Will China Democratize? A “Gray” Transformation

The changes that China has been undergoing over the last 20 years, as well as the country’s rise to world-power status, lend urgency to questions about the possibility of democratization in China. Will China become democratic? If so, how will the process take place? If not, what will happen? Can a nondemocratic China remain politically stable?

On the first question, most Western observers believe that China will democratize, although they do not expect this to happen anytime soon. Some expect a peaceful evolution, guided by a self-consciously reformist government and promoted by business interests, whose influence is growing rapidly. Still others, however, see little if any prospect of democratization, and fear that China will descend into chaos once people decide that they can no longer put up with the communist dictatorship. Within China itself, on the other hand, the prevailing view among intellectuals close to the regime is that the country will remain stable if the government maintains a tight grip on power as fundamental economic and social changes proceed. Those who take this view fear that if the state does try to conduct political reform, the process will surge out of control and bring chaos.

Although China seems to be coming to a crossroads of some sort, it is difficult to predict exactly what lies in store. Yet we can predict certain possible outcomes, and describe the conditions under which each is most likely to occur. In essence, the possibilities are three: recrudescent dictatorship, chaos, and democratization. The first I would rate as distinctly possible, the second as unlikely, and the third as most likely of all.

Over the past ten years, China has changed its communist ideology, but kept the dictatorial regime that went with it. Nonetheless, economic reforms, sweeping social changes, and rising official corruption have all helped greatly to weaken the state’s actual control. The full-blown dictatorship of a single all-powerful leader may have passed away for good with the death of Deng Xiaoping. His successor Jiang Zemin is relatively weak in terms of personal connections and credibility, has no cohesive social class or set of interests behind him, and enjoys only a rather limited degree of power and legitimacy. Indeed, Jiang has no shortage of potential challengers, and must act carefully in order to ensure his political survival. On a broader level, few Chinese want the old order back, and the state itself is pushing political, legal, and administrative reforms with an eye to giving itself more flexibility and efficacy under the new conditions.

Since the mid-1980s, many Chinese intellectuals have been discussing the possibility of the emergence of a collective dictatorship in the post-Deng era. Their argument is that a small group of leaders, recognizing a common interest in the maintenance of order, would cooperate to achieve a balance of power among themselves, thus promoting stability. In an era of drastic change, however, it will be very difficult to establish or preserve a diverse yet stable and united leadership group. The prerequisites are missing. Twenty years of reform, corruption, and power struggles have destroyed the supremacy of communism as an ideology and weakened the party’s political machine. Furthermore, China is not the closed society it once was. The public is able to get news and information from outside official channels, even though open discussion of some issues is still prohibited.

Although no signs of a return to full-blown dictatorship are currently in evidence, such a development is not utterly impossible. Political reform has yet to become systematic or institutionalized. The party-state may be weak due to inefficiency, but in principle its power remains unlimited. If certain conditions arise, Jiang Zemin may receive a chance to set up a personal dictatorship. The Fifteenth Party Congress, held in September 1997, leaves one with two strong impressions: 1) Although Jiang has no clear vision of how to promote China’s progress, he is skilled at accumulating power. He readily and adroitly broke promises and played the “dirty game” of party infighting in order to outmaneuver his rivals. 2) In the minds of China’s...