Abstract

Margaret Walker's Moral Understandings offers an "expressive-collaborative," culturally situated, practice-based picture of morality, critical of a "theoretical-juridical" picture in most prefeminist moral philosophy since Henry Sidgwick. This essay compares her approach to ethics with that of John Rawls, another exemplar of the "theoretical-juridical" model, and asks how Walker's approach would apply to several ethical issues, including interaction with (other) animals, social reform and revolution, and basic human rights.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1527-2001
Print ISSN
0887-5367
Pages
pp. 141-155
Launched on MUSE
2002-01-01
Open Access
No
Archive Status
Archived 2009
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