It is clear that incumbency confers an increasing advantage in electoral competition across the region, an advantage that can be damaging to democracy when combined with an extended or even indefinite mandate for the executive. In times past this problem was thought of as peculiar to sub-Saharan Africa, if not exclusively so, rather than Latin America—with the scandalous exception of Alberto Fujimori in Peru. But times change. In Argentina, the Kirchners first tried to finesse term limits by passing the presidency between them and then, following the death of her husband, Néstor Kirchner, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner tried unsuccessfully to extend her mandate against the ruling of the judiciary. In Bolivia, Evo Morales persuaded the Constitutional Court not to count his first partial term on the grounds that the rules had changed in the interim, and few are convinced that he willingly will step down at the end of his current (second but, in fact, third) term. In Colombia, Álvaro Uribe Vélez tried for a third term, but was blocked by the independence of the Supreme Court. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa has easily persuaded a compliant Constitutional Court to wave through the abolition of term limits to allow him to run for office again in 2017 when his current term expires. Although the opposition is mobilizing around a referendum to stop him, the final decision will rest with the equally compliant National Electoral Commission. In Nicaragua, the opposition was complicit in Daniel Ortega’s power grab and the abolition of term limits in January 2014, just so long as its major figures could continue to pursue their business interests without interference. And notoriously, in Venezuela Hugo Chávez succeeded in extending the executive mandate indefinitely in 2009, a prerogative now enjoyed by his successor. All of this suggests that the continuity of the electoral cycle does not everywhere contribute to spreading democratic norms across the political system but, on the contrary, may lead to political polarization and a loss of system legitimacy. Indeed, the strength of the tendency has led to rather bizarre calls for democratic transitions to return government to a more procedurally constrained and openly competitive form of democracy. The problems of endemic corruption and radical and widespread citizen insecurity tend to go hand in hand, largely because both of them derive in large part from a lack of accountability in the democratic regimes of the region, and especially in their criminal justice systems. The evidence in support of this proposition is now overwhelming, and it finds further and ample confirmation in the chapters assembled here, demonstrating beyond doubt that these problems are ubiquitous, however much they may vary in degree and scope across national boundaries. Naturally, attention tends to be drawn to the most recent or notorious cases, whether in Argentina, Brazil,