Estimating the deterrent effect of incarceration using sentencing enhancements

DS Abrams - American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2012 - aeaweb.org
DS Abrams
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2012aeaweb.org
Increasing criminal sanctions may reduce crime through two primary mechanisms:
deterrence and incapacitation. Disentangling their effects is crucial for optimal policy setting.
I use sentence enhancements due to the introduction of state add-on gun laws to isolate the
deterrent effect of incarceration. Using cross-state variation in the timing of law passage
dates, I find that the average add-on gun law results in a roughly 5 percent decline in gun
robberies within the first 3 years. This result is robust to a number of specification tests and …
Abstract
Increasing criminal sanctions may reduce crime through two primary mechanisms: deterrence and incapacitation. Disentangling their effects is crucial for optimal policy setting. I use sentence enhancements due to the introduction of state add-on gun laws to isolate the deterrent effect of incarceration. Using cross-state variation in the timing of law passage dates, I find that the average add-on gun law results in a roughly 5 percent decline in gun robberies within the first 3 years. This result is robust to a number of specification tests and does not appear to be associated with large spillovers to other types of crime. (JEL K14, K42)
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