Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621: The Failure of Grand Strategy (review)

Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621: The Failure of Grand Strategy. By PAUL C. ALLEN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. Illustrations. Maps. Figures. Notes. Bibliography. Index. xvi, 335 pp. Cloth, $35.00.

Paul Allen's book is a meticulous reconstruction of the policies and actions taken by the Spanish monarchy during the reign of Philip III regarding struggles for power in Europe. Although Allen touches upon most aspects of Spain's European agenda he is particularly interested in Philip III's policies towards three of Spain's traditional enemies, namely, England, France, and the Dutch Republic. In each case, Allen documents important continuities between Philip III's policies and those of his father, Philip II. The author also demonstrates that Philip III advanced actions that in many ways challenged his father's agenda. He upheld the peace with France, a peace that lasted until the 1630s; he reached a peace agreement with England immediately following Queen Elizabeth's death in 1603; and he refused to organize new armadas against England or to help the Irish rebels. Most importantly, he consented to a 12-year truce with the Dutch Republic (1609-21), a polity that was formed after provincial elites successfully rebelled against Philip II's authority.

Although, as Allen claims, the tactical need to give the Spanish crown a military respite so that it could recover its former strength contributed to this pacifist strategy, the motives were more complex. Philip III and his principal minister, the duke of Lerma, were well aware of the support among the ruling elites for competing views regarding the proper Spanish role in international politics. In fact, despite his public display of support for his father's programs, Philip III's own feelings were closer to the policies put forth by those who criticized Philip II's "grand strategy." Both Philip III and Lerma believed that the Spanish crown's highest priority should be conservation rather than expansion. But even more important was their conviction that the ruler of the Spanish monarchy should act, first and foremost, as "the king of Spain" and not as a lieutenant of the Roman pope. The Spanish king's principal objective, they believed, was to protect Spain's interests while the defense of the Catholic orthodoxy and Catholics throughout Europe was a secondary priority. The Spanish crown could no longer afford to act as Europe's policeman, but instead had to choose its military interventions carefully, focusing on goals that were most likely to advance the monarch's interests in conserving his territories. These views meant that Spanish rulers should and could consider the possibility of abandoning territories that until then had been regarded as inalienable parts of the Spanish monarchy. It was this new approach to Spain's role in international affairs that made the approval of the Twelve Years Truce with the Dutch Republic possible following almost 40 years of costly conflicts.

In the end, however, these policies failed and beginning in 1618 Spain and other European polities became entangled in a global conflict lasting more than 30 years and ending with the loss of Spain's influence in Europe. Philip III's strategy failed not because it was poorly conceived or farfetched, but due to fatal mistakes in its implementation, opposition of a new generation of royal advisers who pressured the king to return to Philip II's "grand strategy," and international developments outside the control of the Spanish monarch, such as the increasing power and international ambitions of France and the Dutch Republic.

Regardless of what happened to Philip III's European strategy, Allen's book offers solid evidence for arguments that other historians have recently made about this period: both Philip III and Lerma were actively involved in finding solutions to conflicts that had been carried over from the reign of Philip II and in reappraising the...