Commemorating Malikiyya: Political Myth, Multiethnic Identity and the Making of the Lebanese Army

Preface

The convoluted process of state building in Lebanon since its independence in the mid-1940s, and in particular the formation, disintegration and revitalization of its formal institutions before, during and after the 1975-1990 civil war, raise some intriguing questions: How did state institutions in Lebanon, all established under the aegis of the French Mandate (1922-1945), manage to become national institutions, i.e. to acquire legitimacy in the eyes of members of the many ethnic groups, large families (or: clans) and regions that comprise its society, and to win prestige in the regional, i.e. inter-Arab, arena? To what extent were these institutions able to bring together members of these disparate groups and meet challenges and demands put forward by their spokesmen and why did they fall apart after the outbreak of civil war? Finally, how did the state and its institutions manage to survive the long and devastating conflict despite their near-paralysis, and how can their outstanding ability to reassert themselves after its end be explained?

In this respect, the Lebanese army is a case in point. Originating in units of local volunteers set up during World War I as an auxiliary force for the French colonial army, it was soon entrusted with the duty of maintaining order within the independent Lebanese state and, to a lesser extent, of defending it against external aggression. Dominated by members of the Christian communities, the army faced growing demands for greater Muslim representation, and later became the focus of internal and external pressures concerning the presence and actions of the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon. When civil war broke out in 1975, its units began to disintegrate along communal and regional lines, and it could no longer restore order or serve as a mediator, arbiter or "holder of the balance" of the political system, as it had done earlier with considerable success. Yet despite its near-paralysis throughout the conflict, the Lebanese army did manage to survive, and two attempts to reconstruct it took place in 1977-1979 and again in 1982-1984. Since 1990, once the civil war in Lebanon finally ended, this institution was revitalized with Syrian support and Western aid and is now considered to be the mainstay of its new political order.

This article, which aims to highlight some hitherto overlooked elements of the process of state building in Lebanon, focuses on the army as an important player in this endeavor, exploring its establishment, fragmentation and reconstruction. However, rather than attempt to present a detailed account of the army's performance over the years, as done by previous works on this subject, particularly on the period 1945-1990, I have chosen to focus on the continuous efforts of its commanders to address three major dilemmas that they encountered by commemorating one event from its history: the battle of Malikiyya of 5-6 June 1948, which took place during the first Israeli-Arab war. My main argument will be that through the commemoration of this unique event, the army command endeavored to turn it into a myth and embed it in the collective memory of its officers and men. ¹ This was done in order to achieve three main objectives, all of which reflected present needs and circumstances: first, transforming combatants who formerly served in the Troupes Spéciales, the local auxiliary units of the French colonial army, into a Lebanese national army since the mid-1940s, by promoting a collective identity among them (a "foundation myth," or an "origin myth") ² ; second, according this newborn institution prestige and legitimacy that enabled it to play a moderating role domestically and abide by strict neutrality in the regional arena (what could be termed an "explanatory myth"); and, finally, keeping the army intact throughout the long and devastating civil war, thus enabling the Lebanese government to rebuild it so that it could assert itself once again in...