Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (review)

Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. By Amy B. Zegart (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999) 317 pp. $45.00

Although Zegart believes in using history to explain the birth and life of national security institutions, this book is the work of a political scientist. Approximately 40 percent of the book is devoted to theory; the rest was written to prove her theory.

In Zegart's view, present theories are inadequate for the study of the national security agencies. Presenting her own theoretical framework, the author refutes the realists who, she argues, dominate the international-relations field. If realists are right, and states behave as rational actors, then national security agencies should also be designed rationally so that they might properly serve the state. But from their inception, the national security agencies created by the 1947 National Security Act were flawed "by design."

Zegart turns to a "modified new institutionalist framework" for her theoretical base (9). New Institutionalism theory begins with the premise that studying the origins and policies of institutions can illuminate their influence. However, she notes, this theory, primarily directed toward domestic agencies, is inapplicable to national security agencies. Thus, she modifies the theory by "transforming New Institutionalism into a National Security Model" (41).

To test her model, she analyzes the origins of three national security agencies: the National Security Council (nsc), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (jcs), and the Central Intelligence Agency (cia). Her book is based upon secondary sources, some government documents, and interviews with forty-eight individuals, twenty-eight of whom chose to remain anonymous.

Discussing the "flaws," Zegart emphasizes the point that no national security agency was designed to "serve the national interest" (52). She points to the effort of James Forrestal to protect the navy rather than create a strong nsc. But Forrestal defended the position of the navy because he was convinced he was acting in the national interest. Similarly, in weakening the coordinating capacity of the cia, the military services may have genuinely been concerned about civilian control over military intelligence. The assumption that during the creation of these agencies, no one cared about the national interest represents today's cynical view of executive agencies, not necessarily the historical context of fifty years ago.

Zegart proves that the national security agencies are flawed but fails to convince that they were flawed "by design." "History" is used only to verify her model. As a result, her conclusions are shallow, derivative, and lacking in context. Zegart could benefit from reading more history and less theory.

Anna Kasten Nelson
American University

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