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International Security 26.4 (2002) 196-201



[Access article in PDF] Correspondence

Limited National and Allied Missile Defense

Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter

[To the Editors]

The Authors Reply:

We agree with many of the points that James Lindsay and Michael O'Hanlon make in their response to our article. Where we disagree, it is mostly on judgments of the likelihood of various scenarios and the perceptions of future leaders of the value of missile defense systems that now exist only on paper. On the broad spectrum of opinion that defines current U.S. debate over national missile defense—from complete opposition to support for full-scale deployment of a multilayer NMD designed to undermine Russian and Chinese nuclear retaliatory capabilities—our policy conclusions are fairly close to theirs. 1 There are, however, differences in both our analysis and our conclusions that are worth exploring. [End Page 196]

Deterrence

Lindsay and O'Hanlon argue that we have underestimated the probability that the United States will fail to deter a missile attack by a rogue state, and therefore that we undervalue the expected benefits of NMD. At the danger of oversimplification, the challenge posed by Lindsay and O'Hanlon is captured by the following scenario: Iraq acquires ICBMs and nuclear weapons; Iraq then invades Kuwait; in response, the United States decides to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein and his regime. 2 With his survival at stake, Saddam might believe that he has nothing to lose by launching his nuclear-armed ICBMs, making NMD necessary for protecting the United States. By focusing on a scenario that worries U.S. foreign policy experts and has driven U.S. conventional force planning, Lindsay and O'Hanlon's analysis makes more vivid the dangers and incentives that the United States would face. We agree that in this scenario, all else being equal, 3 the United States would be better off with NMD than without it.

This scenario is highly conditional, however, and the value of NMD is significantly lower than Lindsay and O'Hanlon imply. First, Iraq is not expected to acquire an ICBM for at least ten years, and possibly much longer. Moreover, it may take as long or longer for Iraq to acquire a nuclear weapon that is small and light enough to be carried on an ICBM. As illustrated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, significant political change can occur in a relatively short period—Saddam might no longer be Iraq's ruler, potentially reducing the country's desire for this combination of technologies. Although surprises are always possible, the delay and uncertainty in the emergence of the threat affords the United States an opportunity to defer a decision on deploying NMD, while pursuing research and development of the most promising technologies.

Second, although Iraq's acquisition of nuclear-armed ICBMs might increase its willingness to invade Kuwait, the United States could pursue a variety of conventional, nuclear, and diplomatic policies to reduce the probability of Iraqi nuclear aggression. 4 Many of these, including a declaration that made clear U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons in retaliation and efforts to ensure that Iraqi leaders knew that the United States had developed operational plans for their use, would be designed to reduce the counter-deterrent value of the Iraqi nuclear threat. They might therefore largely offset the advantages that Iraq had hoped its nuclear weapons would provide.

Third, and perhaps most important, a decision to invade Iraq and overthrow its regime is entirely under U.S. control. Lindsay and O'Hanlon may be correct that if Iraqi [End Page 197] or North Korean leaders once more invade their neighbors there would be a "compelling argument for overthrowing them." But if they have nuclear weapons, there would be an even more compelling case for not attempting to overthrow them. As Lindsay and O'Hanlon argue, a U.S. invasion of a rogue state is the scenario most likely to trigger missile attacks. Unless U.S. leaders are virtually certain that NMD would work perfectly, which they could not reasonably...

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