publisher colophon

Footnotes

1. Shawn Bushway provided helpful comments for the discussion below.

2. For example, see Levitt (forthcoming).

3. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990).

4. Wilson (1995).

5. Wilson (1996: xiii).

6. Uggen (1994).

7. Lynch (1995).

8. UN (1999, p.43).

9. James Lynch (personal communication).

10. The 1995 figure was 1.8 (Registered Murders in the Netherlands, Press Release, CBS Voorburg-Statistics Netherlands, 14 July 1998, cited by www.csdp.org/factbook/thenethe.htm).

11. UN (1999).

12. Statistics Sweden (2000).

13. Bennett and Lynch (1990, p.155).

14. Field (1999, p.11).

15. Schneider and Enste (2000); Tanzi (1999); Becker (1965).

16. UN (1999).

17. Thoumi (1995). Since the mid-1990s it appears that the major drug trafficking enterprises, associated with Cali and Medellín, have been replaced by a larger number of smaller enterprises, numbering perhaps in the hundreds. However, this comes after the period covered by Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza.

18. MacCoun and Reuter (forthcoming).

19. Office of National Drug Control Policy (various issues).

1. This method was first proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995).

2. See, for example, the Monte Carlo evidence presented by Judson and Owen (1999).

3. See the Monte Carlo evidence presented by Kiviet (1995) and Judson and Owen (1999). Kiviet states, "We find that OLS has an impressingly small standard deviation, and therefore, when bias is moderate (which it is when the coefficient on the dependent variable is high), it has an attractive mean squared error" (1995, p. 70).

4. The same point is made by Bourguignon, who states that the coefficient on the Gini "becomes insignificant when a dummy variable is introduced for Latin America in the homicide regression" (1999, p. 22).

5. See Bourguignon (1999) for a formal model of this idea.

6. See, for example, Wilson (1987, 1996) on inner city violence in the United States; Levitt and Venkatesh (1998) on gang violence.

7. The countries included in the graph are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

8. This index, which was developed in a recent paper by Dahan and Gaviria (2000), is based on the correlation of schooling among teenage siblings: the higher this correlation, the lower the prospects of mobility.

9. Glaeser and others (1999) present experimental evidence showing that the available measures of social trust are indeed measures of trustworthiness.

References

Allan, Emilie Anderson, and Darrel J. Steffensmeier. 1989. "Youth, Underemployment, and Property Crime: Differential Effects of Job Availability and Job Quality on Juvenile and Adult Arrest Rates." American Sociological Review 54: 107-23.
Arellano, Manuel, and Stephen Bond. 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and Application to Employment Equations." Review of Economic Studies 58: 277-97.
Arellano, Manuel, and Olympia Bover. 1995. "Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-Components Models." Journal of Econometrics 68: 29-52.
Barro, Robert, and Jong-Wha Lee. 1996. "New Measures of Educational Attainment." Harvard University, Department of Economics. Mimeographed.
Becker, Gary S. 1965. "A Theory of the Allocation of Time." Economic Journal 75(299): 493-517.
———. 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." Journal of Political Economy 76: 169-217. Reprinted in Chicago Studies in Political Economy, edited by G.J. Stigler. University of Chicago Press, 1988.
———. 1993. "Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior." Journal of Political Economy 101: 385-409.
Bennett, Richard, and James P. Lynch. 1990. "Does a Difference Make a Difference? Comparing Cross-National Crime Indicators." Criminology 28: 153-82.
Blumstein, Alfred. 1995. "Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry." Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 86(1): 10-36.
Blumstein, Alfred, and Richard Rosenfeld. 1998. "Explaining Recent Trends in U.S. Homicide Rates." Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 88(4): 1175-216.
Bourguignon, François. 1998. "Crime as a Social Cost of Poverty and Inequality: A Review Focusing on Developing Countries." Washington: World Bank. Mimeographed.
———. 1999. "Crime, Violence, and Inequitable Development." World Bank Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics. Washington.
Buvinic, Mayra, and Andrew Morrison. 1999. "Technical Notes: Violence Prevention." Washington: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Mimeographed.
Case, Anne C., and Lawrence F. Katz. 1991. "The Company You Keep: The Effects of Family and Neighborhood on Disadvantaged Youths." Working Paper 3705. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Chamberlain, Gary, 1984. "Panel Data." In Handbook of Econometrics vol. 2, edited by Z. Griliches and M. D. Intriligator. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Collier, Paul. 1998. "Social Capital and Poverty." Washington: World Bank, Development Economics Research Group. Mimeographed. [End Page 296]
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. "On the Economic Causes of Civil War." Oxford Economic Papers 50: 563-73.
Contreras, Dante. 1997. "What Do We Want to Measure: Inequality or Polarization?" Santiago: Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Ingenieria Comercial. Mimeographed.
Cruz, José Miguel, Alvaro Trigueros Argüello, and Francisco González. 2000. "El crimen violento en El Salvador: factores sociales y económicos asociados." San Salvador: World Bank and Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP).
Dahan, Momi, and Alejandro Gaviria. 2000. "Sibling Correlations and Social Mobility in Latin America." Economic Development and Cultural Change (forthcoming).
De Gregorio, José, and Jong-Wha Lee. 1998. "Education and Income Distribution: New Evidence from Cross-Country Data." Santiago: Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Ingenieria Industrial. Mimeographed.
Deininger, Klaus, and Lyn Squire. 1996. "A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality." World Bank Economic Review 10(3): 565-92.
DiIulio, John J. Jr. 1996. "Help Wanted: Economists, Crime and Public Policy." Journal of Economic Perspectives 10: 3-24.
Donohue, John J. 1998. "Understanding the Time Path of Crime." Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 88(4): 1423-51.
Easterly, William, and Ross Levine. 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions." Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 1203-50.
Ehrlich, Isaac. 1973. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation." Journal of Political Economy 81: 521-65.
———Ehrlich, Isaac. 1975a. "The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death." American Economic Review 65: 397-417.
———. 1975b. "On the Relation between Education and Crime." In Education, Income and Human Behavior, edited by F. T. Juster. McGraw-Hill.
———. 1981. "On the Usefulness of Controlling Individuals: An Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation and Deterrence." American Economic Review 71(3): 307-22.
Esteban, Joan-Maria, and Debraj Ray. 1994. "On the Measurement of Polarization." Econometrica 62(4): 819-52.
Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza, 1998. Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World: An Empirical Assessment. Washington: World Bank (www.worldbank.org/laccrime).
———. 1999. "Inequality and Violent Crime." Washington: World Bank. Mimeographed (www.worldbank.org/laccrime).
———. 2000. "What Causes Violent Crime?" European Economic Review, forthcoming. [End Page 297]
Farrington, David P. 1986. "Age and Crime." In Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research, vol. 7, edited by Michael Tonry and Norval Morris, 189-241. University of Chicago Press.
Farrington, David, and others. 1986. "Unemployment, School Leaving and Crime." British Journal of Criminology 26: 335-56.
Field, Simon. 1999. Trends in Crime Revisited. Research Study 195. London: Home Office.
Fleisher, Belton M. 1966. "The Effect of Income on Delinquency." American Economic Review 56: 118-37.
Fox, James Alan, and Marianne W. Zawitz. 2000. Homicide Trends in the United States. Washington: Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Freeman, Richard. 1986. "Who Escapes? The Relation of Churchgoing and Other Background Factors to the Socioeconomic Performances of Black Male Youths from Inner-City Tracts." In The Black Youth Employment Crisis, R. Freeman and H. Holzer. University of Chicago Press.
———. 1991. "Crime and the Employment of Disadvantaged Youths." NBER Working Paper 3875. Reprinted in Drugs, Crime and Social Isolation: Barriers to Urban Opportunity, edited by A. Harrell and G. Peterson. Urban Institute Press.
———. 1994. "Crime and the Job Market." Working Paper 4910. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
FUNSALUD (Fundación Mexicana para la Salud). 2000. "Trends and Empirical Causes of Crime in Mexico." Washington: World Bank. Mimeographed (www.worldbank.org/laccrime).
Gaviria, Alejandro, and Carmen Pagés. 1999. "Patterns of Crime Victimization in Latin America." Washington: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Mimeographed.
Glaeser, Edward. 1999. "An Overview of Crime and Punishment." Washington: World Bank. Mimeographed.
Glaeser, Edward, Daniel Kessler, and Anne Morrison Piehl. 1998. "What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of Drug Offenders and Concurrent Jurisdiction." Working Paper 6602. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Glaeser, Edward, and Bruce Sacerdote. 1999a. "Why Is There More Crime in Cities?" Journal of Political Economy 107: S225-58.
———. 1999b. "The Determinants of Punishment." Harvard University, Department of Economics. Mimeographed.
Glaeser, Edward, Bruce Sacerdote, and José Scheinkman. 1996. "Crime and Social Interactions." Quarterly Journal of Economics 111: 507-48.
Glaeser, Edward, and others. 1999. "What Is Social Capital? The Determinants of Trust and Trustworthiness." Working Paper 7216. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research. [End Page 298]
Glueck, Sheldon, and Eleanor Glueck. 1950. Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency. Harvard University Press.
———. 1968. Delinquents and Nondelinquents in Perspective. Harvard University Press.
Gottfredson, Michael R. 1985. "Youth Employment, Crime, and Schooling." Developmental Psychology 21, 419-32.
———. 1986. "Substantive Contributions of Victimization Surveys." In Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research, vol. 7., edited by Michael Tonry and Norval Morris, 251-87. University of Chicago Press.
Gottfredson, Michael R., and Travis Hirschi. 1990. A General Theory of Crime. Stanford University Press.
Grogger, Jeffrey. 1991. "Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment." Economic Inquiry 29: 297-309.
———. 1997. "Market Wages and Youth Crime." Journal of Labor Economics 16(4): 756-91.
———. 1999. "Crack Cocaine and the Rise and Fall in Violence: An Economic Analysis." University of California, Los Angeles, Department of Policy Studies. Mimeographed.
Grogger, Jeffrey, and Mike Willis. 1998. "The Introduction of Crack Cocaine and the Rise in Urban Crime Rates." Working Paper 6353. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, Whitney Newey, and Harvey S. Rosen. 1988. "Estimating Vector Autoregressions with Panel Data." Econometrica 56: 1371-95.
Instituto Apoyo. 2000. "Criminal Violence: Studies in Latin American Cities—The Case of Peru." Washington: World Bank. Mimeographed (www.worldbank.org/laccrime).
International Centre for the Prevention of Crime. 1998. Crime Prevention Digest (www.crime-prevention-intl.org).
Judson, Ruth A., and Ann L. Owen. 1999. "Estimating Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide for Macroeconomists." Economics Letters 65: 9-15.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón. 1999. "Governance Matters." Washington: World Bank. Mimeographed.
Kiviet, Jan F. 1995. "On Bias, Inconsistency, and Efficiency of Various Estimators in Dynamic Panel Data Models." Journal of Econometrics. 68: 53-78.
LaFree, Gary. 1999. "A Summary and Review of Cross-National Comparative Studies of Homicide." In Homicide: A Sourcebook of Social Research, edited by M. Dwayne Smith and Margaret A. Zahn. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
Lederman, Daniel. 1999. "Crime in Argentina: A Preliminary Assessment." Washington: World Bank. Mimeographed (www.worldbank.org/laccrime).
Lederman, Daniel, Norman Loayza, and Ana María Menéndez. 2000. "Violent Crime: Does Social Capital Matter?" Washington: World Bank. Mimeographed (www.worldbank.org/laccrime). [End Page 299]
Leung, Siu Fai. 1995. "Dynamic Deterrence Theory." Economica 62: 65-87.
Levitt, Steven. 1996. "The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation." Quarterly Journal of Economics 111: 319-52.
———. 1997. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime." American Economic Review 87: 270-90.
———. 1998a. "Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce Crime: Deterrence, Incapacitation, or Measurement Error?" Economic Inquiry 36: 353-72.
———. 1998b. "Juvenile Crime and Punishment." Journal of Political Economy 106: 1156-85.
———. Forthcoming. "Alternative Strategies for Identifying the Link between Unemployment and Crime." Journal of Quantitative Criminology.
Levitt, Steven D., and Sudhir A. Venkatesh. 1998. "An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang's Finances." Working Paper 6592. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Loayza, Norman, and others. 1998. "A World Savings Database." Washington: World Bank, Policy Research Department. Mimeographed.
Londoño, Juan L., and Rodrigo Guerrero. 1999. "Violencia en América Latina: Epidemiología y Costos." Washington: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Mimeographed.
MacCoun, Robert, and Peter Reuter. Forthcoming. Drug War Heresies: Learning from Other Vices, Times and Places. Cambridge University Press
Mandel, Michael J., and others. 1993. "The Economics of Crime." Business Week (December 13).
Mathieson, D., and P. Passell. 1976. "Homicide and Robbery in New York City: An Economic Model." Journal of Legal Studies 6: 83-98.
Mauro, Paulo. 1995. "Corruption and Growth." Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(3): 681-712.
Mocan, H. Naci, and Daniel I. Rees. 1999. "Economic Conditions, Deterrence and Juvenile Crime: Evidence from Micro Data." Working Paper 7405. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Muller, Edward, and Mitchell Seligson. 1994. "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships." American Political Science Review 88: 635-52.
Neapolitan, Jerome L. 1997. Cross-National Crime: A Research Review and Sourcebook. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
Newman, Graeme, ed. 1999. Global Report on Crime and Justice. Oxford University Press.
Piquet, Leandro. 2000. "Violent Crime in Latin American Cities: Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo." Washington: World Bank. Mimeographed (www.worldbank.org/laccrime). [End Page 300]
Posada, Carlos E. 1994. "Modelos económicos de la criminalidad y la posibilidad de una dinámica prolongada." Planeación y Desarrollo 25: 217-25.
Posner, Richard A. 1995. "What Do Judges Maximize?" In Overcoming Law. Harvard University Press.
Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press.
Rubio, Mauricio. 1997. "Perverse Social Capital: Some Evidence from Colombia." Journal of Economic Issues 31: 805-16.
Sah, Raaj K. 1991. "Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime." Journal of Political Economy 99: 1272-95.
Schmidt, Peter, and Ann Dryden Witte. 1984. An Economic Analysis of Crime and Justice: Theory, Methods, and Applications. Academic Press.
Schneider, Friederich, and Dominik H. Enste. 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences." Journal of Economic Literature 38 (Spring).
Soares, Rodrigo Reis. 1999. "Development, Crime and Punishment: Accounting for the International Differences in Crime Rates." University of Chicago. Mimeographed.
Statistics Sweden. 2000. Sweden in Figures, 2000 (www.scb.se/publkat/allman/Sweden.pdf).
Tanzi, Vito. 1999. "Uses and Abuses of Estimates of the Underground Economy." Economic Journal 109(456): 338-47.
Tauchen, Helen, Ann Dryden Witte, and Harriet Griesinger. 1994. "Criminal Deterrence: Revisiting the Issue with a Birth Cohort." Review of Economics and Statistics 76: 399-412.
Thoumi, F. 1995. Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press.
Trumbull, William. 1989. "Estimations of the Economic Model of Crime Using Aggregate and Individual Level Data." Southern Economic Journal 94: 423-39.
Uggen, Christopher. 1994. "Innovators, Retreatists, and the Conformist Alternative: A Job Quality Model of Work and Crime." Unpublished paper. University of Wisconsin, Madison.
UN (United Nations). Various issues. United Nations Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (www.ifs.univie.ac.at/uncjin2/mosaic/wcs.htm).
U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy. Various issues. National Drug Control Strategy.
Vélez, Luis F., and others. 2000. "Victimización en Colombia: Un análisis exploratorio del caso de la ciudad de Cali." Washington: World Bank. Mimeographed (www.worldbank.org/laccrime).
Viscusi, W. Kip. 1986. "Market Incentives for Criminal Behavior." In The Black Youth Employment Crisis, edited by Richard B. Freeman and Harry Holzer. University of Chicago Press. [End Page 301]
WHO (World Health Organization). Various issues. World Health Statistics Annual.
Wilson, William Julius 1987. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy. University of Chicago Press.
———. 1996. When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor. Random House.
Witte, Ann Dryden. 1980. "Estimating the Economic Model of Crime with Individual Data." Quarterly Journal of Economics 94: 57-87.
Witte, Ann Dryden, and Helen Tauchen. 1994. "Work and Crime: An Exploration Using Panel Data." Public Finance 49: 155-67.
World Bank. 1993. World Development Report. Washington. [End Page 302]

Footnotes

1. International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (1998, chap. 3, p. 5).

2. Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (1998, pp. 11-15).

3. New York Times and CBS poll, quoted in Blumstein (1995, p. 10).

4. International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (1998, chap. 3, p. 2).

5. Polls conducted by Latino Barómetro, quoted in Londoño and Guerrero (1999, p. 6).

6. See Buvinic and Morrison (1999, technical note 4).

7. Glaeser (1999, p. 19).

8. International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (1998, chap. 2, p. 3).

9. World Bank (1993).

10. Buvinic and Morrison (1999, technical note 4).

11. Mandel and others. (1993).

12. International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (1998, chap. 2, p. 3).

13. Londoño and Guerrero (1999, p. 27).

14. Alternatively, in explaining the intangible costs of crime, the cumulative effect of relatively high levels of crime over a long period of time may be more important than the levels of crime at a given point in time. Thus the costs of crime could grow even in the context of stable or declining crime rates.

15. An approach that has not been applied to date in Latin America is that of using so-called hedonic estimates of housing prices to measure the economic costs of crime. In the United States, results from studies of this type indicate that a doubling of crime rates could lead to a reduction of 8 to 12.5 percent in real estate costs (Buvinic and Morrison, 1999). One advantage of these studies is that they generate estimates of the value of marginal reductions in the level of crime, as opposed to accounting estimates of the total costs of crime (Glaeser, 1999, p. 20). Indeed, the former may be most useful from a practical point of view, since most policy measures will not lead to a complete eradication but rather to marginal reductions of the level of crime.

16. Londoño and Guerrero (1999, p. 22).

17. Londoño and Guerrero (1999, p. 26).

18. Becker (1968).

19. Becker (1993, pp. 385-86, emphasis in original).

20. Becker (1993, p. 390).

21. Ehrlich (1973); Mathieson and Passell (1976).

22. Ehrlich (1975a).

23. Ehrlich (1981, p. 311).

24. Ehrlich (1975a, 1981); Levitt (1998a).

25. Becker (1968, p. 178); Ehrlich (1973, p. 528). The standard assumption in theoretical models is to consider individuals who are risk averse, but who exhibit decreasing risk aversion with increasing income (Schmidt and Witte, 1984, p. 161).

26. Grogger (1991). This result is also supportive of the prevalence of the deterrent vis-à-vis the incapacitation effects of imprisonment.

27. Levitt (1996, 1997, 1998a).

28. Levitt (1996).

29. Prison overcrowding lawsuits have been filed in the United States since 1965 on the grounds of unconstitutional conditions in prisons. Levitt shows that the filing of prison overcrowding litigation leads to the lowering of prison population growth rates, even before the courts reach any decision. Moreover, the status of prison overcrowding litigation is shown to be unrelated to previous crime rates.

30. Levitt (1997).

31. Levitt (1998a).

32. Posner (1995).

33. Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999b).

34. Glaeser, Kessler, and Piehl (1998).

35. Fleisher (1966); Ehrlich (1973).

36. Fleisher (1966) finds that a city's average family income has a negative effect on the arrest rates of young males, while Ehrlich (1973) finds that states with higher median family incomes have higher rates of violent and property crimes.

37. Fleisher (1966) measures income inequality as the difference between the average income of the second lowest quartile and the highest quartile of households, whereas Ehrlich (1973) uses the percentage of families below one-half of the median income.

38. Ehrlich (1973) assumes that the median income for the state is a good proxy for the payoffs from crime—the "opportunities provided by potential victims of crime"—while legitimate opportunities available to potential offenders may be approximated by the mean income level of those below the state's median income.

39. Fleisher (1966); Ehrlich (1973). In the words of Fleisher, "in attempting to estimate the effect of income on delinquency, it is important to consider the effects of both normal family incomes and deviations from normal due to unemployment" (1966, p. 121).

40. See the literature review in Freeman (1994). Two notable exceptions are Witte (1980) and Trumbull (1989). Trumbull's analysis is based on county-level data from North Carolina, while Witte follows a sample of North Carolina men released from prison.

41. Tauchen, Witte, and Griesinger (1994, p. 410).

42. Grogger (1997).

43. Grogger (1997). The author's econometric results on the youth wage-crime relation also help explain racial differences in rates of crime participation and the age distribution of crime.

44. Freeman (1991, p. 6).

45. Ehrlich (1975b).

46. Ehrlich (1975b, pp. 319-35).

47. Witte and Tauchen (1994). The same finding is reported in Tauchen, Witte, and Griesinger (1994, p. 410), who find a negative relation between crime and the variables for the amount of time spent at work and at school, but no significant effect from educational attainment on arrest rates. Moreover, the coefficients for the time spent at work and at school are not significantly different from one another. This finding is also present in Farrington and others (1986); Gottfredson (1985); Viscusi (1986).

48. Dilulio (1996, pp. 20-21).

49. Putnam (1993, p. 173).

50. Freeman (1986).

51. Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999a, p. S253).

52. Case and Katz (1991).

53. Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996, p. 512).

54. Sah (1991, p. 1282).

55. Blumstein (1995).

56. Grogger and Willis (1998).

57. Blumstein and Rosenfeld, (1998); Grogger (1999). Grogger (1999) argues that the costs of entry in the market for illegal drugs increased with the escalation of violence that accompanied the introduction of crack cocaine. This would have shifted the supply curve for illegal drugs upward, which would explain the reversal in drug-related violence.

58. Levitt (1998b) shows that juvenile crime is at least as responsive to criminal sanctions as is adult crime; Grogger (1997) shows that when deciding to participate in crime, youth do take into account the level of legitimate wages; and Mocan and Rees (1999) find that juvenile crime responds to arrest rates and to local economic conditions.

59. Gottfredson (1986, p. 257).

60. Gottfredson (1986, p. 256).

61. Cruz, Trigueros Argüello, and González (2000, p. 14).

62. Fox and Zawitz (2000, p. 1).

63. Glaeser (1999, p. 26).

64. Newman (1999, p. 25).

65. Glueck and Glueck (1950, 1968).

66. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990, p. 221). Cruz, Trigueros Argüello, and González (2000) use prison survey data to study the factors that make some criminals more violent than others.

67. Farrington (1986, p. 212). Panel data also provide the researcher with a means of controlling for reverse causality and other sources of endogeneity in the explanatory variables.

68. Freeman (1994, p. 10). These studies have often found that crime rates are negatively related to the contemporaneous unemployment rate but positively related to the first lag of this variable, which has been interpreted as reflecting, respectively, the effects of reduced criminal opportunities and reduced opportunity costs of crime.

69. This section draws heavily on Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (1999, 2000), and Lederman, Loayza, and Menéndez (2000).

70. For details on definitions and sources of crime data and other variables, see table A1 in the appendix.

71. Soares (1999).

72. Donohue (1998, p. 1425).

73. Newman (1999), statistical appendix.

74. To control for quality we excluded countries that had tenfold or greater increases in the reported number of crimes from one year to another. The presumption underlying this criterion is that such large jumps in the series could only be due to changes in definitions or reporting standards. For more detailed information on how the data was cleaned up, see the appendix in Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (1998).

75. The basic WHO regression sample comprises twenty OECD countries, ten Latin American countries, five Caribbean countries, four East Asian countries, three eastern European and central Asian countries, and three African and Middle Eastern countries.

76. The GMM estimator was developed by Chamberlain (1984); Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988); Arellano and Bond (1991); Arellano and Bover (1995).

77. For a more complete exposition of the GMM dynamic panel methodology, see Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (2000).

78. Arellano and Bond (1991).

79. Ehrlich (1975b).

80. See Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996).

81. See Leung (1995).

82. See Sah (1991); Posada (1994).

83. An alternative explanation is that economic conditions may have a cognitive impact on individuals by affecting their moral values or tolerance for crime.

84. Ehrlich (1973, pp. 538-40).

85. Bourguignon (1998, p. 2).

86. Neapolitan (1997); LaFree (1999).

87. Soares (1999).

88. See Fajnzylber, Loayza, and Lederman (2000). Although the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients for the key crime determinants are robust, their magnitude is not very stable in different regressions. This is hardly surprising given that, first, the samples across regressions are not the same and, second, we estimate the coefficients using an instrumental-variable approach.

89. Some countries changed their stance toward the death penalty between 1970 and 1994; therefore, the death-penalty indicator used in the regressions ranges between 0 and 1.

90. Lack of data prevents us from controlling directly for the joint endogeneity of the drug-related variables, as we do in the case of our core economic variables. We use them as country averages (that is, without time variation) to minimize their within-country endogeneity with crime rates. In the case of the dummy for drug-producing countries, the production of illegal drugs responds mostly to climatic characteristics (such as abundant rain in the forests of Colombia and Bolivia) and geographic location (such as the proximity of Mexico to the United States, with its high demand for drugs). Thus this variable is not driven by prevalent crime rates in the country. At any rate, we recognize that we do not control for potential between-country endogeneity of the drug-producers dummy or the drug-possession crimes rate.

91. See Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996); Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999a).

92. See, for example, Blumstein and Rosenfeld (1998).

93. De Gregorio and Lee (1998).

94. Esteban and Ray (1994); Collier and Hoeffler (1998).

95. Esteban and Ray (1994).

96. See Contreras (1997).

97. See Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (1999) for details about the construction of the polarization index.

98. Mauro (1995); Easterly and Levine (1997); Collier and Hoeffler (1998).

99. Although the inequality result is maintained even after controlling for income polarization and ethnic division, we acknowledge that social mobility is another potentially important variable, one that is omitted here. We thank Alejandro Gaviria for pointing this out. Unfortunately, as far as we know, there is no internationally comparable data set with indicators of social mobility.

100. See Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996).

101. Dilulio (1996).

102. Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999a).

103. Rubio (1997).

104. The World Values Survey is coordinated by the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.

105. Muller and Seligson (1994).

106. See Collier (1998).

107. As with crime rates, we express the social capital indicators in natural logarithms. Since these indicators are given in different units, it is necessary to express them in logs to be able to compare their coefficients and interpret them as the effect on crime rates of (approximately) a percentage change in each indicator.

108. Glaeser and others (1999, p. 5) point out that their results, which are based on an experiment conducted on a sample of Harvard undergraduates, show that "while trust survey questions [such as the one from the WVS] are bad at predicting the levels of trust, they may be good at predicting the overall level of trustworthiness in a society." If these results were applicable to our sample of countries, then our results would need to consider the conceptual difference between trust (defined by Glaeser and others as "the commitment of resources to an activity where the outcome depends on cooperative behavior") and trustworthiness (defined as "behavior that increases the returns to people who trust you"). At the national level, however, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between these two concepts, because having a large number of people with trust must be highly correlated with the level of trustworthiness.

109. Soares (1999).

110. Kaufmann, Kray, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999).

111. See the case studies financed by the World Bank: Cruz, Trigueros Argüello, and González (2000); Funsalud (2000); Instituto Apoyo (2000); Piquet (2000); Vélez and others (2000). Some of the homicide rates cited here are disputed by alternative sources of information that are available in each city, and the studies cited contain detailed discussions about the alternative sources.

112. See Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999a); Gaviria and Pagés (1999).

113. For simple but formal theoretical models of the incentives to commit crimes, see Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (1998) and the appendix in Lederman, Loayza, and Menéndez (2000).

114. The case studies of Cali, San Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo also control for the individual's ethnic origin.

115. For Mexico City, see Funsalud (2000); for Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, see Piquet (2000); for San Salvador, see Cruz, Trigueros Argüello, and González (2000).

116. An alternative sociological explanation of this result is that employed individuals spend more time in public areas during their commute to and from the workplace than do unemployed individuals (see Piquet, 2000).

117. For Cali, see Vélez and others (2000); for Lima, see Instituto Apoyo (2000); for Mexico City, see Funsalud (2000); for Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, see Piquet (2000); for San Salvador, see Cruz, Trigueros Argüello, and González (2000).

118. For a discussion on how the public disclosure of information on crime and victimization can be used as a tool for fighting crime, see Lederman (1999).

Previous Article

Comments

Next Article

Comments

Additional Information

ISSN
1533-6239
Print ISSN
1529-7470
Pages
219-278, 296-302
Launched on MUSE
2000-10-01
Open Access
No
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.