so, too, in the case of the earth . . . the paternal care of the Divine Spirit, which hovered over it, assured its future evolution and life." See also A. Heidel's discussion of the verb *merechepheth* in *Babylonian Genesis*, as well as Westermann, *Genesis 1-11: A Commentary*, trans. John J. Scullion (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1984), 107.
19. The exegetical history of Genesis is one of the most complicated of all biblical books. There are numerous approaches that attempt to gain greater insight into the text. Canonical criticism (see B. Childs) especially underlines the importance of taking the received canonical text as normative.
20. While the exact nature of the cosmological understanding of Genesis is deeply controverted, the canonical text nonetheless provides a profound theological understanding of creation. Those truths that emerge from the text and that reveal the constitutive nature of created reality are precisely the area we desire to explore in this paper.
21. This point will be dealt with in greater detail under the section on differentiation grounded in unity. The critical point here is that the nature of creation is determined by the word and will of God.

22. This understanding of the role of *tohu vabohu* has been expressed by Cassuto, *A Commentary on the Book of Genesis*, 34.
23. Eichrodt, *Theology of the Old Testament*, 98.
24. There is very extensive literature that deals with the relationship between these two chapters. See *The Creation of Man and Woman*, ed. G. P. Luttikhuisen (Leiden: Brill, 2000) for the Jewish and Christian interpretations of these texts. Also see the exegetical works of Westermann, Wenhan, von Rad, Cassuto, and Eichrodt. Regardless, however, of the exegetical approach used, both texts clearly manifest the principle of *havdalah*, or separation. For a theological analysis of creation, see Cardinal J. Ratzinger, *In the Beginning . . .*, trans. B. Ramsey (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1995); and John Paul II, *Original Unity of Man and Woman: Catechesis on the Book of Genesis in Theology of the Body* (Boston: Pauline Books, 1997).
25. Here, tension is not a negative quality but a description of the fruitful relationship between differentiated parts existing within a fundamental unity.
26. "And God said, Let the earth cause to bring forth the living soul according to its kind" and then lists animals that emerged.
27. See *Midrash Rabbah: Genesis*, vol. 1, trans. H. Freedman (New York: Soncino Press, 1983) 22n.6, which connects the ceremony of *habdalah* with the creation of light. Also, note that the concept of holiness on which the community of Israel is predicated has, as its foundational meaning, the idea "to be separated out from."
28. It has been normative within modern critical exegesis to view Genesis 1:1-24 and 2:5-25 as two separate accounts of creation, the prior emerging from the priestly tradition and the second known as the Yahwist account. On the other hand, canonical criticism places the emphasis on the unity of the received canon. Here, taken as a whole, the textual structure and dramatic architecture are seen as valuable clues to the meaning of the text.
29. This is in contrast to rabbinical exegesis that read an explicit androgyny into the text. See *Midrash Rabbah*, 54. However, the whole tenor of the text moves in another direction and safeguards precisely against this understanding.
30. In summary, the precisions in the text call for a fuller and more adequate understanding of human nature. These include the following: (1) male and female sexuality cannot be posited as two *autonomous* principles active in the created order; (2) they are intrinsically linked by a prior unity; (3) the integrity of each is safeguarded by the direct agency of God in the creation of each; and (4) the identity of the differentiated entity is intrinsically connected to the original source.
31. See Jean de Fraine, *Adam and the Family of Man*, trans. D. Raible (New York: Alba House, 1965), 11: "In order to understand the content of the concept under study, it will be necessary to divest oneself of the ordinary philosophical categories and create a new Semitic or biblical mentality."
32. Eichrodt, *Theology of the Old Testament*, 124.
33. Johannes Pedersen, *Israel: Its Life and Culture* (London: Oxford University Press, 1926, 1954), 110. See also Wheeler Robinson, "The Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality," in *Werden und Wesen des Alten Testaments*, B.Z.A.W. 66 (1936).

34. The *toledoth* form a critical part of Israel's self-understanding. As Westermann has pointed out, they form the backbone of the patriarchal accounts in Genesis. See *Genesis 1-11: A Commentary*. They are also foundational to the understanding of salvation history.
35. Pedersen, *Israel*, 110.
36. Rom. 2:18-20; Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* (ST) I:1; John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio*, no. 3.
37. Francis de Rosa outlines many of the arguments for and against in "On Rescuing Frozen Embryos," *Linacre Quarterly* (Aug. 2002): 228-60.
38. William E. May, *Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life* (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 2000), 107-8.
39. De Rosa, "On Rescuing," 236.
40. In eighteenth-century France, the majority of infants, especially in Paris, were given over to wet nurses. The custom extended from the nobility to the artisan class. Ruth A. Lawrence, *Breastfeeding: A Guide for the Medical Profession* (St. Louis: C. V. Mosby, 1985), 3, 4.
41. De Rosa, "On Rescuing," 248, cited in Helen Watts, "Are There Any Circumstances in which It Would Be Morally Admirable for a Woman To Seek To Have an Orphan Embryo Implanted in Her Womb?" in *Issues in Bioethics*, ed. Luke Gormally (London: Linacre Center, 1999); see also May, *Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life*, 98-99.
42. De Rosa, 254.
43. The well-known geneticist, Jerome Lejeune, has stated, "We know with certainty that the link which relates parents to children is at every moment a material link, for we know it is from the encounter of the female cell (the ovum) and the male cell (the spermatozoon), that a new individual life will emerge. But we know with the same degree of certitude that no molecule, no individual particle of matter enclosed in the fertilized egg has the slightest chance of being transmitted to the next generation. Hence, what is really transmitted is not the matter as such, but a specified conformation of the matter, or more precisely, an 'information.' It is the DNA molecule inherited from both parents that specifies, 'Thou shalt have blond hair, hazel eyes; thou shalt be six feet tall, and thou shalt live some eighty years, if no road accidents intervene!'" "The Nature of Man," *Bulletin of the Ovulation Method Research and Reference Centre of Australia*, 29, vol. 1 (March 2002): 14.
44. Kenneth Schmitz has a good discussion of Aristotle's understanding of substance as composed of form and matter in "Selves and Persons: A Difference in Loves," *Communio* 18 (Summer 1991): 187, 192; Aquinas treats the unity of body and soul in *ST*, I, 76, a. 1-8.
45. Schmitz cites John Locke's reduction of the term substance to "unformed matter," accentuating its supportive role to the exclusion of its more dynamic aspects. Schmitz, "Selves and Persons," 188.
46. *Ibid.*, 189-91.
47. *Ibid.*, 192.

48. Ibid., 194–95.
49. Ibid., 195.
50. Joe McCown, *Availability: Gabriel Marcel and the Phenomenology of Human Openness* (Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1978), 26.
51. Gabriel Marcel says the formula, “I am my body,” has mainly a negative meaning. “It is not true to say that I am not my body.” Ibid., 29; Karol Wojtyła, discusses the difficulty of speaking of either having a body or being a body. Neither are correct. Rather, we must speak of being embodied. Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. A Tymieniecka, *Analecta Husserliana* 10 (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1979).
52. McCown, *Availability*, 26, 28.
53. Ibid., 30.
54. Ibid., 29, 30.
55. Ibid., 34.
56. Ibid.
57. See also Edith Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, trans. Waltraut Stein (Washington, D.C.: ICS, 1989), 40–56, on the relationship of the “I” to the living body.
58. Patrick Lee, “Human Beings Are Animals,” in *Natural Law and Moral Inquiry: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics in the Work of Germain Grisez*, ed. Robert P. George (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998), 135.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., 136.
61. Ibid., 136–43.
62. Ibid., 144–45.
63. Aquinas adopted the Boethian definition of the human being as *rationalis naturae individual substantia* (an individual substance of a rational nature). While he slightly altered it to *distinctum subsistens in natura intellectual* (a distinct substance in an intellectual nature), the emphasis remained on substance or supposit as an existent being in reference to itself rather than on relationship.
64. Kenneth Schmitz, “The Geography of the Human Person,” *Communio* 13 (Spring 1986): 28–34.
65. Aquinas, *ST*, 1 q. 29 a. 3 ad 4. Influenced by the hylomorphism of Aristotle, Aquinas could not see a way both to affirm the intrinsic body-soul unity in the human person and the purely spiritual existence of divine persons, because God cannot be an individual substance composed of matter and form. Therefore, Aquinas uses the term analogically, ascribing only incommunicability to divine persons, not individuality. Because the distinction of the divine persons consists solely in the relations of Father, Son, and Spirit, the word *hypostasis* (or supposit) means what is distinct and incommunicable in God. Aquinas categorically states that relation, which is implied in the meaning of divine persons, does not extend to angelic or human persons. A contemporary Christian philosopher, John Crosby, maintains that incommunicability does express something relational in the human being although in a negative

sense. The terms “unrepeatability” and “incommunicability,” “set a given person in relation to other persons, and affirm that this person is *not* able to be repeated in some sense or other by the other persons, or does *not* share his being with them in some sense or other. It is precisely the incommunicability of the person that is the basis for a true encounter with another. Intimacy is reached through shared self-disclosure not through reason or any external attributes.” John F. Crosby, “The Incommunicability of the Human Person,” *Thomist* 57, vol. 3 (July 1993): 403–42. Edith Stein, a disciple of Husserl, developed the notion of empathy, which she posited as the key to intersubjectivity. *On the Problem of Empathy*, 63–68. John Crosby also considers the role of empathy in intersubjectivity, taking as his starting point Max Scheler, *Zur Phänomenologie und theorie der sympathygefühle und von Liebe und Hass*, “On Empathy,” *Fides Quaerens Intellectum* 2 (Autumn 2002): 23–53. Unlike Scheler, Crosby by particularly stresses the role of experience in empathy, 41.

66. Kevin E. Schmiesing has given a good historical account of the development of personalism as a movement. He traces the origin of the term “personalism” to the discourses of Schleiermacher in 1799. Gabriel Marcel resisted the classification of personalism, but Schmiesing regards his stress on intersubjectivity as in harmony with the personalist tradition. The leading French personalist philosopher is, of course, Emmanuel Molunier. Kevin E. Schmiesing, “A History of Personalism,” at <http://www.Kschmiesing@acton.org>, 15.
67. Jacques Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947), 3.
68. *Ibid.*, 8, 9, 23.
69. *Ibid.*, 24–28.
70. *Ibid.*, 30–32.
71. W. Norris Clarke, “Person, Being, and St. Thomas,” *Communio* 19 (Winter 1992), 601–18.
72. *Ibid.*, 604.
73. *Ibid.*, 607.
74. *Ibid.*
75. Kenneth Schmitz, “The Solidarity of Personalism and the Metaphysics of Existential Act,” *Fides Quaerens Intellectum* 1 (Summer 2001): 196.
76. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, “Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology,” *Communio* 17 (Fall 1990): 439–54. Ratzinger says Aquinas also erred in treating Christ as the “ontological exception,” 449.
77. *Ibid.*
78. *Ibid.*, 451.
79. *Ibid.*, 452.
80. John Grabowski, “Person: Substance and Relation,” *Communio* 22 (Spring 1995): 157.
81. John Paul II’s sources are Scripture, especially Genesis; Vatican Council II, notably *Gaudium et Spes*, nos. 22 and 24; and phenomenology grounded in the metaphysics

- of Aquinas. For a comprehensive list of his sources, see Mary Shivanandan, *Crossing the Threshold of Love: A New Vision of Marriage in the Light of John Paul II's Anthropology* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1999). In his Wednesday Catechesis, published as *The Theology of the Body: Human Love in the Divine Plan* (Boston: Pauline Books, 1977), the Pope affirms the unity of body and soul—"the body expresses the person" (9 Jan. 1980) and the intrinsic relationality of the human being—"It is not good that man (male) should be alone" (Gen. 2:18). The creation of Eve is necessary in order for man to know himself in both his humanity and his masculinity and to fulfill himself through total mutual self-gift. Adam and Eve's union is completed by the birth of the child. The one-flesh union of Adam and Eve in original innocence images the total self-gift of the Trinity (14 Nov. 1979). In developing this symbolism, the Pope is mindful of another strand in Christian thought on the Trinity flowing from St. Augustine through Richard of St. Victor—the symbolism of the Trinity as a union of love that issues in a third. See J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1977); and William J. Hill, *The Three-Personed God: The Trinity As a Mystery of Salvation* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1988).
82. Niles Newton, "Interrelationships between Sexual Responsiveness, Birth and Breast-feeding," in *Contemporary Sexual Behavior*, ed. Joseph Zubin and John Money (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 77–98. In "And the Two Become One: The Biochemical Basis for Unity and Indissolubility," Diane Dewane cites a variety of scientific sources on the bonding characteristics of oxytocin and vasopressin, at <http://www.Christendom-Awake.org/pages/mshivana/tobpaper.htm>.
 83. Phenomenologists such as Max Scheler have studied in depth the various states of consciousness. As previously noted, the emphasis on consciousness and lived experience by the phenomenologists was an attempt to reconnect to the external world of sense. But without a metaphysics of being included within the concept of consciousness, as Karol Wojtyła clearly saw, such a connection is impossible.
 84. Karol Wojtyła, "The Person: Subject and Community," in *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, trans. Theresa Sandok (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 219–61, 219.
 85. Karol Wojtyła, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being," in *Person and Community*, 209–12.
 86. *Ibid.*, 212–213; and Wojtyła, "The Person, Subject and Community," 222, 225–28. In *The Acting Person*, Wojtyła says, "the feeling of one's own body is a necessary condition for experiencing the integral subjectivity of man," 230.
 87. Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 31, 203–226.
 88. Mary Shivanandan and Thomasina Borkman have coined the term a "new form of communication" to describe the information now available to natural family planning couples through monitoring the fertility signs of the body. Mary Shivanandan, *Crossing the Threshold of Love: A New Vision of Marriage in the Light of John Paul II's Anthropology*, (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1999), 248–50.
 89. The "urge for reunion" has been described as "so elemental that a plethora of orga-

nizations has sprung up to assist adoptees in their search. Today, the Internet is replete with Web sites offering registries to help adoptees and their birth families find each other by matching up information such as dates and places of birth." Elizabeth J. Samuels, "How Adoption in America Grew Secret," *Washington Post*, 21 Oct. 2001, Outlook section.

90. Linda Villarosa, "Once Invisible Sperm Donors Get to Meet the Family," *New York Times*, 21 May 2002, D-5. The author describes donor offspring who were denied knowledge of who fathered them as "confused and angry." One such offspring wonders, "Why should the medical profession have the power to deny someone their full genetic history? It's not fair to allow a child to be deluded about who they are." A donor who agreed to meet his biological daughter found the encounter "very emotional. . . . The profile, the mannerisms, everything was so much like me that it was scary."
91. The egg and the sperm are treated as products, which, in many cases, are purchased. *Ibid.*, D-10.
92. M. McCollm, *Adoption Reunion* (Toronto: Second Story Press, 1993), 94, cited in Marshall and McDonald, *The Many Sided Triangle* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2001), 233.
93. *Ibid.*, 244, 245.
94. The child remains a gift that is given even if "given up" for adoption. Adoption is different both in kind and degree from technical interventions in the conception and gestation of a child.